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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from orders and judgment of the Second District Court, which is
a court of record, and the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction,
so this Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the district court err in ruling that Defendant Thomas' actions were not

sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, where, as Plaintiff Kipp Cabaness' ("Kipp") supervisor at Bountiful
Power, Thomas (a) ridiculed and demeaned him, (b) intentionally pressured him and his
crew to shortcut safety procedures, (c) threatened to terminate them for his own
enjoyment, (d) required them unnecessarily to perform dangerous work in hazardous
conditions, (e) required one of Kipp's crew to risk his life by using a jackhammer to
remove concrete from a conduit of energized primary electrical distributor lines,
(f) kneed an employee in the groin in Kipp's presence, (g) publicly disparaged Kipp and
others frequently about their personal and confidential issues to break them down
mentally, (h) specifically targeted Kipp at an employee meeting following his return from
6 weeks of medical absence, knowing of his fragile emotional health, and (i) 13 of 15
Bountiful employees quit between summer 2003 and spring 2004, citing Thomas' abuse
as the sole reason?

1

This issue was preserved in the trial court. PL's Mem. Opp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.
at PL's Statement of Facts Nos. 13-28, 31-36, 41-46, 54-55, 63, (R. at 2346-50, 2352-81,
2420-22, 3641-46, 3657-59, 4006).
Standard of Review: Correctness, Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008
UT 31,15; Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 19.
II.

Did the district court err in ruling that sections 406, 408, and 508 of the

City's Employee Manual failed to create an implied contract between Kipp and the City,
where (a) Kipp knew of those provisions prohibiting hostile working conditions and
expected the City to comply with them, (b) Kipp considered those sections to be a
contract or agreement, (c) the City used and followed the Manual's provisions for
terminating and disciplining employees, (d) Defendants produced no evidence of the
City's argument made for the first time at oral argument that those provisions merely
stated policies, goals, and warnings, and (e) the Manual's limited disclaimer stated only
that "[n]o contract exists between Bountiful City and its employees with respect to
salary, salary ranges, movement with[inj salary ranges, or employee benefits," without
disclaiming or limiting its provisions or promises related to working conditions?
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. at 1380-81, 2382-88, 3654-55,
4000-05,4096-4104,4145-46, 4149-51,4385-93).
Standard of Review: Correctness. Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31 at f 5.
III.

Did the trial court err in excluding the affidavits of Kenneth Mears and

Bonnie Quinn as untimely, where (a) the City asserted for the first time at oral argument
that it intended the Manual only as a statement of policies, goals, and warnings, (b) the
2

City had not argued the issue of intent in any of its memoranda nor submitted any
supporting evidence, but had argued in its memoranda only (i) governmental immunity
and (ii) that the Manual's limited disclaimer prevented formation of a contract, and
(c) Kipp did not produce the affidavits earlier because the issue had not been raised?
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. at 4564-65).
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 21.
IV-

Did the trial court err in holding that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) bars

Kipp's claim for breach of implied contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because "the alleged injury arose out of the alleged infliction of mental anguish"?
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. at 2388-90, 3578, 3622-24, 3630,
3638-39, 3655, 4380-85).
Standard of Review: Correctness. Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31 at f5.
V.

Did the trial court err when it determined that, since there was no implied

contract, there could be no covenant of good faith and fair dealing and, therefore, refused
to address whether emotional distress damages were recoverable under claims for breach
of implied contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
This issue was preserved below. (R. at 2382-88, 2409-14, 3638, 3655, 4000-05).
Standard of Review: Correctness. Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31 at f 5.
VI.

Did the district court err when it ruled that Kipp's wrongful termination

claim was a tort barred by the Governmental Immunity Act rather than a contract action?
This issue was preserved below. (R. at 2388-97, 3638-40, 3655-56, 4380-85).
Standard of Review: Correctness. Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31 at f 5.
3

VII. Did the district court err when it held that Kipp's wrongful termination
claim was duplicative of his claims for breaches of implied contract and the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing where, in addition to sections 406,408, and 508, the City
failed to comply with sections 101, 105, 601-04, and 701 of its Manual?
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. at 3402-08, 3640, 3656, 3742).
Standard of Review: Correctness. Salt Lake City Mission, 2008 UT 31 at f 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (2003):

See Addendum..

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (2003):

See Addendum.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003):

See Addendum.

Bountiful City Personnel
Policies & Procedures Manual
§§ 101,105,406,408,508, 601-604,701:

See Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Kipp Cabaness ("Kipp") appeals the trial court's (i) summary judgment
ruling for Bountiful City and its employees, (ii) denial of Kipp's Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, and (iii) denial of Kipp's motion under Utah R.Civ.P. 59 and 60(b).
This action arises from Bountiful Power Superintendent Brent Thomas' extended
and pervasive abuse of Kipp. Thomas created a hostile work environment by intimidating
and bullying Bountiful Power employees into shortcutting safety procedures and
performing unsafe acts. Bountiful Power Director Clifford Michaelis condoned Thomas'
abusive conduct, and, when Kipp and others complained, he threatened to terminate
them. Thomas' abusive conduct, in combination with the stressful nature of Kdpp's work
4

on potentially lethal high-voltage lines, severely damaged Kipp's mental health and
caused him severe and undisputed mental and physical injuries.
Kipp commenced this action seeking economic and non-economic damages for
(i) Defendants' breaches of the City Employee Manual's implied contract mandating
working conditions that are free of hostility, intimidation, and abuse, (ii) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in those provisions, (iii) constructive and
wrongful termination, and (iv) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that a limited disclaimer in the
Manual prevented formation of an implied contract, and that Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act barred an action seeking damages for mental anguish.
Kipp filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that: (i) the Manual
created an implied contract between the City and its employees, (ii) the City owed him a
contractual duty to prevent harassment and abuse by his supervisor, (iii) consequential
damages for that breach of contract included emotional distress damages, (iv) Kipp either
complied with the City's internal grievance and appeals procedures or was excused from
doing so, and (v) Kipp's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was an ongoing
injury resulting from a continuing and unfolding pattern of abusive conduct.
Following briefing on these motions, the City argued for the first time at oral
argument that it did not intend the Manual to be a contract. However, the City produced
no evidence to support that argument.
The trial court erroneously reasoned that, in filing cross motions for summary
judgment, the parties had stipulated that all the necessary facts to rule on the existence of
5

an implied contract were before it—despite Defendants' concession at oral argument that
the existence of an implied contract is an issue of fact for the jury. The trial court granted
summary judgment, holding that the Manual created neither an implied contract nor a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Governmental Immunity Act barred Kipp's
wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and Thomas'
actions did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court discounted evidence
of (i) Thomas' abusive disregard of human life when on July 30, 2003 he ordered one of
Kipp's crew members to perform a life-threatening act and (ii) another incident on
September 9, 2003, when Kipp returned to work from a medical absence for workinduced depression and Thomas, knowing his mental vulnerability, publicly singled him
out, threatened to fire him, and ridiculed him about personal and confidential issues in
front of all employees. Rather than construing the evidence of these incidents in a light
most favorable to Kipp, the trial court improperly dismissed them.
Kipp filed a Rule 59 and 60(b) motion for relief from the trial court's ruling, with
affidavits from former City employees Bonnie Quinn and Kenneth Mears, who were
involved in creating and enforcing the Manual, testifying that the City Manager and City
Attorney had said that the City intended it to be a binding agreement, and that the City
had treated it as such, and an affidavit from psychologist Rick Hawks analyzing the
damaging effect of the September 9, 2003. The court struck the Quinn and Mears
affidavits and denied that motion. This appeal ensued.

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Beginning March 29, 1978, Defendant Bountiful City ("the City"),

specifically, Bountiful Light & Power Company ("Bountiful Power"), employed Kipp
Cabaness ("Kipp"), who became a foreman for one of the City's three power line crews
from August 1, 1984, through January 2, 2004. Aff. K. Cabaness at f 4 (R. at 1381).
2.

For at least the last 15 years of Kipp's employment, Defendant Clifford

Michaelis was Director of Bountiful Power, and Defendant Brent Thomas was
Superintendent of Operations. Id. at f 11 (R. at 1382).
3.

Thomas never has been a certified journeyman line worker, in contrast to

the foremen, including Kipp, who is certified as such. Dep. Thomas at 45:8-46:15, 52:1753:4 (R. at 1419-20); Dep. Michaelis at 21:12-22 (R. at 1842).
4.

The City's Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual ("the Manual")

promises and represents in §§ 406, 408, and 508 that harassment, threats, and
intimidation will not be tolerated, nor will a hostile work environment. See Addendum,
Manual at §§ 406 (R. at 1590), 408 (R. at 1592-93), 508 (R. at 1604-07).
5.

The Manual expressly disclaims creating any type of contract "with respect

to salary, salary ranges, movement with[in] salary ranges, or employee benefits," but it
makes no such disclaimer regarding the mandate in §§ 406,408, and 508's of a work
environment free of hostility, intimidation, and abuse. Manual at §101 (R. at 1565).
6.

Kipp believed the City had an obligation to comply with those provisions,

Aff. K. Cabaness at f 10, (R. at 1381), §§ 406, 408, and 508 (R. at 1590-93, 1604-07),
and, as Director, Michaelis was responsible to implement the Manual, including its
7

promises that the City would not tolerate harassment, intimidation and ridicule of
employees by supervisors or others. Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1861).
7.

In violation of those Manual provisions, Thomas created a hostile work

environment through harassment, demeaning comments, and other abuse of the workers
he supervised, including Kipp, and Michaelis knowingly tolerated and condoned that
abuse. Aff. K. Cabaness (R. at 1382-83), Aff. Hatch (R. at 1947), Aff. Hutchings (R. at
1952-53), Aff. Tuttle at 10-15 (R. at 1939-41), Dep. D. Fames (R. at 1508-12, 1514-22,
1528); Dep. Gines (R. at 2172, 2175-78); Dep. A. Fames (R. at 1546-47, 1550, 1554);
Dep. Bellon (R. at 1752-60, 1782-83); Aff. Knighton at H 7-9, 15, 18, 23 (R. at 2211).
8.

Former City employee Kenneth Mears, who was involved in creating and

enforcing the manual, testified:
Both the City Manager and the City Attorney advised me and the other
members of [the committee that wrote and edited provisions of the Manual]
that all of the provisions of the Manual including ... those provisions for
Work Environment, Work Place Violence, for Sexual and Other
Harassment, Employee Safety, ... Standards of Conduct, Disciplinary
Action, and termination would be implemented and enforced by City
management personnel, for the protection and benefit of City employees,
and that a City employee could be terminated for a violation of those
provisions as provided in Sections 500 (Standards of Conduct) et seq. and
Section 600 et seq. (disciplinary action) of the Manual. I was also advised
by the City Manager and the City Attorney that management personnel
were obligated to implement and enforce all of the provisions of the
Manual, for the protection and benefit of all of the City employees, and that
a failure of management personnel to comply with this obligation would be
grounds for termination of that individual.
Aff. Mears at f 14 (R. at 4144) (offered at 4140, stricken at 4564-65).
9.

Kipp daily worked with hazardous and potentially lethal power lines, under

Thomas' pressure to perform quickly and shortcut safety measures, which exacerbated
8

the hostile and abusive work environment Thomas created. Aff. Hawks at ff 8-19 (R. at
3906-10); Report Hawks at <H H.A.6., 7., and Observations 3-5 (R. at 3895-96, 3901).
10.

"The danger associated with the unsafe work environment substantially

influenced [Kipp's] depression and related emotional concerns to worsen during the last
few years of his employment." Report Hawks at Observation 4 (R. at 3901).
11.

Thomas' abuse took multiple forms, all of which were intended to

manipulate and control Kipp psychologically, often at the expense of his safety:
12.

Thomas constantly used verbal harassment, abuse, intimidation, ridicule

and gross profanity to manipulate and control power company employees through their
emotions and break them down mentally. Aff. Knighton at U 10, 15 (R. at 2213-14);
Dep. D. Fames 69:4-14, 72:10-73:13 (R. at 1519).
13.

Using profanity and cutting sarcasm, Thomas insulted and demeaned Kipp

throughout his entire career, calling him "dumbass," "jackass," and "shit for brains." (R.
at 2120, 2128); Report Hawks atffl II.A.6 (page 5) (R. at 3893).
14.

Thomas even verbally abused Kipp and other linemen over the radio, to the

point where, sometime in the late 1990s, a dispatcher, Richard Pierce, asked Thomas why
he treated them so badly. Thomas responded with more profanity, and an unusually
graphic obscene gesture. Dep. Cabaness at 72:9-73:16 (R. at 2129).
15.

To belittle Kipp and his crew, Thomas repeatedly ordered them to perform

unnecessary, laborious, and even hazardous tasks, solely to exercise power over them,
threatening to fire them if they did not obey. Id. at 36:1-38:22 (R. at 2120-21); Aff.
Knighton at f 10 (R. at 2213); Aff. Hatch at f 19 (R. at 1948).
9

16.

For example, sometime during the 1990s, after a car hit a power pole, all

three crews responded, and, under the direction of the three foremen, were safely setting
a new pole into the ground and restoring power while managing traffic. However, when
Thomas arrived, he intentionally created unnecessary and dangerous tension by
screaming at everyone to stop working and senselessly ordered them to re-arrange the
trucks, pounding on his chest and saying "I'm the captain," after which the foremen had
to settle everybody down so they could safely finish the dangerous task of getting the
power lines restored. Dep. Cabaness at 36:1-38:22. (R. at 2120 [reverse side]).
17.

On another occasion in the late 1990s or 2000, Kipp's and foreman Steve

Knighton's crews were installing underground electrical lines at Bountiful High School.
The foremen were supervising the job and had positioned the trucks and equipment
correctly when Thomas arrived and ordered Kipp to needlessly switch the locations of the
two trucks and pull the wire from the reverse side, just to make the crews obey him and
do additional work. When Knighton asked Thomas why he was making them move the
trucks and equipment that already had been positioned properly, Thomas told him and
Kipp that he was their boss, and if they didn't do it his way, he would create a paper trail
and fire them. Id. at 43:2-45:17 (R. at 2122); Dep. Bellon at 33:25-36:12 (R. atl758-61).
18.

Also in 2000 or 2001, Kipp and his crew were building a new mile-long

transmission line, which involved first putting each pole on a stand and "framing" it by
installing the insulators before setting it into the ground. Kipp and his crew had a pole
framed and were about to set it into the ground, when Thomas needlessly ordered them to
disassemble it and then frame another, identical pole to set in its place, just to make Kipp
10

and his crew do additional work. Dep. Cabaness at 53:14-55:4 (R. at 2125).
19.

As another example of intentionally belittling employees, Thomas dumped

out a bin of tools from Brent Turtle's work truck, scattered them onto the floor, and
ordered Tuttle to pick them up. Id. at 85:5-19. (R. at 2133).
20.

Thomas also tried to create tension and animosity by turning the crews

against each other. For example, in fall of 2003, after a crew had replaced an
underground electrical conduit that had been located incorrectly, when the crews returned
to the warehouse, Thomas blamed Tuttle for making a mistake and asked Kipp if he liked
having to redo Turtle's work; when Tuttle apologized, Thomas angrily told him he had a
bad attitude and threatened to write him up for it. Id. at 39:11 to 41:1. (R. at 2121-22).
21.

Thomas, for his own amusement, frequently threatened to fire employees to

intimidate them, remind them that he could control them, and create fear and tension. Aff.
Tuttle at ffll 1-12, 16 (R. at 1941-42); Aff. Knighton atffl 10-11 (R. at 2213); Dep. D.
Fames at 32:13-18, 79:3-80:15 (R. at 1509, 1521).
22.

On one occasion in the latter part of 1996 or early 1997, Thomas walked

up to a new employee, Don Hatfield, and said, "You're fired!" just to scare him and
watch his reaction. Dep. Cabaness at 77:16-78:2 (R. at 2131); Aff. Hatch atf 19 (R. at
1948); Dep. D. Fames at 29:20-31:19 (R. at 1521).
23.

Thomas regularly told Kipp, "You are lucky to have this job. If you don't

do what you are told, we can fire you," (R. at 2118-19), and criticized him publicly about
personal and confidential issues to humiliate and belittle him. Aff. Knighton at <|[10 (R. at
2213); Dep. D. Fames at 41:8-42:21; 81:10-82:8 (R. at 1512, 1522).
11

24.

In 2003, Thomas told Kipp, "You know what your problem is? It's your

wife. You need to get rid of your wife." Kipp tried to change the subject, but Thomas
kept repeating that statement. Dep. Cabaness at 67:18-69:9 (R. at 2128).
25.

Thomas also abused employees physically in front of Kipp and others,

including in 1999 when he kneed Steve Hutchings in the groin with such force that he
dropped to the floor, reeling in pain, after which Thomas said, "I guess I showed you who
is boss." Id. at 84:5-85:2 (R. at 2132-33); Aff. Hutchings at 1 7 (R. at 1952); Aff. Tuttle
at 114 (R. at 1941); Dep. D. Fames at 28:11-29:19 (R. at 1508).
26.

Thomas intentionally and cavalierly ordered Kipp and other employees to

perform unsafe acts. For example, in 1983, when Kipp was working on a pole with a
primary line of 7,200 volts, Kipp wanted to ground it before going up the pole to work,
which is the safe procedure. However, Thomas told Kipp there was not time and made
him go up the pole and work on it anyway. Kipp received a painful and anxietyproducing shock that scared him badly because he knew he could have been killed. Dep.
Cabaness at 81:11-82:3 (R. at 2132); Report Hawks atfj II.A.7 (R. at 3895-96).
27.

When a transformer caught fire at the hospital and was still smoking when

the crews arrived, Thomas just tapped it with his knuckle and told Kipp and his crew,
"All right, it's not hot, you guys are all right. Open the door and start doing your work in
there," when he knew it unsafe to do so. Dep. Cabaness at 78:9-79:6 (R. at 2131).
28.

During the late 1990s, when Kipp and the crews were working at 500 West

and 2600 South, they had to kill the power, "breaking the load" by removing three old
fuses, but lacked the right safety equipment. Nonetheless, Thomas ordered Gary Hatch to
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pull first one fuse and then another. Hatch knew the last fuse would have a heavy load
and did not want to pull it. Thomas, who is not a certified lineman, said there was no load
and pulled the fuse. It exploded. To a crew routinely working with high-voltage lines,
that explosion was extremely anxiety-producing. Id. at 79:19-81:7 (R. at 2131).
29.

Thomas also forced Kipp and his crew unnecessarily to do dangerous work

in rain, snow, and wind hundreds of times in Kipp's 25-year career, when it easily could
have been postponed and completed more safely. Thomas lightly dismissed their
concerns, saying "I bought you rain gear. Use it." Id. at 82:10-83:17 (R. at 2132).
30.

Each month when Kipp, as the Safety Director, held the required safety

briefings, Thomas sat in the back, pointing to his watch and saying "Let's go, let's go,
let's go," and then cut the meetings short of the time planned, saying "Let's go, we're
done, we need to go to work." Id. at 136:12-137:5 (R. at 2145).
31.

On July 30, 2003, as a show of power, intimidation, and control, Thomas

ordered Brent Turtle, a member of Kipp's close-knit crew, to use a jackhammer to
remove concrete from a conduit of live primary electrical distributors. Thomas knew the
act posed a serious, life-threatening risk. Although Turtle also knew the risk, he obeyed
out of fear he would be fired. Id. at 56:1-60:21 (R. at 2125-26); Aff. Turtle at 115 (R. at
1941-42); Aff. K. Cabaness at 131 (R. at 1392).
32.

Turtle broke through the conduit multiple times, narrowly missing the live

wires inside it; had he hit them, he likely would have been killed. Dep.Thomas at 170:1218 (R. at 1450); Aff. Turtle at 115 (R. at 1942); Aff. K. Cabaness at 131 (R. at 1392).
33.

Kipp was not present for the jackhammer incident but found out about it
13

from Gary Hatch, and it upset him greatly. Plaintiff described:
I was shocked and appalled. I started crying .... I was really worried
because they were my crew that actually did it .... It made me feel bad
inside because I didn't want nothing to happen to them .... I was wishing I
was there .... We were all in a brotherhood together. We were just all close.
They were like my family. Because of the situations with Cliff and Brent
we had to stick together. I wasn't surprised because Brent made us do that
before.
Report Hawks at f II.A.7. (R. at 3894-95).
34.

After Kipp learned about the jackhammer incident and returned to work, his

mental health worsened significantly. Aff. VanderMerwe at ff 7-9 (R. at 2052-54).
35.

As Safety Director, Kipp served with Greg Bellon, Jay Christensen, Kent

Servoss, Brian Smart and Brent Tuttle on the Safety Committee, which investigated the
jackhammer incident and issued reports on September 10 and 22, 2003. Aff. Kipp
Cabaness a t f l 9, 14 (R. at 1381, 1383); Dep. Bellon (R. at 1767-69).
36.

The Safety Committee concluded that Thomas was the site supervisor and

knew the concrete encased energized primary distribution conductors but ordered Tuttle
to jackhammer it anyway, and that Tuttle was extremely scared because of the danger and
should have stopped but, feeling intimidztted, obeyed Thomas. Reports of September 10
and 22, 2003 (R. at 2012, 2016).
37.

The Safety Committee cited Thomas with a "serious safety violation" for

ordering Tuttle to jackhammer over live primary distributors. Id. (R. at 2012, 2016).
38.

Michaelis told the committee he was "currently investigating the

accusations of intimidation" about Thomas, "according to Bountiful City policies and
procedures and ha[d] conducted interviews with affected Bountiful Power employees."
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Id. (R. at 2016).
39.

OSHA and the Utah Labor Commission also investigated the jackhammer

incident and found a "serious violation," concluding that "management directed a work
crew to use a jackhammer to break the concrete from around a buried conduit line which
was known to have live electrical conductors running through the conduit" and that it was
Thomas who had ordered Tuttle to do so. September 19, 2003, Report (R. at 2019, 2023).
40.

Due to medically-diagnosed work-related major depression, Kipp was off

work from July 23 to September 8, 2003. Aff. VandeMerwe at H 7-10 (R. at 2051).
41.

Michaelis and Thomas knew why Kipp missed work, and that he had

fragile mental health and was on antidepressants. Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1855).
42.

When Kipp returned from his medical absence, Thomas singled him out

and publicly humiliated him at an employee meeting on September 9, 2003, by
threatening to fire him and criticizing him about his personal issues in front of all the
employees. Id. (R. at 1867); Aff. Knighton at <H 7, 19 (R. at 2211, 2215); Dep. D. Fames
(R. at 1513-14); Aff. McComas at 1 9 (R. at 2031).
43.

Later in September 2003, as a result of the jackhammer incident

investigations, Michaelis formed an "executive committee" of himself, David Fames,
Alan Johnson, and Jay Christensen, to investigate the employees' complaints of
harassment and intimidation by Thomas. The committee interviewed 15 Bountiful Power
employees. Dep. D. Fames (R. at 1511); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1849-52); Michaelis
Outline for Exec. Comm., (R. at 2191); Aff. Knighton at <H 22-23 (R. at 2215-16).
44.

From those interviews, the committee learned that, for over a decade,
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Thomas regularly abused, intimidated, and harassed employees, creating a hostile and
intolerable working environment. He frequently threatened to terminate them, and they
felt their jobs were on the line every day. Dep. D. Fames (R. at 1511-12, 1517-24); Dep.
Michaelis (R. at 1852-59); Aff. Knighton (R. at 2216).
45.

That committee also learned that Michaelis knew of Thomas' abuse for

over a decade without taking any action to correct it. Michaelis' only response had been
to threaten to terminate any employees who complained again. Dep. D. Fames (R. at
1511-12, 1517-24); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1852-59, 1880); Aff. Knighton (R. at 2216).
46.

That committee learned that Thomas practiced "breaking people down

mentally" and that he had specifically targeted Kipp, Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1881-83);
Aff. Knighton at f 23 (R. at 2216), and that Thomas had threatened to fire any employees
who took complaints over his head. Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1889).
47.

On September 15, 2003, Michaelis wrote a letter to Thomas stating that he,

the OSHA inspector, and the Safety Committee "agree on the seriousness of the factor of
intimidation and, no matter how great a safety program we have, it failed us in this [the
jackhammer] incident," because Thomas intimidated the employees. Letter, (R. at 2038).
48.

In that letter, Michaelis told Thomas, "Your intimidation needs to stop,"

and said he had interviewed each employee who Thomas supervised, and they each
begged him to make Thomas change. Id. (R. at 2038).
49.

Michaelis also told Thomas that he would be forced into retirement if he

did not make a "life change," within 90 days, including eliminating employee
intimidation. Id. (R. at 2038); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1866, 1877-80).
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50.

The Safety Committee recommended that Thomas be given two days off

without pay, held in abeyance if he would write a letter acknowledging the seriousness of
the safety violation and set out what he would do to prevent similar problems. Report
dated September 10, 2003, (R. at 1826), Dep. Thomas (R. at 1496-98).
51.

However, those sanctions were not enforced. Thomas' response stated that

he "strongly disagrees with most of [the committee's] findings," and that he "ha[s] to
accept [his] part of the misconstrued facts that led to [the jackhammer] incident," Mem.
Sept. 17, 2003 (emphasis added) (R. at 1496-98), and he told the employees that he had
changed as much as he was going to change, and that he would change no further, stating,
"You can't change the spots on a dog." Dep. D. Fames at 68:11-69:4 (R. at 1518-19).
52.

As Director of Bountiful Power, Michaelis was responsible to implement

the Manual, and, where City employees besides Thomas were concerned, the City
followed its provisions for discipline and termination. Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1861); Aff.
Mears (R. at 4144-46); Aff. Quinn (R. at 4149-51) (both stricken at 4564-65).
53.

However, despite that responsibility, Michaelis did nothing to correct

Thomas' abusive conduct, but in fact tolerated and condoned it:
54.

As early as 1986, Cabaness informed City Councilman Harold Shatter

about Thomas' abusive conduct, and Shatter told him he would discuss Thomas'
behavior with Michaelis, but no action was taken. Aff. K. Cabaness at f 21 (R. at 1386).
55.

Michaelis acknowledged first receiving complaints about Thomas' abusive

treatment of employees as early as the late 1980s or early 1990s and that he received
similar complaints through 2003. Dep. Michaelis at 59:2-13, 69:5-22 (R. at 1851, 1854).
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56.

Prior to 1991, Bountiful Power employees began reporting to Michaelis

that Thomas was creating a hostile working environment through abuse, intimidation, and
harassment. Aff. Cabaness atfl 16 (R. at 1384-85); Aff. Tuttle at<H 12-13 (R. at 1941);
Aff. Hatch at 112 (R. at 1946-49); Aff. Hutchings atffl 10-11 (R. at 1951-53); Dep. D.
Fames (R. at 1510-11, 1514-15, 1528); Dep. A. Farnes, (R. at 1551).
57.

On January 17, 1994, twelve Bountiful employees reported Thomas'

abusive behavior to Michaelis. They reminded him of his obligation to provide a nonhostile work environment and told him he was failing to do so. After that meeting,
Thomas' abusive behavior and the hostile work environment persisted. Aff. K. Cabaness
at 123 (R. at 1387); Aff. Knighton at 113 (R. at 2214).
58.

Also in the early 1990s, the three line foremen (Kipp, Knighton, and David

Fames) met with Michaelis and complained that Thomas created a hostile work
environment by abusing, intimidating, and demeaning employees. Aff. K. Cabaness at
<H 13,16 (R. at 1382-85); Dep. D. Farnes (R. at 1510-12, 1514-15, 1528); Dep. A. Farnes
(R. at 1551); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1352-56); Aff. Knighton at 110 (R. at 2213).
59.

Following that meeting with Michaelis, Thomas' abusive conduct

worsened. Dep. D. Farnes (R. at 1513-15); Aff. Knighton atfK 10-15 (R. at 2213-14).
60.

The three foremen continued to complain to Michaelis about Thomas'

worsening conduct, and, in apparent retaliation for a complaint Kipp made in 1997,
Thomas wrote a letter to Kipp on or about July 14, 1997, unjustly threatening to
terminate him. Aff. K. Cabaness, at 119 (R. at 1385).
61.

On July 21, 1997, Kipp and his wife, Holly, met with Michaelis and told
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him about Thomas and the hostile work environment he created daily though profanity,
rage, intimidation, harassment, threats of termination, interference with safety, and
similar abuse. Id. (R. at 1380, 1386); Aff. H. Cabaness at f 10 (R. at 2003).
62.

On or about August 1, 1997, Kipp again told City Councilman Harold

Shafter about the abusive work environment Thomas continued to create, and Shatter
again told Kipp he would discuss that matter with Michaelis. However, Shafter did not
communicate any further with Kipp. Aff. K. Cabaness atf 21 (R. at 1386-87).
63.

On August 4, 1997, David Warden, M.D., diagnosed Kipp with depression

caused by an abusive boss and a hostile working environment, and he treated him with
antidepressants through June 1999. Notes of Dr. Warden (R. at 2041).
64.

Sometime between July 1997 and February 1998, the three foremen,

including Kipp, again met with Michaelis to complain about the hostile work
environment Thomas created through intimidation, harassment, verbal abuse, profanity,
and threats of termination. Aff. K. Cabaness at f 25 (R. at 1388); Dep. D. Fames (R. at
1515-16, 1521); Dep. A. Fames (R. at 1551); Dep. Bellon (R. at 1754-56, 1782-83); Dep.
Michaelis (R. at 1852-57); Aff. Knighton at ffl 16-17 (R. at 2214).
65.

During that meeting, Michaelis told the foremen to stop complaining about

Thomas and that he did not want to hear any more complaints. He threatened that if they
complained any more about Thomas, he would fire them and their linemen. Aff. K.
Cabaness at 125 (R. at 1387); Dep. D. Fames (R. at 1515-17); Dep. A. Fames (R. at
1552); Aff. Hatch a t ! 20 (R. at 1949); Aff. Tuttle atfll 12-13 (R. at 1941); Dep.
Michaelis (R. at 1852-55); and Aff. Knighton a t f l 16-17 (R. at 2214).
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66.

The foremen told the others about Michaelis' threats, and Michaelis told

Thomas that he warned the foremen not to complain about him again and had threatened
to terminate them. Aff. K. Cabaness a t i 13 (R. at 1382-83); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1855).
67.

After Michaelis told Thomas about the complaints, his abusive behavior

and the hostile work environment worsened. Dep. D. Fames (R. at 1516-17); Dep. Bellon
(R. at 1784-92); Aff. K. Cabaness at f 26 (R. at 1389); Aff. Hatch at <H 9-10, 15, 18, 19
(R. at 1946-49); Aff. Knighton at 117 (R. at 2214).
68.

Thomas repeatedly threatened to terminate employees, and they did not

learn that he lacked authority to fire them until September 11, 2003. On the contrary, they
believed that Michaelis agreed with Thomas' management decisions and anyone who
complained would be terminated. Aff. K. Cabaness aif 13 (R. at 1383); Aff. Tuttle a t !
11 (R. at 1941); Aff. Hatch atffl 10, 15, 19 (R. at 1946-49); Dep. D. Fames (R. at 150910); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1855, 1895-96); Aff. Knighton at<H 20-21 (R. at 2215).
69.

In August 1999, Bountiful Power employees met with an attorney from the

Utah Public Employees Association about Thomas' abuse, the hostile work environment,
and Michaelis' threat to fire them if anyone complained again. The attorney told them
that the City was an "old boys' network" and that the grievance and appeals process was
useless. Aff. K. Cabaness at f 28 (R. at 1390); Dep. K. Cabaness (R. at 2113-14).
70.

On June 24, 2003, David A. VandeMerwe, M.D., diagnosed Kipp with

major depression/chronic dysthymia with insomnia caused by an abusive boss and a
hostile work environment. As a result, he treated Kipp with antidepressants. Aff.
VandeMerwe at f l 5-10 (R. at 2051).
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71.

At Dr. VandeMerwe's direction, Kipp was off work from July 23 to

September 8, 2003, due to work-related major depression. Although Kipp's depression
improved while he was off work, upon his return to work, it recurred. When Kipp saw
Dr. VandeMerwe on January 27, 2004, his diagnosis was major depression with a
question of bipolar condition, and Dr. VandeMerwe continued antidepressants and
referred him to Jerry Sandberg, Ph.D., for psychotherapy. Id. at ff 7-10 (R. at 2051).
72.

Thomas knew of Kipp's fragile mental condition and that his medical

absence from July to September 2003 was for work-related major depression. Dep.
Michaelis at 73:6-74:5 (R. at 1855).
73.

On September 9, 2003, when Kipp returned to work from his medical

absence for work-related major depression, Thomas publicly humiliated him by
criticizing him about personal and family issues and threatened to fire him in front of a
meeting of all Bountiful Power Employees. Aff. Knighton at <H 19 (R. at 2215).
74.

Kipp's examining psychologist described the effect of that public

humiliation on him as follows:
When Brent Thomas, in the presence of the co-workers of Mr. Cabaness,
belittled and ridiculed him, threatened him with job termination (authority
he did not have), and included in his statements personal and family matters
relating to Mr. Cabaness, it was a substantial factor and further aggravated
the fragile mental condition of Mr. Cabaness and made his mental disorders
and conditions more severe. It was my opinion that his mental disorders
and conditions, and particularly his conditioned helplessness, worsened,
substantially, due to the conduct of Brent Thomas during the course of that
meeting. The fact that Mr. Cabaness cannot recall these events at the
present time is irrelevant to the diagnosis and its cause. Rather, the fact of
his involuntary forgetfulness is a reflection of the severity [of Kipp's]
mental suffering and the severity of the abuse which occurred on
September 9, 2003.
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Aff. Hawks at 118 (R. at 3909).
75.

On October 2, 2003, Kipp's wife met with City Mayor Joseph Johnson and

told him about Thomas' abusive conduct. She explained the effect that the abuse had on
Kipp, his diagnosed depression, treatment with antidepressants, and his numerous
complaints to Michaelis over the years, as well as Michaelis' threats to terminate him.
She explained that she had not spoken to City Manager Tom Hardy because of his prior
demeaning comments to her and other female City employees from 1977-1980, when
Hardy said he would not listen to any female employees until they "learned how to pee
standing up" and said they could be replaced by "any monkey on the street." The Mayor
told her that Hardy knew of their meeting and that it was not necessary for either her or
Kipp to meet with Hardy. The Mayor also said he would interview Tuttle about the
abuse. However, neither the Mayor nor Hardy communicated further with Kipp or his
wife. Aff. H. Cabaness a t f [ 1-21 (R. at 1959-2008 [sic] [numbers skip]).
76.

In October 2003, Tuttle told Mayor Johnson about the abusive and hostile

environment Thomas created, the many reports to Michaelis about it, and that Michaelis
had done nothing about them. The Mayor said that Hardy knew all that was going on.
Aff. Tuttle at<H 18-21 (R. at 1943-44).
77.

Kipp's employment with the City terminated in Janauary 2004, when Kipp

became completely unable to continue working in the hostile work environment there.
Aff. K. Cabaness at f 38 (R. at 1395).
78.

On February 5, 2004, from Dr. VandeMerwe's referral, Jerry L. Sandberg,
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Ph.D., began treating Kipp and diagnosed him as suffering major depression (DSM IV §
296.33) and a panic disorder (DSM IV § 300.01) of longstanding duration caused by an
abusive boss and a hostile work environment. Aff. Sandberg at ff 1-8 (R. at 2058).
79.

Between summer 2003 and spring 2004, all but two Bountiful Power

employees quit due to the hostile work environment Thomas created. The employees who
quit due to Thomas' abuse include: Brent Tuttle, Steve Knighton, Steve Hutchings, Gary
Hatch, Bret Thomas, and Justin Halloran, who all quit because they were tired of
"fighting it" and "didn't want to deal with it anymore"; the only two employees who
stayed were David Fames and Kent Gines. Michaelis knew why those individuals were
leaving Bountiful Power but let them go in order to protect Thomas. Dep. D. Fames (R.
at 1526-27); Dep. A. Fames (R. at 1553-54); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1877); Aff. Hutchings
at <H 5-6 (R. at 1951); Aff. Hatch at f 13 (R. at 1946-47); Aff. Tuttle at f 10 (R. at 1941);
Aff. Knighton at f 26 (R. at 2216).
80.

In April 2005, board-certified psychiatrist Dennis H. Smith, M.D., began

treating Cabaness, and diagnosed him as follows:
Axis I:
1.
Major depression, first episode, in partial remission, 296.25
2.
Dysthymia, 300.4
3.
Note: Anxiety disorder, symptoms with the depression
4.
Panic disorder without agoraphobia, 300.01
Axis II:
1.
Deferred, none really apparent during this interview
Axis III
1.
No significant medical problems known.
Axis IV
1.
Still struggling with some PTSD-type (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder)
issues related to employment.
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Aff. Smith at 1 6 (R. at 2066).
81.

In Dr. Smith's professional opinion, Kipp's abusive boss and hostile

working environment were substantial causes of his diagnosis. Id. at f][ 6-8 (R. at 2066).
82.

Plaintiff sustained both economic and non-economic damages from

Defendants' conduct. Id. (R. at 2066, 2085); Aff. K. Cabaness (R. at 1397-1401); Aff. H.
Cabaness (R. at 1959); Aff. Hawks (R. at 3904); Rep. Hawks at (R. at 3889-3901); Aff.
Warden (R. at 2041); Aff. Sandberg (R. at 2058); Aff. VandeMerwe (R. at 2051).
83.

Kipp was not mentally or emotionally able to pursue any administrative

remedies due to his major depression, major panic disorder, and elements of posttraumatic stress disorder, from at least June 2003 through January 2004 and beyond. Aff.
Smith at M 13-19 (R. at 2004-07); Aff. Hawks atffl 7-10, 19 (R. at 3904).
84.

Kipp did make a workers' compensation claim in early 2004, to which the

City responded, stating, "In our opinion, the claim is nonsense," and the claim was
denied. Letter from City, May 25, 2004 (R. at 2109).
85.

The Manual provides that Kipp, as a regular employee, could not be fired

or even disciplined unless the City (i) conducts a disciplinary investigation, giving him a
written notice of the claims against him, an opportunity to respond, and advising him in
writing of the discipline and findings of the investigation, Manual at § 603 (R. at 165859), (ii) informs him of his right to appeal the discipline, id. at § 602(e) (R. at 1658), and
(iii) allows him to appeal the discipline to the City Manager, City Council, or Board of
Appeals, including the opportunity to present evidence and confront witnesses at a public
hearing, id. at § 604(c)(3)(iii) (R. at 1660-61).
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86.

Thomas' intimidation of City employees continued even during this

litigation, as he insisted upon being present for the depositions of all City employees
deposed. Each City employee stated that Thomas' presence was intimidating to them and
made them feel uncomfortable and fear reprisals if they said something untoward about
him, even though it was the truth, and his presence likely affected their deposition
testimony. Dep. A. Farnes at 4:20-6:13; Dep. V. Gines at 4:25-8:16,49:25-53:12; Dep.
Bellon at 8:19-12:4, 85:18-86:24; Dep. Thomas at 187:21-188:10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in ruling that Thomas' continuing pattern of abuse of Kipp
over more than ten years was not extreme and outrageous, considering the dangerous and
stressful nature of Kipp's work and Thomas' knowledge of Kipp's particular mental
vulnerability. The court erred by refusing to consider an incident where Thomas ordered
a member of Kipp's crew to jackhammer into a live electrical conduit because, although
Kipp was not present, Thomas intended the order to upset him, and it did. The trial court
improperly discounted an employee meeting where Thomas publicly humiliated Kipp on
the day Kipp returned from a medical absence for work-induced major depression.
The trial court also erred when it held that the Manual on its face did not create an
implied contract as to abuse-free work conditions and failed to consider extrinsic
evidence that the parties intended the Manual to form a binding contract and treated it as
such. Inherent in that contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although
Defendants and Plaintiff both moved for summary judgment, the trial court erred in
assuming that they had agreed the court had before it all evidence necessary to determine
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whether the Manual created an implied contract. Defendants asserted for the first time at
oral argument that the City intended the Manual to be only a statement of policies, goals,
and warnings to employees, and the trial court erred by striking the subsequently
submitted affidavits of Bonnie Quinn and Kenneth Mears testifying that City
management had told them the Manual was a binding agreement.
Damages for Kipp's emotional distress are available as consequential damages for
the City's breach of its implied contract with him. Furthermore, Kipp's claims are not
barred by governmental immunity because his emotional distress injuries were intentional
and result from a breach of contract. Finally, his wrongful constructive termination claim
also is a breach contract action distinct from his other contractual claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT THOMAS' ABUSIVE CONDUCT WAS
SUFFICIENTLY EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS TO
ALLOW A JURY TO DECIDE KIPP'S INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM.

The trial court dismissed Kipp's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, holding that Thomas' actions did not meet the threshold level of extreme and
outrageous conduct. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court refused to consider the
July 30, 2003 jackhammer incident because Kipp was not immediately present. It also
disregarded the evidence of Thomas' deliberate public humiliation of Kipp on
September 9, 2003, upon his return from a medical absence caused by work-induced
major depression because that evidence was "conclusory." (R. at 3657-59).
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As demonstrated below, the trial court's refusal to consider those extreme
instances of abuse and intimidation is reversible error. However, even if disregarding
those incidents were proper, the court erred in dismissing the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim because Kipp's cumulative evidence of Thomas' unchecked
abuse and mistreatment spanning well over a decade was sufficient to satisfy the extreme
and outrageous threshold.
The Court should consider the jackhammer because, although Kipp was not
immediately present, Thomas' deliberate disregard of human life on that occasion is
consistent with evidence of other efforts by Thomas to break down Kipp and his crew
through verbal abuse, fear, and intimidation. On that occasion Thomas required Brent
Tuttle use a jackhammer to remove concrete from a conduit with energized primary
distributor lines, knowing that the lines carried lethal amounts of electricity, and the
jackhammer broke through the conduit in multiple places, narrowly failing to penetrate
the insulation to the energized lines inside. Had the jackhammer penetrated into the lines,
Tuttle likely would have been killed. Aff. Cabaness a t f l 30-31 (R. at 1392); Aff. Tuttle
at 115 (R. at 1941-42); Dep. Thomas at 170:12-18 (R. at 1450).
One could reasonably conclude that Thomas' shocking disregard of human life in
that instance was intended to have precisely the severe impact on Kipp that it in fact had
according his psychological expert, Dr. Hawks. Thomas clearly intended a more
pervasive and far-reaching impact, in terms of fear and intimidation, than merely upon
the crew members present. Indeed, the evidence of its impact bears that out.
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The trial court also erred in disregarding as conclusory Knighton's affidavit
regarding the September 9, 2003, personnel meeting following Kipp's return from a
medical absence caused by work-induced major depression. In that meeting, Thomas
singled Kipp out and deliberately humiliated him publicly by threatening to fire him and
criticizing him about private personal matters.
In sum, the trial court committed reversible error by (i) concluding as a matter of
law that Thomas' abusive treatment of Kipp was not extreme and outrageous,
(ii) disregarding the jackhammer incident, (iii) disregarding Thomas' public humiliation
of Kipp following his return from medical leave for severe, work-induced depression, and
(iv) failing to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in Kipp's favor.
A, Even Without Considering the July 30 and September 9, 2003
Incidents, Defendants' Actions, In The Aggregate, Were
Sufficiently Extreme And Outrageous To Support A Claim For
Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Kipp must plead
facts that demonstrate that Thomas:
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a
nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f 58 (internal quotation
marks omitted). "Emotional distress does not so much occur as unfold... where a
defendant subjects a plaintiff... to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by themselves
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though clearly intolerable in the aggregate. Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992).
Consequently, the Court must consider Thomas' pattern of mistreatment,
intimidation, and verbal abuse cumulatively, in light of all the facts and circumstances of
the case, rather than construing each incident separately. Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App
150, f 38. The extreme and outrageous character of Thomas' conduct:
may arise from [Thomas'] knowledge that [Kipp] is peculiarly susceptible
to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or
peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, or outrageous
when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not
be so if he did not know.
Id. at f 31 (quoting Rest, 2d, Torts § 46 cmt. F (1965)).
During Kipp's more than twenty years at Bountiful Power, his work was
inherently highly stressful, characterized by daily work on potentially lethal power lines
and heightened by the added responsibility for his crew members' safety. Consequently,
Thomas' abusive treatment of Kipp, spanning well over a decade, was not merely rude or
unpleasant, but rather a willful and deliberate disregard of human life and dignity.
Thomas routinely required Kipp to compromise his own safety and that of his
crew members by shortcutting important safety measures and unnecessarily rushing
through dangerous procedures, all the while subject to Thomas' verbal abuse and threats
of termination. Thomas cut short Kipp's safety meetings and pressured him to skip
standard safety procedures. As an example, on one occasion, Thomas required Kipp to
forego grounding a 7,200-volt line before climbing up to work on it, resulting in an
extremely painful and anxiety-producing shock. Thomas repeatedly required Kipp and
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his crew to unnecessarily work in dangerous conditions such as rain, snow, and wind,
when that work could have been done safely at a later time. Aff. K. Cabaness at ff 14-15,
22 (R. at 1383-84, 1387); Dep. Cabaness at 81:11-83:17 (R. at 2132), 136:12-137:5 (R. at
2145); Report Hawks at ff II.A.7 (R. at 3895-96).
Throughout Kipp's career, Thomas sought to break him down by demeaning him
with verbal abuse and profanity, calling him "dumbass," "jackass," and "shit for brains."
(R. at 2120, 2128); Report Hawks at ffl ILA.6 (page 5) (R. at 3893). For his own
amusement, Thomas often threatened to fire Kipp and regularly told him, "You are lucky
to have this job. If you don't do what you are told, we can fire you." (R. at 2118-19).
Thomas also frequently criticized Kipp publicly about his personal, private matters to
humiliate him. Aff. Knighton (R. at 2213); Dep. D. Fames at 41:8-42:21; 81:10-82:8 (R.
at 1512, 1522). In 2003, Thomas told Kipp, "You know what your problem is? It's your
wife. You need to get rid of your wife." Dep. Cabaness at 67:18-69:9 (R. at 2128).
Thomas also physically abused employees to instill fear, such as when he kneed Steve
Hutchings in the groin and told him, "I guess I showed you who is boss." Dep. K.
Cabaness at 84:5-85:2 (R. at 2132-33); Aff. Hutchings (R. at 1952).
Thomas also senselessly created tasks for Kipp and his crew to perform, such as
when he scattered a lineman's tools across the floor and ordered him to pick them up,
Dep. Cabaness at 85:5-19. (R. at 2133), or when he ordered them to needlessly reposition
equipment, Dep. Cabaness at 43:2-45:17 (R. at 2122), and unnecessarily repeat properly
completed tasks such as disassembling a framed pole only to frame an identical pole in its
place, Dep. Cabaness at 53:14-55:4 (R. at 2125). Indeed, even if Thomas' inappropriate
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conduct might have been more tolerable in other employment circumstances, here, the
life-threatening nature of Kipp's work and his known fragile mental health makes the
aggregate of Thomas' abusive behavior over a decade extreme and outrageous.
Kipp's resulting emotional distress was exacerbated by Michaelis' patent support
of Thomas. Although the foremen frequently informed Michaelis over the years of
Thomas' mistreatment and abuse, and Michaelis knew the mental and emotional
suffering it caused Kipp and others, Dep. Michaelis at 73:6-74:5 (R. at 1855), he did
nothing to stop it, and actually threatened to terminate any employees who complained to
him again about Thomas' abusive conduct. Aff. Kipp Cabaness at I I 13, 19, 22, 27 (R. at
1382, 1385-87, 1389-90); Aff. Hatch at I 10 (R. at 1947); Aff. Hutchings at 19 (R. at
1952); Aff. Knighton at 119 (R. at 2215).
Even without considering the outrageous July 30 and September 9, 2003 incidents,
one could reasonably conclude that Thomas' actions, which Michaelis tolerated and
condoned, were extreme and outrageous, offending accepted standards of decency and
morality, particularly in the aggregate, where Defendants knew of Kipp's emotionally
susceptible state. Dep. Michaelis at 73:6-74:5 (R. at 1855). That these intolerable actions
caused Kipp extreme emotional and psychological harm is well documented by his
professional care providers and must be accepted as undisputed. Aff. VandeMerwe at
II5-10 (R. at 2051); Aff. Sandberg at II1-8 (R. at 2058); Aff. Smith at II3-10 (R. at
2066); Aff. Hawks at II8-19 (R. at 3906-10); Report of Hawks at I I H.A.6., 7., and
Observations 3-5 (R. at 3895-96, 3901). At a minimum, a reasonable person could
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sensibly conclude that Thomas' pervasive pattern of abusive treatment of Kipp was
extreme and outrageous, and that issue should have been presented to a jury:
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of
the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
Gygi v. StorcK 503 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1972) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46 cmt. h (1965)). Consequently, the trial court erred in not allowing the issue of whether
Thomas' conduct, in the aggregate, was extreme and outrageous to go the jury.
B. Although Kipp Was Not Present For The Jackhammer
Incident, Whether Thomas Intended It To Instill Fear In Kipp
As Well As His Crew Members Present Is A Jury Issue, And
The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Consider That Incident.
The trial court erred by refusing to consider the July 30, 2003, jackhammer
incident where Thomas ordered Brent Tuttle, a member of Kipp's crew, to risk his life by
using a jackhammer to remove the concrete around a conduit containing live primary
distributor lines with lethal amounts of electricity. The trial court erroneously refused to
consider that incident because Kipp was not immediately present. (R. at 3658-59).
While, as a general rule, conduct outside a plaintiffs presence cannot give rise to
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, an important exception to that rule:
reflects the law's recognition that certain conduct not committed in one's
presence can nevertheless be so injurious to an individual, despite the fact
that he is not present to witness it, that our societal values would be
offended were we not to provide a remedy at law. Unusually offensive
behavior can and should trigger the exception.
Hatch v. Davis, 2000 UT 44, \ 29.

32

Whether the jackhammer incident should have been considered, where Kipp was
not present, requires the Court to consider: (1) Turtle's relationship to Kipp; (2) Thomas'
relationship with Kipp; and (3) the egregiousness of Thomas' conduct. Id. dX\ 27.
Thomas must also have undertaken the conduct, in whole or in part, with the intent to
inflict injury upon Kipp, even though he was not present. Id.
This incident must be viewed properly as part of an ongoing course of conduct
characterized by Thomas' intimidation and control of Kipp and his crew through
manipulation, ridicule, and fear. Examples include Thomas forcing Kipp or his crew
members to: (i) perform unreasonably dangerous acts, while skipping safety procedures,
Dep. Cabaness at 81:11-82:3 (R. at 2132); Report Hawks at <H H.A.7 (R. at 3895-96),
(ii) unnecessarily reposition equipment and vehicles already properly set up to run lines
and perform the task in the opposite direction, Dep. Cabaness at 43:2-45:17 (R. at 2122);
Dep. Bellon at 33:25-36:12 (R. at 2122), (iii) needlessly repeat properly completed tasks,
such as disassembling a framed pole only to identically frame an indistinguishable pole in
its place, Dep. Cabaness at 53:14-55:4 (R. at 2125), and (iv) pick up a lineman's tools
from the garage floor after Thomas purposely dumped and scattered them with no
apparent purpose other than to manipulate him. Dep. Cabaness at 85:5-19. (R. at 2133).
Such evidence creates, at the very least, a reasonable inference that when Thomas
ordered Turtle to jackhammer the conduit, he intended to create a factor of fear and
intimidation extending not only to those linemen immediately present, but also the entire
crew, including Kipp. A jury could infer reasonably that Thomas knew or expected that
those present would tell absent crew members such as Kipp, who, as their foreman and
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safety director, was responsible for their safety. In fact, Kipp learned about this lifethreatening incident soon after it occurred, and his psychologist determined that the
incident exacerbated his fear and depression, even though Kipp did not witness it first
hand. Report Hawks at f II.A.7. (R. at 3894-95).
Under the Hatch factors, the trial court should have considered the jackhammer
incident when assessing Kipp's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
First, Tuttle was a member of Kipp's close-knit crew with whom he had worked for years
and had developed a close bond through the shared adversity of Thomas' emotional
abuse. Second, Thomas was Kipp's supervisor, and Kipp was a member of the crew that
Thomas' order was meant to scare and intimidate. Moreover, Thomas routinely singled
Kipp out for ridicule and verbal abuse on many other occasions, both before and after the
jackhammer incident. Third, Thomas' order was particularly egregious because it
seriously endangered Turtle's life. Finally, in light of Thomas' pervasive pattern of
intimidating, manipulating, and controlling Kipp and his crew through emotionally
abusive conduct, there is at least an issue of fact as to whether Thomas intended his
conduct to intimidate and control the entire crew, including Kipp, although not present.
Thus, the trial court should have considered the jackhammer incident, and its decision to
disregard that incident must be reversed.
C. Steve Knighton's Affidavit Is Not Conclusory And Creates A
Genuine Issue Of Fact As To Whether Thomas's Conduct Was
Extreme And Outrageous*
The trial court held that Steve Knighton's affidavit testimony was conclusory
regarding a Power Company employee meeting held on September 9, 2003. Knighton
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testified that upon Kipp's return from a medical absence for work-induced major
depression, Thomas, knowing of the reason for that absence, singled Kipp out at that
meeting, threatened to fire him, and publicly belittled him by criticizing him about
personal and confidential matters in front of all the employees. (R. at 3659).
However, the trial court erred because Knighton's affidavit did state specific and
material facts. While Knighton did not identify what Thomas said about Kipp's personal
matters, Knighton's affidavit establishes certain essential facts demonstrating that
Thomas' conduct on that occasion was outrageous: (i) the meeting occurred the day after
Kipp returned from a six-week medical absence for work-induced depression (ii), all
Bountiful Power employees were present, (iii) Thomas singled out Kipp in front of them,
and (iv) Thomas threatened to fire him. Aff. Knighton (R. at 2215). Where Thomas knew
of Kipp's vulnerability to depression and the reason for his medical absence, Dep.
Michaelis at 73:6-74:5 (R. at 1855), the facts alleged were sufficiently specific to
consider the instance as a part of Thomas' continuing and unfolding pattern of extreme
and outrageous conduct. See Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, f 31 (extreme and
outrageous nature of conduct may arise from actor's knowledge that victim is particularly
vulnerable to emotional distress due to mental condition); Retherford, 844 P.2d at 975
(emotional distress an unfolding injury). Moreover, Knighton's affidavit was sufficiently
specific to allow Kipp's psychologist to form an opinion that Thomas' public humiliation
of Kipp adversely affected his mental health. See Aff. Hawks at f l 11-18 (R. 3907-3910);
Aff. Knighton a t f l 19, 24 (R. at 2215-16).
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Rather than disregarding Knighton's affidavit, the trial court should have
construed it in a light most favorable to Kipp. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172
(Utah 1983) ("Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly presented, or the
nature of inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment."). Its failure to do so constitutes reversible error.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT THE MANUAL CREATED
NEITHER A CONTRACT NOR A COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

In granting Defendants summary judgment as to Kipp's claim for breach of
implied contract, the trial court erroneously held, as a matter of law, that the Manual did
not create any contract between Kipp and the City. (R. at 3654).
A. The Existence Of An Implied Contract Is A Question Of Fact
That The Trial Court Wrongly Decided As A Matter Of Law.
Whether an employee manual creates an implied contract is a question of fact,
particularly where, as here, the Manual purports to limit an employer's power to
discharge an employee. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah 1991).
"[E]mployee manuals and bulletins containing policies for employee termination are
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the parties and for fixing the
terms of the employment relationship." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,
1002 (Utah 1991). To determine whether the Manual created an implied contract, the
Court should consider not only the language of the Manual itself, but also the employer's
course of conduct and pertinent oral representations. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 56.
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If the parties intended to form an implied agreement, the Court should give effect
to the parties' intentions by enforcing that agreement, and determining the parties'
intentions is a question of fact. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003. Without a conspicuous and
unambiguous disclaimer, the determination that an employee manual is not an implied-infact contract cannot be made as a matter of law. Id.
B. The Manual Created An Implied Contract Between The City
And Its Employees, Including Kipp, And The Court Erred In
Disregarding Evidence of Contractual Intent.
The trial court ruled that there was no implied contract between Kipp and the City
because "the language of the City Manual on which plaintiff relies is not ambiguous and
does not create a contract between plaintiff and the city as to the issues raised in this
lawsuit" and "the disclaimer in the City Manual, at Section 101(b), is clear and
conspicuous and precludes the existence of a contract as to any items or rights identified
in said disclaimer." (R. at 3654).
However, that ruling is erroneous because the disclaimer is limited to salary and
benefit issues: "No contract exists between Bountiful City and its employees with respect
to salary, salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or employee benefits" (R. at
1570) (emphasis added). The disclaimer neither extends nor applies to employee
discipline and termination policies and procedures or the Manual's promise of a
workplace free of harassment or abuse. Where the City followed the Manual's binding
provisions for disciplinary action, disciplinary measures, disciplinary investigations,
disciplinary appeals, and termination of employment, (R. at 1608-13), the Manual was a
legitimate source for Kipp to rely upon for the terms of his employment. Brehany, 812
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P.2d at 56 (employee manuals and bulletins containing personnel policies are legitimate
sources for determining parties' intentions and fixing terms of employment relationship)
The Manual states the City policy that all employees are expected:
to comply with the City's standards of conduct and performance, including
all matters set forth in this manual.... and that any noncompliance with
these standards may be remedied by appropriate disciplinary action.
(R. at 1608) (emphasis added).
The City both intended and treated the Manual as an implied contract for the
protection and benefit of City employees, and any failure by management to implement
or enforce its provisions was grounds for termination. Aff. Mears at ff 10, 14 (R. at
4142-43); Aff. Quinn atffl 10-11 (R. 4149-50). The Manual manifested the City's intent
concerning work environment, safety, disciplinary action, termination, standards of
conduct and other benefits and protections, upon which City employees could rely.
Manual at §§ 406 (Work Environment), 409 (Sexual And Other Harassment); Aff. Mears
at f 12 (R. at 4143); Aff. Quinn at f 10 (R. 4149-50) (both stricken at 4564-65). Those
provisions were sufficiently definite to act as unilateral contract terms and communicated
to Kipp. Consequently, his retention of employment constituted acceptance of, and
consideration for, those contract terms. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1000-02.
When disciplining employees for failure to comply with the Manual, the City
followed the Manual's procedures. Aff. Mears at f 17 (R. at 4145); Aff. Quinn at <H 7-13
(R. 4149-51) (both stricken at 4564-65). Moreover, Michaelis acknowledged that he was
responsible to enforce the Manual's policies for the City. Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1856-61).
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The parties' oral representations also show that Kipp and the City both considered
the Manual to be a contract, and Kipp testified that he intended and understood it to
govern his terms of employment. Aff. Mears at ff 10, 14 (R. at 4142-43); Aff. Quinn at
<H 10-11 (R. 4149-50) (both stricken at 4564-65); Aff. Cabaness at f 10 (R. at 1381). The
City has produced no evidence to the contrary.
An implied employment contract can be established from "a variety of sources,
including the conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of that
particular trade or industry, or other circumstances." Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT
60, f 17 (quoting Berube, v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (atwill presumption may be overcome by evidence of contractual intent in employee
manual, and conclusion that promise exists may arise from announced personnel
policies)). See also Canfield, 2005 UT 60 at f 24 (municipal employer may create
implied employment contract through personnel policies); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 56
(plaintiffs could recover if they prove that terms in manual were implied terms of contract
and were breached); Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (Utah 1991) (employee manuals
legitimate sources for determining parties' intent and fixing terms of employment).
Hence, the trial court erred when it ruled that the Manual did not form an implied
contract concerning the provisions Kipp relied upon.
C. The Trial Court Erred By Concluding That The Parties
Agreed All Necessary Facts To Determine The Implied Contract
Issue Were Before The Court.
With cross-motions for summary judgment pending, the trial court incorrectly
assumed that the parties agreed the court had before it all necessary facts to determine
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whether there was an implied contract and then decided as a matter of law that there was
no contract. (R. at 4600). However, the mere fact that opposing parties file cross motions
for summary judgment does not mean that a case may be decided as a matter of law.
DeStefano v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This is so
because, by filing a motion, a party concedes only that no issue of fact exists under the
theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so concede that no issues remain in the
event his adversary's theory is adopted. Id. When considering cross-motions for summary
judgment, a court should weigh each motion separately, viewing the facts and inferences
favorably to the non-moving party. Prince, Yeats & Geldzahler v. Young, 2005 UT 26,
^[10. The court below failed to apply these principles.
Kipp did not stipulate that all of the necessary facts were before the trial court.
Indeed, Defendants did not raise the issue of the parties' intent regarding the Manual
prior to their oral argument. Defendants' summary judgment memoranda argued only that
the Manual's disclaimer in section 101 prevented it from creating an implied contract, so
Kipp did not address the issue of the parties' intent in his briefing, and the trial court had
not received any evidence of intent regarding the Manual. (R. at 1254-59). Ironically,
Defendants even conceded at oral argument that the issue of whether an implied contract
exists is a question of fact for the jury:
MR. PRESTON: The Court could decide all sorts of fact issues, but
whether there's an implied contract is typically an issue, under the Dan's
Foods case, that is reserved to a jury. Because the jury needs to hear the
entire evidence and conclude, well, is there an implied contract, and, if so,
what are the terms of that contract.
Partial Transcript of July 26, 2006, Hearing at 4:7-12 (transcript begins at R. at 4599).
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At oral argument, for the first time, the City claimed that it intended the Manual
merely to create non-binding goals, while producing no evidence to support that claim.
(R. at 4600). In response to that bald assertion at oral argument, Kipp insisted that the
parties' intent was vital to the analysis and that, without evidence to determine the
parties' intent, the trial court could not grant Defendants' motion. (R. at 4601). At the
conclusion of oral argument, the trial court incorrectly assumed, sua sponte and without
justification, that the parties had agreed that all of the necessary facts on the implied
contract issue were before the court and granted summary judgment. (R. at 4600).
Having had no chance to address adequately Defendant's newly-raised argument,
following summary judgment, Kipp subsequently produced affidavits from Kenneth
Mears and Bonnie Quinn, two City employees involved in creating, implementing, and
enforcing the Manual. They testified that the City intended the Manual to be binding
upon both the City and its employees, that the City followed its procedures for employee
discipline and termination, and that both the City Attorney and City Manager had made
statements consistent with that intent. (R. at 4160, 4168.) Without any evidence from the
City regarding intent,1 the trial court struck the Mears and Quinn affidavits.
D. The Trial Court Erred By Striking The Affidavits Of
Kenneth Mears And Bonnie Quinn.
The trial court erroneously struck the Mears and Quinn affidavits, which Kipp
submitted with his Rule 59 and 60(b) motion, and which evidence that the City intended
the Manual to be contractually binding upon both the City and its employees.
defendants neither briefed nor submitted or proffered any evidence of intent.
41

Defendants' oral argument raised issues not included in their briefing, and the
affidavits of Mears and Quinn were necessary for Kipp to respond to those new
arguments. Had Defendants raised the issue of intent in their supporting brief, Kipp
would have discovered and produced those affidavits of intent prior to oral argument.
However, Kipp did not do so because the only evidence before the court for summary
judgment was Kipp's testimony that he intended the Manual to govern the terms of his
employment and that the parties acted in accordance with their understanding that the
Manual was binding.2 Aff. K. Cabaness at f 10 (R. at 1381). Where Defendants omitted
from their memoranda any claim that the City never intended the Manual to form a
binding agreement (and therefore Kipp did not address it in his opposition
memorandum), then Defendants raised that claim for the first time at oral argument, and
that claim later became important to the trial court's summary judgment ruling, the trial
court unfairly denied Kipp the opportunity to respond to that argument and abused its
discretion by refusing to consider the Mears and Quinn affidavits.
E. The City's Implied Contract With Kipp Included An Implied
Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.
Under Utah law, the Manual created an implied contract, which includes an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Wood v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT
App 35, H 23-24 (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in implied
employment contract). At the very least, the Manual created a triable issue of fact of the
2

Even if the trial court's ruling striking the Mears and Quinn Affidavits stands,
Plaintiffs testimony that he understood the Manual to be a binding contract and that the
parties acted in accordance with that understanding stands as the only evidence of either
side's intent regarding the Manual. Aff. K. Cabaness at f 10 (R. at 1381).
42

existence of such an implied contract. Indeed, Defendants conceded that determining
whether there is a contract is a question of fact. (R. at 4599). Thus, the trial court erred in
dismissing Kipp's claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
III.

UNDER KIPP'S CONTRACT CLAIMS, HE MAY RECOVER
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR HIS EMOTIONAL
INJURIES, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING
TO SO HOLD.

Having held that the Manual did not create an implied contract or a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, the trial court did not decide whether Kipp could recover
emotional distress damages under his claim for breach of implied contract. (R. at 3655).
For breach of contract, Utah law allows recovery of consequential damages, that
is, "those [damages] reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable
by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.y 701 P.2d
794, 801 (Utah 1985). In an unusual case such as the one at bar, damages for mental
anguish may be provable as consequential damages for breach of contract. See id. at 802.
The foreseeability of any damages depends upon the nature and language of the contract
and the parties' reasonable expectations. Id. at 801.
The Manual provides that the City will not tolerate conduct that creates an
intimidating, offensive, or hostile work environment, § 406 (R. at 1590-91), that the City
will provide a work environment free of violent behavior and threatening conditions,
§ 408 (R. at 1592), that oral and written threats, physical assault, harassment, intentional
damage, and every other act or threat of violence is strictly prohibited, § 408 (R. at 1592),
that employees should refrain from offensive or undesirable conduct, § 508(b) (R. at
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1604-05), and that profanity and abusive language, threatening or intimidating coworkers, and conduct endangering employee safety are all prohibited, § 508(c) (R. at
1605-07). Given the hazardous nature of Kipp's work, dealing daily with potentially
lethal electrical lines, it was reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting that, if
those Manual provisions were breached, an individual with Kipp's fragile emotional
health could suffer emotional distress damages of the type and extent that he did in fact
suffer. Similarly, given Thomas' willful and deliberate mistreatment of Kipp, knowing of
his fragile mental and emotional health, and the effects of that abuse upon him,
consequential damages here should include damages for Kipp's emotional distress. See
Townsend v. Daniel Mann, Johnson Mendenhall, 196 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 1999)
(consequential emotional distress damages allowed for breach of contract with willful or
wanton conduct).
IV.

UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT WAIVES
IMMUNITY FOR BREACHES OF THE CITY'S
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.

The trial court held that the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 633-1 to 63-30-38 (Supp. 1997),3 bars Kipp's claims for breaches of implied contract and of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for wrongful termination. The trial court
reasoned that, under Ledfors v. Emery County School DisL, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah
1993), and Butler, Crocket & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 402
(unpublished), § 63-30-10(2) barred Kipp's breach of implied contract claim because his

3

Although the Governmental Immunity Act relied upon was repealed, it still controls this
matter. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to 63-30d-904 (2004).
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injury arose out of an infliction of mental anguish. The trial court further ruled that, under
Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of Cache County School DisL, 910 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996), the Act bars Kipp's wrongful termination claim. (R. at 3655-56). However,
the trial court misinterpreted § 63-30-10, Ledfors, and Butler, because that section is
inapposite to Kipp's claims that City employees intentionally caused him emotional
distress, and § 63-30-5 has waived governmental immunity for breach of contract claims.
A. The Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar Kipp's
Claims For Breach Of Implied Contract.
In Utah, "[ijmmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any
contractual obligation." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) (Supp. 1997). Despite that waiver,
the trial court held that, under Ledfors, 849 P.2d 1162, and Butler, Crocket & Walsh Dev.
Corp., 2005 UT App 402, § 63-30-10(2) creates an exception for breach of contract
claims seeking damages for infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 3655).
The trial court's interpretation of Ledfors and Butler is erroneous. First, § 63-3010 addresses only "injuries proximately caused by a negligent act or omission" of a
government employee and is inapplicable here, where Kipp's injuries were caused by
Thomas' intentional and deliberate acts.4 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. The Supreme
Court has held that § 63-30-10(2) is inapposite to injuries caused by a municipal actor's
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007,
1011 (Utah 1993) (finding § 63-30-10 inapposite where plaintiff did not "allege injury

Although Plaintiff initially pleaded a cause of action for negligence, the sole claim based
on negligence was withdrawn. (R. at 2330).
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caused by negligent act of the County or its employee" but specifically alleged "that the
County's intentional acts caused her emotional distress"') (emphasis in original).
Neither Ledfors nor Butler addressed claims arising from intentional, deliberate,
and wrongful acts of a government employee; Ledfors alleged a negligent failure to
supervise, resulting in the assault and battery of one high school student by others, 849
P.2d at 1165-66, while Butler claimed a negligent failure to grant a conditional use
permit, disguised as a contract-based declaratory action, 2005 UT App 402 at *1.
Second, § 63-30-10 does not apply to claims for injuries arising from a
government entity's breach of contractual obligations. In Ledfors, the Court held that the
"Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-10, focuses on the conduct or
situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability crafted by the
plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged." 849 P.2d 1166 (emphasis added). In Butler,
the Court of Appeals expanded upon that holding to affirm the dismissal of the
developer's claims for a negligent failure to grant a conditional use permit, where the
developer had re-packaged those claims as a contract-based declaratory action, trying to
avoid the immunity provision of § 63-30-10. 2005 UT App 402 at *1. In contrast, here,
Kipp does not allege or rely upon any type of negligence, only an intentional breach of
contract. Complaint at <H 22-35 (R. at 2-9).
The present case is further distinguishable from Butler in that Kipp's claim
legitimately sounds in contract and is not an attempt to disguise a negligence claim as a
breach of contract to evade immunity. Here Kipp seeks only damages available for the
City's breaches of contract, which include consequential damages for foreseeable injuries
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to his mental health, see Complaint at fK 27-29 and page 12 (R. at 1-13), whereas in
Butler, the developer's contract-based declaratory judgment action sought affirmative
relief far beyond what was available in a declaratory action, 2005 UT App 402 at *1.
Simply put, Kipp's breach of contract claim does not arise from any infliction of
emotional distress, much less an infliction of emotional distress caused by negligence.
Instead, Kipp's injuries arose from Defendants' breach of the Manual's implied contract
where the City, having promised not to tolerate an abusive and hostile work environment
created, allowed and condoned exactly that. Kipp's injuries also arose from his wrongful
constructive termination by the City, which, as set forth below, also is a contract claim.
These breaches of contract exist independently of Kipp's emotional distress injuries.
The fact that Defendants' breaches of contract caused Kipp emotional distress
does not transform his contract claims into barred claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
B. Governmental Immunity Is Waived For Kipp's Wrongful
Termination Claim Because It Is A Breach Of Contract
Rather Than A Tort.
A wrongful termination claim may have both tort and contract aspects, depending
on which exception to the at-will employment presumption applies. If the claim alleges
that the termination violates a clear and substantial public policy, it is a tort. Berube, 111
P.2d at 1042. However, if it alleges that the termination violates an implied contract, it is
a contract action. Id. at 1044; see also Johnson, 818 P.2d at 997 (examining involuntary
termination action under contract theory); Canfield, 2005 UT 60 at ff 13-15 (treating
wrongful termination action against city as contract action).
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Here, the abusive working conditions became so intolerable that 13 of 15
Bountiful Power crew members quit between summer of 2003 and spring 2004. Dep. D.
Farnes (R. at 1526-27); Dep. A. Farnes (R. at 1553-54); Dep. Michaelis (R. at 1877); Aff.
Hutchings atffl 5-6 (R. at 1951); Aff. Hatch at 113 (R. at 1946-47); Aff. Tuttle at 110
(R. at 1941); Aff. Knighton at <fl 26 (R. at 2216). Kipp claims that, under the authority of
Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2006 UT 71, f 27 ("...a resignation under working
conditions that a reasonable employee would consider intolerable is equivalent to
termination."), his constructive termination by the City violated the City's own policies
and procedures as set forth in the Manual.
Kipp was a regular employee, not an at-will employee. See Manual at § 105(c) (R.
at 1571). Consequently, his constructive termination by the City violated § 701(a), which
provides only that non-regular employees may be terminated at the will of the
Department Head. (R. at 1613). The Manual also provides that, in order to terminate or
even discipline Kipp, the City was required to (i) conduct a disciplinary investigation,
giving him a written notice of the claims against him, an opportunity to respond, and
advising him in writing of investigation's findings and the discipline, Manual at § 603 (R.
at 1658-59), (ii) inform him of his right to appeal the discipline, id. at § 602(e) (R. at
1658), and (iii) allow him to appeal the discipline to the City Manager, the City Council,
or the Board of Appeals, including the opportunity to present evidence and confront
witnesses at a public hearing, id. at § 604(c)(3)(iii) (R. at 1660-61). Because Kipp's
constructive termination by the City deprived him of the rights those sections guarantee
him, the City breached its implied contract with Kipp.
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Kipp does not claim that his termination violated public policy and even stipulated
in the trial court that his wrongful termination claim is not brought under a tort theory.5
Thus, Kipp's wrongful termination action seeks damages for the breach of a contractual
obligation, and sovereign immunity has been waived under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5-1.
VI.

KIPP'S WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM IS NOT
DUPLICATIVE OF HIS OTHER CONTRACT CLAIMS.

The District Court held that, to the extent that Kipp's second cause of action, for
wrongful termination, was a contract claim, it was duplicative of his other contract claim.
(R. at 3656). On the contrary, Kipp's wrongful termination claim is not duplicative,
because it alleges that Kipp's wrongful termination violated separate provisions of
Manual and the implied contract those provisions created.
Kipp's claim for breach of implied contract and the duty of good faith and fair
dealing alleges that the City breached the Manual's provisions regarding working
conditions and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by subjecting Kipp to
harassment, intimidation, and abuse. Complaint at ff 27-28 (R. at 7). Kipp's wrongful
termination claim also includes those allegations, but it goes beyond them, additionally
alleging that the City breached the Manual's implied contract by constructively
terminating him, under the precedent of Touchard, 2006 UT 71, f 27. By subjecting Kipp
to abusive, harassing, and hostile working conditions that a reasonable employee would

5

Although the Complaint uses the words "wrongful" and "tortious," those terms merely
indicate Plaintiffs recognition that a wrongful termination may have both tortious and
contractual aspects. The factual allegations underlying the Complaint control its
interpretation. See Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT App 537, <][ 13 (court determines the character of
a pleading by the facts set out in the pleading), rev'd on other grounds, 2007 UT 45.
49

have considered intolerable, and by ignoring his complaints and requests that the City
take remedial action to improve those conditions, the City forced him to resign. Id.
The essence of Kipp's wrongful termination claim is that the City constructively
terminated him and, by so doing, wrongfully deprived him of the procedures that the
Manual requires the City to follow when terminating an employee, amounting to a
separate breach of contract from the City's breach of §§ 406,408, and 508. Complaint
(R. at 7-8). Compare §§ 406, 408, and 508 (R. at 1590, 1592-93, and 1604-07,
respectively) with § 603 (R. at 1609) (procedure for disciplinary investigation); § 602(d)
and (e) (R. at 1609) (right to be informed of right to appeal discipline), § 604(c) (R. at
1611-12) (right to appeal to City Manager, City Council, or Board of Appeals), and
§ 701(a) (R. at 1613) (allowing termination at-will only of nan-regular employees).
Due to these distinctions, Kipp's wrongful termination claim is not duplicative of
his other contractual claims and was erroneously dismissed by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's
ruling granting Defendants
dants summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court.
Dated this / / day of November, 2008.
CRAKE U TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, P.C

tig L. Taylor
Willis F. McComas
Hal Armstrong
Bryan D. Nielsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (2003)
Immunity of governmental entities from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
govemmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and
from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique or essential core governmental functions and,
notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63- 30-10, governmental entities,
political subdivisions, and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resultingfromthe implementation of or the failure to:
(a) implement measures to control the causes of epidemic and communicable diseases and other
conditions significantly afifecting the public health or necessary to protect the public health as set
out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments;
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b,
Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined in
Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the President of the United States or other federal
official requesting public health-related activities.
(3) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical programs and services
performed at a state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to the core of
governmental activity in this state and are considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of
the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned university hospital or
provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of
their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by
physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a
court finds is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state.
(b) If any claim under this Subsection (3) exceeds the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the
claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legislature under Title
63, Chapter 6.

(4) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit for any injury
which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 62 A,
Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (2003)
Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation.
Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of
Sections 63-30-11, 63- 30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to
deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear
River Development Act, if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due to
drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in the amount of
available water.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (2003)
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee —
Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass,
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental
anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious
or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal
confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in
connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;

(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the
requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam,
reservoir, or other public improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b)fightingfire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations;
(e) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can
be rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(f) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any function pursuant to
Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources -Division
of Water Resources, which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law.
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101.

PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL

(a)
This Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual provides information concerning
the practices, standards of conduct, disciplinary measures and other policies and procedures, of
the City. Because of the changing nature of Federal and State laws, as well as the changing
needs of the City and its residents and employees, the policies and procedures in this manual
may be unilaterally added to, rescinded, or modified from time to time as may be decided by the
Bountiful City Council
(b)
No contract exists between Bountiful City and its employees with respect to
salary, salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or employee benefits. These may change
as a result of salary surveys, job analysis, appropriations of the City Council, or changes in City
policies and procedures.
(c)
This manual supersedes all prior policies and procedures of the City of Bountiful
which are inconsistent with the matters stated therein.
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105.

APPLICATION OF THIS MANUAL

(a)
These policies and procedures do not apply to the City Manager. The City
Manager's status, compensation, benefits and responsibilities are determined by State law and as
negotiated between the City Manager and the City Council.
(b)
Department heads are the City Recorder, City Treasurer, City Engineer, Police
Chief, Fire Chief, Water and Sewer Manager, Parks and Recreation Director, Light and Power
Director, Streets and Sanitation Superintendent, Planning Director, Information Systems
Manager, Administrative Services Director and the City Attorney. This manual applies to
department heads, except for those provisions relating to disciplinary actions. Department heads
may be terminated with or without cause, without appeal, as provided by State law. In the event
of involuntary termination for reasons other than dishonesty, department heads shall be
compensated with a lump sum severance pay of thirteen weeks' salary and 20% of accrued sick
leave up to a maximum of 288 hours, plus accrued vacation up to a maximum of 240 hours.
(c)
Regular employees are those individuals filling Council-authorized positions who
have successfully completed a probation period of one year, and who are expected to work 32 or
more hours per week on a year-round basis. This manual has been specifically intended to apply
to regular employees.
(d)
Probationary employees are those individuals hired to fill Council-authorized
positions who have yet to complete a probationary period of one year, and who are expected to
work 32 or more hours per week. This manual has been specifically intended to apply to
probationary employees, except for those provisions relating to disciplinary actions.
Probationary employees are strictly at-will employees and may be terminated with or without
cause, without appeal or procedure.
(e)
Non-regular employees are those individuals hired on a part-time, seasonal,
temporary or other basis. These policies and procedures apply to non-regular employees as to
hiring practices, employment policies and standards of conduct, but not otherwise. Benefits will
be paid only if required by law or by express provision of the position with the approval of the
City Manager. Non-regular employees are strictly at-will employees and may be terminated with
or without cause, without appeal or procedure.
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406.

WORK ENVIRONMENT

It is the policy of the City to promote a productive work environment that is a clean, safe
and hospitable place to which employees niay fulfill their responsibilities. Accordingly, City
policy will not tolerate verbal or physical conduct by any employee which harasses, disrupts, or
interferes with another's work performance or which creates an intimidating, offensive, or hostile
environment, nor will the City tolerate any such behavior toward, or from, members of the
general public. Employees are expected to act in a positive manner and contribute to a
productive environment
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WORK PLACE VIOLENCE

It is the policy of the City to provide, as far as possible based on the nature of our duties,
a work environment that is free of threatening conditions, violent behavior and criminal activity.
Oral or written threats, physical assault, harassment, intentional damage, and every other act or
threat of violence by City employees is strictly prohibited.
It is the responsibility of all employees to notify the Department Head when there has
been as act or threat of violence, whether actual, express, or implied. In a situation of immediate
danger, the Police Department should be immediately notified.
All incidents of work place violence are to be reported immediately to the Department
Head, who shall in turn notify the City Attorney. It is the responsibiUty of all employees to fully
cooperate with any City investigation into an incident of work place violence.
Work place violence is grounds for termination of employment from the City.
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STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

(a)
Employment is subject to meeting the performance and conduct requirements of
the employee's job to the satisfaction of the City. Employees who fail to satisfy these
requirements may be subject to disciplinary action from warnings to termination. The standards
set out below are as complete as can reasonably be made, but are not necessarily all-inclusive.
(b)
Employees are expected at all times to conduct themselves in a positive manner
so as to promote the best interests of the City and the public. Such conduct includes:
(1)

Applying one's self folly to assigned duties during work hours.

(2)
Reporting to work punctually as scheduled and being at the proper work
station, ready for work, at the assigned starting time.
(3)

Giving proper advance notice whenever unable to work or repot on time.

(4)
When away from work for any reason, keeping supervisors informed as to
the reason, expected duration, the date and/or time of anticipated return, and, when
required, furnishing medical or other documentation justifying the absence.
(5)

Prudent and frugal use of City funds, equipment, vehicles, and supplies.

(6)

Complying with all safety and security regulations.

(7)

Wearing clothing appropriate for the work being performed.

(8)

Maintaining work place and work area cleanliness and orderliness.

(9)

Treating the public, visitors and co-workers in a courteous manner.

(10) Refraining from conduct that is offensive or undesirable, or which is
contrary to the City's best interests.
(11) Performing assigned tasks efficiently and in accord with established
quality standards.
(12) Reporting to management suspicious, unethical or illegal conduct by the
public, visitors or co-workers.
(13)

Co-operating with City investigations.

(c)
The following conduct is prohibited and may subject the individual involved to
disciplinary action up to and including termination:
(1)

Violation of City or departmental policies and procedures.

(2)
The use of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs during working hours,
reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or the use, sale, dispensing or
possessing of alcohol and/or illegal drugs or narcotics on City premises.
(3)

The use of profanity or abusive language.

(4)

Chronic tardiness.

(5)
The possession of firearms or other weapons on City property, unless
connected with the City work assignment of the employee.
(6)
Insubordination, or the refusal by an employee to follow management's
instructions concerning a job-related matter, or the refusal to perform a function of the
job when capable of doing so.
(7)

Violence, fighting, or assault on a co-worker or member of the public.

(8)
Unauthorized possession or use, theft, destruction, defacement or misuse
of City property, or that of another employee or member of the public.
(9)
Recording conversations with other employees or supervisors without the
knowledge of all the parties involved.
(10)

Gambling on City property.

(11)

Falsifying or altering any City record or report.

(12)

Threatening or intimidating co-workers or members of the public.

(13)

Absence from work or work station without authorization or excuse.

(14)

Smoking where prohibited.

(15)

Sleeping while on duty.

(16) Failure to wear assigned safety equipment or failure to abide by safety
rules and policies.
(17)

Conduct endangering the safety of employees or the public.

(18) Improper attire or inappropriate personal appearance, or failure to wear
required uniforms.
(19)

Inducing or attempting to induce any City employee to violate any City

(20)

Engaging in any form of sexual or other harassment

policy.

(21) Incompetency, inefficiency, poor workmaaship, misfeasance, malfeasance
or nonfeasance in the performance of job duties, or neglect ofjob duties.
(22)
(23)
supervisors.
(24)

Dishonesty in word or conduct.
Failure to be courteous or cooperative with the public, co-workers or
Falsification of City records or reports.

(25) Failure to conduct one's self in a professional and competent manner
appropriate to the position.
(26)

Unauthorized use, or abuse, of City vehicles or equipment.

(27)

Unauthorized performance of City services.

(28) Failure to maintain eligibility for a driving license, when driving is
necessary to the discharge of City duties.
(29) Failure to maintain sldlls and professional licensing, when such skills or
licensing are necessary to the discharge of City duties.
(30)

Violation of the criminal laws, whether Federal, State or local.

(31)

Unlawful discrimination of any nature.

(32) Failure to keep confidential City matters which are of a delicate, sensitive,
or private nature by law, custom, policy or instruction of supervisor.
(33)

Abuse of sick leave, bereavement leave, jury duty or other paid or unpaid

(34)

Unauthorized possession of a firearm or other deadly weapon.

leave.

(35) Conduct off the job which discredits the City or affects the employee's
ability to perform his/her duties effectively.
(36)

Failure to cooperate with an investigation.

(37)

Unjustified interference with the work of other City Employees.

(38) Failure to comply with any policy or agreement with the City concerning
the use of equipment, including personal cellular telephone agreements.

Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual of the City of Bountiful
601. GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
It is the policy of the City that all employees are expected to comply with the City's
standards of conduct and performance, including all matters set forth in this manual, City
policies as may be elsewhere expressed, and any applicable departmental policies and
procedures, and that any non-compliance with these standards may be remedied by appropriate
disciplinary action.
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DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

(a)
Under normal circumstances, the City endorses a policy of progressive discipline
in which it attempts to provide employees with notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to
improve. However, where the non-compliance is grave, more serious discipline may be applied,
up to and including termination, even when there is no prior disciplinary history.
(b)
An employee whose conduct violates these policies and procedures may be
subject to one or more of the following actions, depending upon the judgment of the supervisor
and/or Department Head of the severity of the offense and the employee's previous performance
record:
(1)
An oral warning, to be documented and placed in the employee's
personnel file. The fact that the oral warning is documented does not convert it into a
written reprimand. An immediate supervisor, a Department Head or the City Manger
may issue an oral warning.
(2)
A written reprimand, with a copy to be placed in the employee's personnel
file. A Department Head or the City Manager may issue a written reprimand.
(3)
Suspension or other time off without pay, or forfeiture of accrued leave of
up to 30 days. A Department Head or the City Manager may issue an order of
suspension. An employee on suspension shall be responsible for the continuation of
his/her employment benefits.
(4)
Demotion by either moving an employee to a position of lesser
responsibility and compensation, or by keeping the employee in the current position but
at a lesser compensation. A Department Head or City Manager may demote an
employee.
(5)
Termination from employment with the City. A Department Head or the
City Manager may terminate an employee.
(c)
Pending a full investigation into the alleged violations, the City may, when it
deems it to be in the best interests of the City and/or the employee, (1) suspend an employee and
relieve him/her of all City duties, with pay, or (2) temporarily reassign an employee to another
position or work location at the same rate of pay. In such case, if the employee is found to be
innocent, he/she shall be reinstated without loss of seniority or credits of any kind.
(d)
An employee will be informed of the alleged violation and given an opportunity
to present his/her explanation of the event or conduct in question prior to any disciplinary action
being taken. Discipline shall not be imposed upon there is a determination that facts sufficient
for discipline exist

(e)
Except for oral warnings, an employee will be given a notice, in writing, of the
disciplinary action and of his/her right to appeal the same.
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DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIONS

(a)
Before any disciplinary action (except for oral reprimands) may be taken against
an employee, the following steps shall be taken:
(1)
him/her.

The employee should be given written notice of the claims against

(2)
Prior to a determination of what discipline is to be imposed, if any, the
employee shall be given the oppoitunity to respond verbally and/or in writing to the
claims alleged. A record of the response shall be made. No disciplinary decision shall be
made at the time of the employee's explanation.
(3)
If, after due deliberation, it is determined by the Department Head that
discipline is appropriate, the employee shall be advised in writing of the findings and
discipline.
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604.

DISCIPLINARY APPEALS

Once the Department Head has determined upon a disciplinary action, it shall be
implemented immediately. A regular employee has the right of appeal, but, except in the case of
suspensions, during the pendency of the appeal the action taken shall be in effect. In the even
that the action taken is overturned on appeal, the employee shall be reinstated without loss of
pay, seniority or credits of any kind. Suspensions shall not be implemented until after all appeals
have been concluded.
There shall be a right of appeal of discipline in regular employees, as follows:
(a)

Oral Warnings.

(1)
If given by a supervisor, an oral warning may be appealed to the
Department Head. If an oral warning is given by the Department Head or the City
Manager, there is no right of appeal.
(2)
The appeal shall be made by the aggrieved employee by filing with the
Department Head, within ten days of the issuance of the oral warning, a written statement
of the appeal. The statement shall set forth the nature of the oral warning, the
circumstances in which it arose, and the reasons why the employee is appealing its
issuance.
(3)
The Department Head shall immediately notify the supervisor of the
appeal. Unless extenuating circumstances are present, the supervisor shall file a written
response to the appeal within ten days from the date of the filing of the appeal. The
employee shall be furnished a copy of the response.
(4)
Within ten days, or as soon thereafter as is practical, of the filing of the
appeal, the Department Head shall review the appeal and the response. The employee
shall be given the opportunity in person to informally review the appeal with the
Department Head. At the request of the Department Head, the supervisor shall also be
present. Within fifteen days, or as soon thereafter as is practical, of the filing of the
appeal, the Department Head shall determine whether to uphold, modify or disallow the
oral warning. The Department Head may not increase the severity of the discipline, such
as by increasing an oral warning to a written reprimand. The employee shall be notified
in writing of the decision of the Department Head.
(b)

Written Reprimands and Suspensions.

(1)
A written reprimand or a suspension may be appealed from the
Department Head to the City Manager, but there is no further right of appeal. A written
reprimand or suspensionfromthe City Manager may not be appealed.

(2)
The appeal shall be made by the aggrieved employee by filing with the
Department Head, within ten days of the issuance of the written reprimand, a written
statement of the appeal The statement shall set forth the nature of the written reprimand
or suspension, the circumstances in which it arose, and the reasons why the employee is
appealing its issuance.
(3)
The Department Head shall immediately notify the City Manager of the
appeal. Unless extenuating circumstances are present, the Department Head shall file a
written response to the appeal within ten days from the date of the filing of the appeal.
The employee shall be furnished a copy of the response.
(4)
Within ten days of the filing of the appeal, or as soon thereafter as is
practical, the City Manager shall review the appeal and the response. The employee shall
be given the opportunity in person to informally review the appeal with the City
Manager. At the request of the filing of the appeal, or as soon thereafter as is practical,
the City Manager shall determine whether to uphold, modify or disallow the written
reprimand or suspension. The City Manager may not increase the severity of the
discipline, such as by increasing a written reprimand to a suspension, or a suspension to a
demotion. The employee shall be notified in writing of the decision of the City Manager.
(c)

Demotions and Terminations.

(1)
Demotions and terminations may be appealed to the City Manager, the
Board of Appeals and the City Council.
(2)
City Manager: The appeal to the City Manager shall be made in the same
manner as described in the preceding section for Written Reprimands and Suspensions.
(3)

Board of Appeals.

(i)
If the aggrieved employee wishes to appeal further, the appeal
shall be made by the aggrieved employee by filing with the City Recorder, within
ten days of the issuance of the decision of the City Manager, a written request that
the appeal be heard by the Board of Appeals.
(ii)
The City Recorder shall immediately notify the Board of Appeals
of the appeal. The Board shall be furnished with the written appeal documents of
the aggrieved employee, the response of the supervisor and/or Department Head,
and the written decision of the City Manager.
(iii) The Board of Appeals shall take and receive evidence and fully
hear and determine the appeal. The aggrieved employee shall be entitled to
appear in person, be represented by counsel, have a public hearing, confront the
witnesses whose testimony is to be considered, examine the evidence to be
considered by the Board, and call such witnesses and submit such relevant
evidence as he/she deems desirable. The City Attorney or his/her designee shall
present the case in support of the disciplinary action, may present such witnesses

and relevant evidence as he/she deems desirable, and may cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the appellant.
(iv)
Within fifteen days of the filing of the appeal, the Board of
Appeals shall hold a hearing and determine whether to uphold, modify or disallow
the disciplinary decision of the City Manager. The Board of Appeals, after
concluding the hearing, may deliberate in private. Its decision shall be made by
secret ballot. A majority vote of the Board is required to sustain a disciplinary
action. The Board may not increase the severity of the discipline originally
imposed by the Department Head, such as by increasing a demotion to a
termination. However, if the City Manager lessened the original discipline, the
Board may in its discretion increase the severity of the discipline back to that
originally imposed by the Department Head. The employee shall be notified in
writing of the decision of the Board of Appeals.
(4)

The City Council:

(i)
If the aggrieved employee wishes to appeal further, the appeal
shall be made by the aggrieved employee by filing with the City Recorder, within
fourteen days of the issuance of the decision of the Board of Appeals, a written
request that the appeal be heard by the City Council.
(ii)
The City Recorder shall at the next City Council meeting notify the
appeal. The City Council shall be furnished with the written appeal documents of
the aggrieved employee, the response of the supervisor and/or Department Head,
the transcript or tape recording of the proceedings before the Board of Appeals,
and the written decisions of the City Manager and the Board of Appeals.
(iii) The City Council shall hear the appeal in the nature of an appellate
court. No new evidence may be submitted, and no witnesses may be called. The
aggrieved employee shall be entitled to appear in person, be represented by
counsel, have a public hearing, submit written argument based on the existing
record at least five days prior to the hearing, and make oral arguments before the
Council either himself/herself or through counsel at the hearing, or both. The
City Attorney or his/her designee shall present the case in support of disciplinary
action, may submit written argument based on the existing record at least two
days prior to the hearing, and may make oral arguments before the Council at the
hearing.
(iv)
Within fifteen days of the notification of the appeal by the City
Recorder, or as soon thereafter as is practical, the City Council shall hold a
hearing and determine whether to uphold, modify or disallow the disciplinary
decision of the Board of Appeals. The City Council, after concluding the hearing,
may deliberate in executive session. Its decision shall be made in open session.
A majority vote of the Council is required to sustain the disciplinary action. The
Council may not increase the severity of the discipline originally imposed by the
Department Head, as by increasing a demotion to a termination. However, if the

City Manager or Board of Appeals lessened the original discipline, the Council
may in its discretion increase the severity of the discipline back to that originally
imposed by the Department Head. The employee shall be notified in writing of
the decision of the City Council.
(v)

The decision of the City Council is final.

Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual of the City of Bountiful
701.

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

(a)
Department Heads are authorized to terminate at their discretion the employment
of any employee filling a non-regular employment position.
(b)
Non-regular employees are free to resign from employment at any time. The City
requests, however, that such employees provide their supervisor or Department Head with as
much prior notice as possible. This will enable the City to find an adequate replacement in a
timely manner.

STANLEY J, PRESTON (4119)
MARALYN M. REGER (8468)
BRYAN M. SCOTT (9J81)
SNOW, CHRISTBNSBN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Sait JLqke Crty, Utah 84146
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
RUSSELL L. MAHAN (2059)
BOUNTIFUL CITY ATTORNEY
790 South 100 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OH DAVIS COUNTY"
STATE OF UTAH

KJJPP CABANESS and DOES 1-20,
Plaintiffe,

vs.
BRENT THOMAS, CLIFFORD C.
MICHAELIS and BOUNTIFUL CITY,
Defendants.

ORDER:
(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59
AND 60(b) MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND COURT'S FINAL ORDER;
(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE; AND
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO STRIKE
Civil No. 040700494
Judge Glen R. Dawson

The Rule 59 and Ride 60(b) Motion to Alter or Amend Courts Final Order and
Incorporated Memorandafiledby plaintiff Kip Cabaness ("plaintiff"), together with Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike and Overrule Defendants' Objection to the Consideration by the Court of the
MdavitandFsychologioal Keport of Br, Ri&kD:HawksBa,D>>^ well us the Motion to Strifethe Affidavits of Matthew HHton, Bonnie Quinn and Kenneth E, Meais,filedby defendants
Brent Thomas, Clifford C. Miehaelis and Bountiful City (collectively "defendants"), aU came on
regularly for hearing before the above-referenced Court, the Honorable Judge Glen I t Dawson
presiding, on March 24,2008, Plaintiff was represented by Willis F, McComas of Craig L.
Taylor & Associates and Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton P.C. Defendants were represented
by Stanley I Preston and Bryan M« Soott of Snow, Christensen & Martineau and Russell L.
Mahan, the Bountiful City Attorney,
Tie Court* havingfirilyreviewed the motions, memoranda, exhibits and affidavits filed
by the parties regarding the referenced motions, having heard oral argument by the parties'
respective counsel, and being M y advised in the premises,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS;
1,

Plaintiffs Rule 59 and RuLe 60(b) Motion to Alter or Amend Court's Final Order

is denied tor the reasons set forfh in defendants' memoranda, and the reasons articulated 'by the
Court at hearing in this matter, inoluding the following:
(a)

The Court is comfortable with the grounds upon which it made its

decision herein, as articulated in the Court's Final Order and its Memorandum

2

Decision, and does not believe that its decision was made in error.
(b)

The Court has considered the cases which plaintiff claims

constitute "newtew"and has d&ermimd that, even if new case law constitutes a
proper basis "for granting a Rule t>9 and/or Rule 60(b) motion, toe tames du nut
constitute new law, nor do they alter the Court's decision.
(c)

hi addition, none of the evidence upon which plaintiff's motion

relies coxistitutes "newly discovered evidence" which satisfies the applicable due
diligence requirement under ibe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, such that it could
not have been previously discovered and timely submitted prior to or during the
summaiy judgment stage of these proceedings. Even if the Court were to consider
this evidence, however, the Court determines that it is cumulative and incidental,
and would not change lie Court's decision.
2,

Defendants* Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Matthew Hilton, Bonnie Qninn

and Kenneth Mears is granted to the <Mmt set forth below, for the reasons set forth in
defendants' memoranda, and the reasons articulated by the Court at hearing in this matter,
including the following:
(a)

With Regards to Mr, Hilton's Affidavit the Court strikes

paragraphs 1-9 and 18-26, as well as ail of the footnotes in this Affidavit on the
grounds that they are irrelevant and/or contain legal argument Paragraphs 10-17
of Mr. Hilton's Affidavit are relevant to, and were considered by tto Court only as
3

theyreiateto, the issue of whether plaintiff was surprised by defendants'
arguments during the summary judgment stage of Ms case. The Court, however,
determines that there has not been a sufficient showing of surprise by plaintiff
pursuant tu Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure to receive Mr, Hilton'sAffidavit
(b)

In addition, the Affidavits of Mr. Mears and Ms. Quinn are stricken

on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary Showing of
surprise. In addition, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the applicable due diligence
requirement with respect to these two Affidavits, le., that the information
contained therein could not have been previously discovered and timely submitted
prior to or during the summary judgment stage of these proceedings. Regardless,
even if the Court were to consider these two Affidavits, the evidence therein is
cumulative and incidental, and it would not change the Court's decision.
3.

Finally, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Overrule Defendants' Objection to the

Consideration hy the Court of the Affidavit and Psychological Report of Dr. Rick D. Hawks
Ed,D., is denied. It is the best view of the Court that defendants' arguments as they relate to the
Affidavit of Dr. Hawks should not be disregarded. Dr. Hawk's Affidavit does not constitute new
evidence that satisfies tie above-referenced due diligence standard. Morever, Ellison v. Stam,
2006 Ut App 150,136 P.3d 1242, does not create new law, and even if considered does not
change the Court's decision.
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DATED (bis J&_day of

A^uJ1

, 2008.

BY THE COURT:

^"CLc-K^O-Oii

x-t"

Judge GJen R. Dawson
District Court Judge

APPRQVED AS TO FORM:
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.

By:

rttMfa

Date:

Craig L. Taylor
Willis F.McComas
Matthew Hilton
Attorneys for Plaiatifif Kip Cabauess
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ZODB APR 15 A D l f l
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE SECOKp SiSl rt -;c; COURT
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendants, and that I caused to be served ORDER: (1) DENYING
HPLA1NTIFPS RULE 59 AND 60(b)MOTIOW TO ALTER OR AMEND COURTS
HNAL ORDER; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRDQE; AND (3)
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STREKE (Case Number 040700494) upon the
following parties this /V^day of April, 2008, by facsimile and first class mail, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Craig L. Taylor, Esq.
...Willis F, McComas, Esq,
472 North Main Street
Kaysville, UT 84037
Matthew Hilton, Esq.
P.O. Box 1004
Kaysville, UT 84037
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IN THE SECOND DCSTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KIPP CABANESS and DOES 1-20,
Plaintiffs.
vs.

$37

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: (1)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2)
PXAINTDTF'S MOTION" FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BRENT THOMAS, CLIFFORD C.
MiCHAELIS and BOUNTIFUL CITY'.

Civil No. 040700494

Defendants.

Judge Glen R. Dawson

Tin's mutter came for a hearing before this Coun. the Honorable Glen R. Dawson
presiding on July 26.2006. August 10. 2006. and August 17. 2006. The Court having reviewed
the pleadings and record in this matter, heard the parties* arguments, and considered the
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applicable legal authority, the Court hereby enters this Memorandum Decision on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 17, 2005, ("Defendants' Summary Judgment
xMotion" or "Defs/ SJ Mcm/'X and on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated
November 11,2005, ("Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion" or "PL's SJ Mom/"). In so dding,
the Court has viewed the facts and ail reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,
L

Claim for Breach of Contract Against the City,
A-

The Manual* The City is entitled to summary judgment on die Breach of

Contract claim. Plaintiffs breach df contract claim is based on the allegation that certain
provisions in the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual (the "Manual") created an
implied contract between the City and plaintiff. See Compl. H 23-24, For example, plaintiff
asserts that the following sections of the Manual created an implied contract between plaintiff
and the City:
406.

WORK ENVIRONMENT
It is the policy of the City to promote a productive work environment that
is a clean, safe, and hospitable place in which employees may fulfill their
responsibilities. Accordingly, City policy will not tolerate verbal or
physical conduct by any employee which harasses, disrupts, or interferes
with another's work performance or which creates an intimidating*
offensive, or hostile environment, nor v\ ill the City tolerate any such
behavior toward, or from, members of the general public. Employes are •
expected to act in a positive manner and contribute to a productive
environment.
* #«
i
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408,

ZOOS/9/2

WORK PLACE VIOLENCE
It is the policy of the City to prcfvide a work environment that is free of
threatening conditions, violent behavior, and criminal activity, Oral or
written threats, physica] assault, harassment, intentional damage, and every
other act or threat of violence is strictly prohibited,
# *#

409.

SEXUAL AND OTHER HARASSMENT

b.

Airy behavior or conduct of a harassing or discriminating nature, including
that of o sexual nature, which is pervasive, unwelcome, demeaning,
ridiculing, derisive or coercive, or results in a hostile, abusive or
intimidating work environment, constitutes harassment and shall not be
tolerated by the City.

e,

Any employee who believes that the actions or words of a
supervisor or fellow employee constitute unwelcome harassment or
discrimination has a responsibility to report or complain ns soon as
possible to his/her Department Head. If the complaint involves a
Department Head it should be directed to the City Manager. AH
complaints of this nature should be in writing and should document
specific information regarding the harassment, This information
should include dates, times, places, witnesses, and specific types of
harassment Malicious or frivolous complaints of harassment or
discrimination may result in disciplinary action against the accuser.
* #%

gt

If an employee is not satisfied with either the handling of a
complaint or the action taken by the Department Head, ho or she
shall bring the complaint to the attention of the Ck\ Manager. The
City Manager shall then investigate the charges and respond in
writing to the employee as quickly as possible,

PL's SJ Mem. Ex. H.

3
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The Manual also contains the following disclaimer:
101.
b.

PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL
No coittract exists between Bountiful City and its employees with respect
to salary, salary ranges, movement with salary ranges, or employee
benefits. These may change as a result of salary sarveys, job analysis,
appropriations by the City Council, or changes in City policies and
procedures.

Defs. * SJ Mem. Ex. E, It is undisputed that plaintiff received copies of the Manual frora time to
time as a City employee and that he was generally familiar with the Manual's contents. See
Cabaness DepO. at 98.
Both plaintiff and defendants have requested and agreed that the Court has before it all of
the facts necessary to determine whether a contract exists between plaintiff and the City based on
the above-referenced provisions in the Manual and, indeed, both plaintiff and defendants have
moved for summary judgment on this issue, indicating that the parties do not believe there are
material issues of disputed fact which would preclude the Court from ruling on whether the
Manual did create a contract between the City and plaintiff.
The Court, having reviewed the provisions of the Manual cited by plaintiff, has
determined that those pro\ i.sions are not ambiguous. Based upon the undisputed facts and
evidence before the Court, as a matter of law. Section 101 .b of the *\ Ianual. as set forth above.
constitutes a clear and conspicuous disclaimer that there is no contract between the Ciry and
plaintiff with respect to salary, salary ranges, movement with salary ranges, or employee benefits.

4
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The undisputed facts and evidence before the Court also establish that Sections 406, 408 and 409
of the Manual, as set forth above, state certain policies and goals of the City, and serve as a
warning to City employees not to engage in the misconduct discussed in these policies. By
setting forth these policies in its Manual, however, the City is not promising its employees, either
expressly or impliedly, that the misconduct prohibited by these policies will not occur in the
wofk pteee, nor is it undertaking an express or implied contractual obligation with its employees
to protect themfromsuch misconduct. Based on the undisputed facts and evidence before fhe
Court, no reasonable jury could find that there is an issue of fact regarding whether a contract
exists between the plaintiff and the City with respect to the provisions of the Manual plaintiff has
relied upon in this case. Because there is no contract, there is no implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and defendants are entitled to judgment on any Such claim as a matter of law.
to sum, as a matter of law, the provisions of the Manual cited by plaintiff do not create a
contract between plaintiff and the City as to the issues raised in this lawsuit. The language in the
Manual is not ambiguous and there is no triable issue of fact as it relates to this claim.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Breach of Contract claim.
B.

Governmental Immunity. In addition, defendants are entitled to summary

judgment ou the breach of contract claim because the cluim is based on the same conduct-that
plaintiff alleges inflicted menial aguish and the damages plaintiff alleges to have .suffered as a
result of the City's alleged breach of contract all arise from the alleged infliction of mental
anguish. See CompL fj[ 14-29. Pursuant to applicable case law. the Court is required to look to
5
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the underlying injury lo determine whether immunity is waived under the Utah Governmental
immunity Act (the •'Act")1, Tegardless of how plaintiff has styled or pled the claim. Accordingly,
plaintiffs breach of contract claim rs barred under the Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(2), for the reasons set forth in defendants' supporting memoranda, and pursuant to Lettfors \\
Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162. 1166 (Utah 1993) and Butler, Crockett & Walsh
Development Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 402 (per curiam mem. decision), because
plaintiffs alleged injury arose out of the alleged infliction of mental anguish, which is condtict
specifically described in § 63-30-10(2). As a result, governmental immunity is preserved and the
City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of-contact claim.2
H.

Claim for Wrongful Constructive Termination Against the City,
Plaintiffs wrongful constructive termination claim is pled as a tort claim, not a contract

claim. This claim is based on defendants* alleged ''wrongful and tortious conduct" and plaintiff
seeks punitive damages under this claim.. Compl. U 31-35. The only tort claim for wrongful
constructive termination recognized by Utah case law is where a termination "contravenes a clear
and substantial public policy/* Hansen v. America Online. 2004 UT 62, f 7, 96 P.3d 950 (citing

'Following plaintiffs resignation, the Act has been amended and renumbered. S^e Utah
Code Ann. $ 63-3(kl-30I(5)(b). In revising the Act, however, the Legislature indicated its intent
thai the previous version govern an allegation of injury that occurred before Julv I. 2(XM. See
Cunlkhl v. Upton City. 2005 UT 60,'!(7 n.2, 122 P,3d 622.
:

Based on its ruling herein* the Court does notfindit necessary lo rule on the issue of
whether, if there had been a contract and the claim was not barred by die Act. plaintiff would
have been able to recover emotional distress damages under his breach of contract claim.
6
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Peterson \\ Browning. 832 P.2d 1280, J284 (Utah 1992)). However, plaintiff has failed to allege
anywhere in his Complaint that defendants violated a "clear and .substantial public policy/* Cf
Compl. f l 30-35. fadced, no public policy Is identified in plaintiffs allegations by name or
description. See id. In addition, the undisputed facts and evidence before the Court establish that
plaintiff has failed to show that he was terminated in violation of a "clear and substantial public
policy," as defined by applicable Utah case law. The alleged harassing conduct of Mr. Thortias
(and the City's and Mr. Michaelis' alleged failure to stop that alleged conduct) does not
contravene a clear public policy that is '"plainly defined by Jegislative enactments, constitutional
standards, or judicial decisions/' Hodges v\ Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151,165-66 (Utah
1991),
In addition, plaintiffs tort claim for wrongful termination against the City is barred by the
Act pursuant.to Broadbent v. Board of Education of Cache County School District, 910 P.2d
1274,1276 (Utah Ct, App. 1996). Also, to the extent plaintiff is claiming that his wrongful
constructive termination claim is a contract claim, as opposed to a tort claim, it is duplicative of
his breach of contract claim, and fails for the same reasons that Ms breach of contract claim fails,
as set forth above.
fn sum, plaintiff has failed to state a wrongful termination claim under Utah Iav\\ nnd
hased on the undisputed facts, the City is entitled ro judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

7
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III,

Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Defendants,
This claim is barred by the Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 6300-10(2). Plaintiff has

not opposed summary judgment on this claim and has requested to withdraw this claim.
IV.

Claim for'PunitiveDamages Against tfre City.
Plaintiffs alleged claim for punitive damages against the City is barred by the Act

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-22(1 )(a). Plaintiff has not opposed summary judgment on
this claim and concedes he is not seeking punitive damages against the City.
V.

Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Mr. Thomas and Mr.
Michadis.
It is undisputed that, on August 4, 1997, plaintiffs medical records state plaintiff was

diagnosed as suffering from depression and anxiety as a result of stress from his supervisor at
work and from the fact that he was supervising a work crew. See Medical Records Bates No.
B000760 attached to Affidavit of Sandra Smith hi PL's SJ Mem. Ex. V. The Court has reviewed
plaintiffs Complaint, his entire deposition and his affidavit, as well as all other admissible
evidence that is properly in the record before the Court. Among other things, plaintiff has
alleged that Mr, Thomas engaged in the following conduct towards plaintiff:
(i)

asked plaintiff how he liked doing Mr, Tuttfe's work:

(ii)

told plaintiff to change the way plaintiff and his crew were pulling wire
and threatened lo fire plaintiff for being insubordinate:

(iii)

reprimanded plaintiff for turning off electrical circuits during a snow
storm:

8
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(iv)

told plaintiff that two of his crew members were cutting a telephone pole
incorrectly and then stomped away;

(v)

told plaintiff that he did not want plaintiff and his crew to work on the pole
that they were working on but he wanted them to work on a different pole
first;.

(vi)

was reluctant to let plaiiltiff and other employees look at new trucks and
finally threw the truck keys on the ground anil said.fc*goahfiad, fine, Took
at the truck";

(vii)

in a sarcastic manner told employees to get their jobs done;

(viii) for five or six months ignored plaintiffs comments regarding blown fuses
on a power line by an elementary school that plaintiff felt was potentially
hazardous for school children;
(ix)

on one occasion would not let one of the employees replace the workers'
rubber gloves but rather made him help clean the warehouse;

OO

slammed a pager on the table and told plaintiff he was going to have to do
Steve Knighton's job;

(.xi)

made the employees work in the rain:

l.xiij

made the employees certify theiaseKes with the power department safety
manual on their own time; and

(xiii) threatened to fire plaintiff.

9
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Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Mr. Michaelis is based on the
allegation thai Mr. Michaelis allowed Mr. Thomas to engage in the conduct described above, and
failed to stop or prevent Mr. Thomas from engaging in such conduct.
Plaintiff has focused on two events as the primary evidence to support his cltrim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. First is an incident occurring on July 30, 2003 (the
"OSHA Incident") and second is an employee meeting held on September 9,2003.
Wirh respect to the OSHA Incident, plaintiff alleges that, on July 30,2003, Mr. Thomas
ordered Bountiful Power employees to jack-hammer a concrete block that encased plastic conduit
containing "live0 electrical conductors. See PL's SJ Mem. Ex. S. It is undisputed, however, that
plaintiff was not present during the OSHA Incident because he was on a leave of absence from
July 23,2003, until September 8, 2003, based on his doctor's order, See Affidavit of Dr. David
Vande Merwe f 7, attached as Ex. W. to PI/s SJ Mem. Plaintiff has argued at length and relied
heavily on the OSHA Incident as a primary basis for his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim based on the fact that, even though he was not present, it was his crew that was
ordered to perform the uasafe work.
With respect to the second incident, on September 9, 2003. the day after plaintiff returned
to work from his leave of absence, he attended an cmplojee meeting v\ herein Mr. Knighton
alleged that Mr. Thomas "belittled and berated [pluintiff| and told him. in the presence of all of
the employes, that he was considering firing him. He also brought up some personal matters
involving [plaintiff] and ridiculed him in the presence of the other employees." Steve Knighton

10
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Affidavit f 19, attached as Ex, II to PL's SJ Mem. Mr. Knighton wont on fo say that he found
Mr. Thomas' behavior to be "unforgivable." Id.
Among other legal authority, die Court has reviewed Sorensen r. Barbitro. 2006 UT APP
40121; Retlwrford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc.* 844 P.2d 949, 970
(Utah 1992); and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965), regarding the standard
Utah courts have adopted to determine whether the conduct in question meets the threshold level
of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to coastittrte a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Plaintiff has argued that although he was not present during the OSHA Incident, pursuant
to Hatch w Davis, 2006 UT 44, he nonetheless should be allowed to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because of the exception to the "presence" rule as set forth in
Hatch', In Hatcht the Court identified the following four factors which should be considered in
determining whether an exception to the presence rule should be allowed:
In considering whether conduct triggers the exception, a finder of fact may
consider {I) the relationship ol the target of the conduct to the plaintiff. (2) the
relationship between the person committing the conduct and die plaintiff, and (3)
the egregiousness of the conduct. Finally, (4) a plaintiff must establish that the
conduct was undertaken, in whole or in part, with the intention of inflicting injury
to the absent plaintiff.
hi at % 27. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence to .satisfy the fourth factor
identified in Natch. In addition, the fact that the OSHA Incident involved plaintiffs crew is
insufficient to warrant an exception to the "presence" rule. Accordingly, the Court concludes

11

lQOZ/9/Z

OSOZOOiAfd QZ'lZ'-Zl ZO02/S/S

that the OSHA Incident should not be considered in determining whether Mr. Thomas* conduct
constituted extreme and outrageous conduct towards plaintiff,
With respect to the employee meeting on September 9V 2003, the Court concludes that the
majority of the allegations made by Mr. Knighton are conclusory and insufficient to support a
finding that.Mr. Thomas engaged in the requisite extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to
constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, even talcing all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the evidence does not show that Mr. Thomas or Mr.
Michaelis engaged in conduct that meets the threshold level of extreme and outrageous conduct
necessary to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, threats to
terminate an employee, insults, and indignities are not enough to trigger a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See Boisjoly v. Morton TJwikol, Inc., 712 R Supp. 1514,1522
(D, Utah i 989); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d (1965).
Accordingly based on the undisputed and admissible evidence before the Court, the
Court concludes that Mr, Thomas' alleged conduct does not meet the threshold level of extreme
and outrageous conduct necessary to constitute a claim hv intentional infliction of emotional
distress, as a matter of law. Further, a reasonable jury could not find that the alleged conduct of
Mr. Thomas constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to constitute a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Thomas. Likewise, based on the
undisputed and admissible esidenee before the Court, the Court concludes that Mr. Miehaelis'
alleged conduct does wot meet the threshold level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary

12
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to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as a matter of law.. Further, a
reasonable jury could not find that Mr. Michaelis1 alleged conduct and failure to act constitutes
extreme and outrageous conduct Sufficient to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Mr. Michaelis.
Therefore, the Court holds that plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Mr. Thomas and Mr, Michaelis fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs claim for
punitive damages against Mr. Thomas and/or Mr. Michaelis is denied as a matter of course
because the Court finds that there is no cause of action based in tort that would support the
awarding of punitive damages.
VI.

Notice of Claim
ft is undisputed that plaintiff served his notice of claim on Kim Coteman, the Botwtifii]

City Recorder, on March 31,2004. See PL's SJ Mem. Ex. AA» Based on the undisputed facts,
plaintiff properly served his Notice of Claim on defendants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-3011. Although the terms "fraud" and "malice" are not specifically used in plaintiffs Notice of
Claim in regards to the allegations against Mr. Thomas and Mr. Michaclis, the allegations in the
Notice of Claim are sufficient to conclude that malice has been alleged against Mr. Thomas and
Mr. Michaelis. In asserting a claim again-st Mr. Thomas and Mr. Michaelis for individual
liability, plaintiff is not required to use the specific terms "fraud** and "malice" in his Notice of
Claim against the individual defendants. 5<je PJ. ex reL Jensen v. L'talu 2006 WL 1702585, 13
(D, Utah 2006). There is sufficient detail in the Notice of Claim to put all of die defendants on
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nonce of the claims against them, including a claim for punitive damages against the individuol
defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-i I.
VII.

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be

denied in its entirety for the following reasons:
(a)

Based on the Court's ruling granting Defendants' Sunim'ary Judgment

Motion, it would be inconsistent to grant Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion on
certain issues raised by plaintiff in Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion.
(b)

Based on the Court's ruling granting Defendants1 Summary Judgment

Motion, various issues raised in Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion have been
rendered moot and rhe Court need not decide said issues raised by Plaintiffs Summary
Judgment Motion.
(c)

Both parties have agreed that all of the facts and evidence necessary to

determine whether there was a contract-between plaintiff and the City are before the
Court. Hie Court has concluded that, based on rhe undisputed evidence and taking all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of plaintiff* there was no contract
between the plaintiff ami the City a.s to the issues raised by plaintiff in this case.
(d)

Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is also barred by the Immunity Act,

inasmuch as it is based on an injury that "arises out of, [isJ in connection with, or results
from... infliction of mental anguish." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2):

14
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(e)

There is no contract and thus, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing

that applies to the issues raised by plaintiff in this case. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled
•to summary judgment in his favor with respect to a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
(f)

Plaintiff did not allege in his Complaint that the City breached a covenant

of good faith and fair dealing by failing to notify him of any heaiih and disability benefits
or his options under the Family Medical Leave Act. See Corapl. f 28. Moreover, the
Complaint never mentions or references any such health and disability benefits or the
Family Medical Leave Act and the deadlines for amending pleadings and conducting
discovery have passed. Therefore, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert any such
claim, it is unfairly prejudicial to defendants and is barred as a matter of law.
(g)

For the reasons set forth in defendants' memorandum opposing plaintiffs

summary judgment motion.
DATED this lJQ.day o f B e c s m f e 200jf.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CRAIG L TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES. P.C.

By
,
Craig L. Taylor
Willis F. McComas
Attorneys for Plaintiff
NmABAMOrteVVIcin IX'ewutiSJ |tHIJ«t».uiM

16

960Z001Ald OZ>lZKl Z002/9/S

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Marfcineau,
attonieys for defendants, and that I caused to be served M&MORANDUM DECISION RE: (1)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and (2) PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Case Number 040700494) upon the
following parties this^/*%ay of December, 2006, byfirstclass mail, postage prepaid, addressed
as follows:
Craig L. Taylor, Esq.
Willis F. McComas, Esq.
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
472 North Main Street
Kaysville,UT 84037
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (4119)
MARALYN M. REQER (8468)
BRYAN M. SCOTT (9381)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
RUSSELL L MAHAN (2059)
BOUNTIFUL CITY ATTORNEY
790 South 100 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KEPP CABANESS and DOES 1-20,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER:
(1) DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKE;

YS.

BRENT THOMAS. CLIFFORD C.
MICHAELIS mid BOUNTIFUL CITY.
Defendants.

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
AND
(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SLMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 040700494
Judge Glen R. Dawson

arantii
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VD19407856
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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 17.2005. ("Defendants*
Summary Judgment Motion*'), Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated
November 11,2G05, ("Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion")', and Defendants' Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Supporting Affidavits, dated
January 26, 2006, ("Defeadants' Motion to Strike'*), all came on regularly for hearing before this
Court, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson presiding, on July 26,2006, August 10,2006, and August
17,2006. Defendants Brent Thomas ("Mr. Thomas"), Clifford C. Michaelis CMr. Michaelis")
and Bountiful City (the '•City") (collectively "defendants**) were represented by Stanley J.
Preston and Bryan M. Scott of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and by Russell L. Mahan, the
City Attorney, Plaintiff Kipp Cabaness ("plaintiff *) was represented by Craig L. Taylor, Willis
F. McComas, and Matthew Hilton of Craig L. Taylor & Associates, P,C
The Court, having fully reviewed the motions, memoranda, exhibits and affidavits filed
by the parties regarding the referenced motions, having heard oral argument by the parties*
respective counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision Re: (I) Defendants' Motion for
Summary* Judgment; and (2) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the
•'Memorandum Decision"), and being full) advised in the premises.

->
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HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE:
The Court denies Defendants* Motion to Strike based on the following grounds and
reasoning:
I.

There were numerous problems and failures to comply with Rule 7 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to The City's Motion fat
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Plaintiffs Opposing Memorandum*'}.
2,

There were numerous instances where evidence cited by plaintiff, in the form of

exhibits and affidavits, lacked authentication or admissibility for various reasons under die Utah
Rules of Evidence. Some of these procedural and evidentiary problems are set forth in the
supporting memoranda lo Defendants- Motion to Strike. Based on its own review of Plaintiffs
Opposing Memorandum and its supporting affidavits and exhibits, the Court has also found other
problems and failures which were not specifically identified by defendants,
3.

The Court, however, denies Defendants' Motion to Strike and, in making its

rulings set forth herein, has relied on evidence that is properly before the Court and that meets the
standards of authentication and admissibility under the Utah Rules of Evidence,
DEFENDANTS4 SUMMARY JUDGMENT .MOTION:
The Court grants Defendants' Summarj Judgment Motion in its entirety as to all
plaintiff's claims herein, enters judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs Complaint as u
3
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matter of lavvt and dismisses plaintiff's Complaint, and all claims therein, with prejudice and on
the merits. In so doing, the Court has viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most-favorable to plaintiff. The grounds on which the Court relies in
granting this motion, ns well as the bases for dismissing each of the claims in plaintiffs
Complaint and entering judgment in. favor of defendants on plaintiff s Complaint, are set forth
herein, as well as in the Memorandum Decision.
1,

The Court grants Defendants* Summary Judgment Motion on the First Claim for

Relief for breach of contract and for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
as alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint, enters judgment in favor of defendants on said claim, and
dismisses said claim in its entirety on the merits and with prejudice, based on the following
grounds:
(a)

The language of the City Manual on which plaintiff relies is not

ambiguous and does riot create a contract between plaintiff and the City as to the
issues raised in this lawsuit;
(b)

The disclaimer in the City Manual, at Section IQl.b, is clear and

conspicuous and precludes the existence of a contract as to any items or rights
identified in said disclaimer;

4
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(e)

This claim is baited under the. Utah Governmental Immunity Act

(the "Act")\ pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-10(2), for the reasons set forth
in defendants' supporting memoranda, and pursuant to Lectfors \\ Emery County
School District, 849 P.2d 1162,1166 (Utah 1993) and But/en Crockett & Walsh
Development Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 402 (per curiam
mern. decision), including the fact that, because plaintiffs alleged injury arose out
of the alleged infliction of mental anguish, which is conduct specifically described
in § 63-30-10(2)* governmental immunity is preserved;
(d)

Since the Court has determined there is no contract as to the issues

raised in the lawsuit, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and defendants are entitled to judgment ontfnysuch claim as a matter of law: and
(e)

Based oil its ruling herein, the Court does not find it necessary to

rule on the issue of whether plaintiff would have been able to recover emotional
distress damages under his First Claim for Relief if there had been a contract and
the claim was not barred by the Act.
2.

The Court grants Defendants' Summary' Judgment Motion on the Second Claim

for Relief for wrongful termination, as alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint, enters judgment in favor

'Following plaintiffs resignation, the Act has been amended and renumbered. Sec Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-30I(5)[b). hi revising the Act, however, the Legislature indicated its intent
that the previous version govern an allegation of injury that occurred before July 1, 2004. See
Cunfielcl w Luyton City. 2005 UT 60. i 7 n.2, 122 P.3d 622.

5
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of defendants on said claim, and dismisses said claim in its entirety on the merits and with
prejudice, based on the following grounds:
(a)

This claim is asserted a*, a ton claim and it does not allege by name

or description that defendants have violated a "clear and substantial public policy"
as defined by applicable Utah case law, nor is any such public policy implicated in
this claim as asserted by plaintiff, based on the record before the Court, and, as a
result, plaintiff fails to stale a wrongful termination claim under Utah law;
(b)

Plaintiffs tort claim for wrongful termination against the City is

barred by the Act pursuant to Broadbcnt»'. Board of Education of Cache County
School District, 910 P.2d 1274,1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and
(c)

To the extent plaintiff Ls now claiming that his Second Claim for

Relief is a contract claim, as opposed to a tort claim, it is duplicative of his First
Claim for Relief, and fails for the same reasons that his First Claim for Relief
fails, as set forth in paragraph 1, above.
3,

The Court grants Defendants* Summary Judgment Motion on the First and

Second Claims for Relief in Plaintiffs Complaint to-the extent plaintiff is asserting said claims
against the indi\ idual defendants. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Michael Ls. enters judgment in favor of
defendants ott said claims, and dismisses any such claims on the morit.s and \s ith prejudice. ba*ed
on thefallowinggrounds:

6
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(a)

plaintiffs alleged employment relationship h with the City, not

with Mr, Thomas or Mr. Michaclis: and
(b)

plaintiff concedes that these two claims arc not asserted against

Mr, Thomas or Mr. Michaclis.
4.

The Court grants Defendants* Summary Judgment Motion on Plaintiffs Third

Claim for Relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress, enters judgment in favor of
defendants on said claim, as asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint, and dismisses this claim on the
merits and with prejudice, based on the following grounds:
(a)

this claim is barred by the Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-

30-10(2); and
(b)

plaintiff has not opposed summary judgment on this claim and has

requested to withdraw the claim.
5,

The Court grants Defendants' .Summary Judgment Motion on the Fourth Claim

for Relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint,
enters judgment in favor of defendants on said claim, and dismisses said claim in its entirety on
the merits and with prejudice, based on the following grounds;
(a)

Based on the undisputed admissible evidence before the Court.

Mr. Thomas' alleged conduct does not meet the threshold level of extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as a matter of law, Further, a reasonable jury could not find
7
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that the alleged conduct of Mr. Thomas constitutes extreme and outrageous
conduct sufficient to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress agarnst Mr. Thomas;
(b)

Based on the undisputed admissible evidence before the Court, Mr.

Michaetis' alleged conduct does not meet the threshold level of extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, as a matter of law. Further, a reasonable jury could not find
that Mr. Michaelis' alleged conduct and failure to act constitutes extreme and
outrageous conduct sufficient to constitute a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Mr. Michaelis; and
(c)

Plaintiff has argued that, pursuant to Hatch v, Davis, 2006 UT 44,

although he was not present during the July 30, 2003 incident (the uOSHA
Incident"), he nonetheless should be allowed to recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress because of the exception to the "presence" rule as set forth in
Hatch. Plaintiff, however, has failed to come forward wiih any evidence to satisfy
die fourth factor identified in Hatch* />., "that a plaintiff must establish that the
conduct was undertaken, in whole or in pan, with the intention of inflicting injury
to (he absent plaintiff." hi at 127. In addition, the fact thai the OSHA incident
involved plaintiffs crew is insufficient to warrant an exception to the "presence"
rule. Accordingly, the OSHA incident should not be considered in determining

8
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whether Mr. Thomas* conduct constituted extreme and outrageous conduct
towards plaintiff;
(cl)

With respect to the employee meeting on September 9,2003, the

the majority of the allegations regarding this incident are conclusory and
insufficient to support afindingthat Mr. Thomas engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Moreover, the facts related to this meeting that are not
conclusory do not reach the necessary threshold level of a showing of outrageous
conduct Indeed* threats to terminate an employee, insults, and indignities are not
enough to trigger a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
(e)

Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Mr. Thomas and Mr.

Michaelis is denied as a matter of course, because the Court finds that there is no
cause of action based in toft that would support an award of punitive damages
against the individual defendants.
6.

In dismissing plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the

Court does not rely on certain arguments advanced by defendants, and concludes as follows:
(a)

Plaintiff properly served his Notice of Claim on defendants

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11:
(b)

In asserting a claim against »\Ir. Thomas and Mr. Michaelis for

individual liability, plaintiff is not required to use the specific terms "fraud" and
9

WEWOWd WOV'Zl IQOZ/ZV/V

"malice" in his Notice of Claim and that, although the terms "fraud" and "malice"
are not specifically used in the Notice of Claim in regards to the allegations
against Mr. Thomas and Mr. JVlichaelis, the allegations in the Notice of Claim are
sufficient to conclude that malice has been alleged against Mr. Thomas and Mr.
Michaelis; and
(c)

The allegations in the Notice of Claim are sufficient put all of the

defendants on notice of the claims against them, including a claim for punitive
damages against the individual defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 63-3011.
7.

The Court grants Defendants* Summary Judgment Motion on any alleged ckixft

by plaintiff for punitive damages against the City, enters judgment in favor of defendants on said
claim, and dismisses any such claim on the merits and with prejudice, based on the following
grounds:
(a)

Any punitive damage claim asserted against the City is barred by

the Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-22(1 )(a); and
(b)

plaintiff has not opposed summary judgment on this cla im and

concedes it is not seeking punitive damages against the City,
H.

The Court grants Defendant*/ Summary Judgment Motion on any alleged claim

assorted by the unidentified John Does in Plainiiffs Complaint and against die unidentified John

10
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Roes in Plaintiffs Complaint, and dismisses any such claim on the merits and with prejudice,
based on the following grounds:
(a)

no such John Does/Roes have been identified or added to

Plaintiffs Complaint;
(b)

the time for amending Flaindff s Complaint has expired pursuant

to the terms of the Scheduling Order in this case; and
(c)

plaintiff has not opposed the dismissal of any claims on behalf of,

or against, the unidentified John Does/Roes.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
The Court denies Plaintiffs Partial Summary Judgment Motion in its entirety. In so
doing, the Court has viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving parties. The grounds on which the Court relies in denying this
motion are as follows:
1.

Based on the Court's ruling granting Defendants* Summary Judgment Motion, it

would be inconsistent to grant Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion on certain issues raised by
plaintiff in Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion.
2.

Bnscd on the Court's ruling granting Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion,

various ix.sues raised in Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion have been rendered moot and the
Court need not decide said Issues raised b> Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion.

11
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3,

Both parties have agreed that alt of the facts needed to determine whether there

was a contract between plaintiff and the City are before the Court and, based on Che undisputed
evidence and taking all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of plaintiff, the Court
has concluded that the there is no triable issue of fact as to whether there was a contract between
the plaintiff and the City as to the issues raised by plaintiff in this case,
4.

Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is also barred by the Immunity Act, inasmuch

as it is based on an injury that "arises out of, [is J in connection with, or results from.. .• infliction
of mental anguish." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2).
5.

There is do contract, and thus, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing that

applies to the issues raised by plaintiff in this case, and plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on
any such claim as a matter of law.
6.

Plaintiff did not allege in his Complaint that the City breached a covenant of good

faith and fair dealing by failing to notify him of any health and disability benefits or his options
under the Family Medical Leave Act. See Cornpl. (j[ 28. Moreover, the Complaint never
mentions' or references any such health and disability benefits or the Family Medical Leave Act
and the deadlines for amending pleadings and conducting discovery have passed. Therefore, to
the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert any such claim, it is unfairly prejudicial to defcndanLs
and i.s barred as a mutter of law.
7.

For the reasons set forth in defendants" memorandum opposing plaintiffs

.summary judgment motion.
12

Z6BlOOWd ZS'-OV-Zl LOOZ/Zl/l

DATED this .'Cr day of Deeejnbcr 20QflT.
THE COURT

^M^£W
Glen R. Dawson

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES,

Bv
Craig L. Taylor
Willis F. McCornas
Attorneys for Plaintiff
.VWtWTViPOnlersVSi Onlcr W-llHXUpd
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I hereby certify that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendants, and that I caused to be served ORDER: (I) DENYING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE; (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SIMMARY JUDGMENT,- AND (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Case Number 040700494) upon the foUowing parties
this^/ day of December, 2006, by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Craig L. Taylor, Esq.
Willis F. McComas, Esq.
Matthew Hilton.
CRAIG L. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
472 North Main Strset
KaysviIle,UT 84037
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101. PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL
(a)
This Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual provides information concerning the
practices, standards of conduct, disciplinary measures, and other policies and procedures of the City.
Because of the changing nature of Federal and State laws, as well as the changing needs of the City
and its residents and employees, the policies and procedures in this manual may be unilaterally added
to, rescinded, or modified from time to time as may be decided by the Bountiful City Council.
(b)
No contract exists between Bountiful City and its employees with respect to salary,
salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or employee benefits. These may change as a result
of salary surveys, job analysis, appropriations by the City Council, or changes in City policies and
procedures.
(c)
This manual supersedes all prior policies and procedures of the City of Bountiful
which are inconsistent with the matters stated herein.

102. INTERPRETATION OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The City Manager functions as the Personnel Officer for the City and shall provide the
official interpretation of this manual. Under his/her direction, department heads and supervisors
shall be responsible for implementing these Policies and Procedures within their departments.
Employees are encouraged to consult with their supervisor or department head concerning the
interpretation of these personnel policies and, when necessary, may consult the City Manager.

103. DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Department heads may adopt departmental policies and procedures applicable within their
individual departments. Minor variances with these City policies and procedures may be made to
fit departmental needs, but all departmental policies shall be consistent with applicable law, and must
be approved by the City Manager.

104. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW
It is the intent of the City to comply with all Federal and State laws and regulations applicable
to the City and/or its employees, whether mentioned herein or not.

105. APPLICATION OF THIS MANUAL
(a)
These policies and procedures do not apply to the City Manager. The City Manager's
status, compensation, benefits and responsibilities are determined by State law and as negotiated
between the City Manager and the City Council.
(b)
Department heads are the City Recorder, City Treasurer, City Engineer, Police Chief,
Fire Chief, Water and Sewer Manager, Parks and Recreation Director, Light and Power Director,
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Streets and Sanitation Superintendent, Planning Director, Information Systems Manager,
Administrative Services Director and the City Attorney. This manual applies to department heads,
except for those provisions relating to disciplinary actions. Department heads may be terminated
with or without cause, without appeal, as provided by State law. In the event of involuntary
termination for reasons other than dishonesty, department heads shall be compensated with a lump
sum severance pay of thirteen weeks' salary and 20% of accrued sick leave up to a maximum of 288
hours, plus accrued vacation up to a maximum of 240 hours.
(c)
Regular employees are those individuals filling Council-authorized positions who
have successfully completed a probation period of one year, and who are expected to work 32 or
more hours per week on a year-round basis. This manual has been specifically intended to apply to
regular employees.
(d)
Probationary employees are those individuals hired to fill Council-authorized
positions who have yet to complete a probationary period of one year, and who are expected to work
32 or more hours per week. This manual has been specifically intended to apply to probationary
employees, except for those provisions relating to disciplinary actions. Probationary employees are
strictly at-will employees and may be terminated with or without cause, without appeal or procedure.
(e)
Non-regular employees are those individuals hired on a part-time, seasonal, temporary
or other basis. These policies and procedures apply to non-regular employees as to hiring practices,
employment policies and standards of conduct, but not otherwise. Benefits will be paid only if
required by law or by express provision of the position with the approval of the City Manager.
Non-regular employees are strictly at-will employees and may be terminated with or without cause,
without appeal or procedure.

SECTION 200
HIRING PRACTICES
201. EMPLOYMENT PHILOSOPHY
(a)
The City of Bountiful seeks to attract and retain for employment the most competent
persons available on the basis of ability, qualifications, experience and potential.
(b)
Successful employees are self-motivated problem-solvers, who seek to provide
service in a professional manner. These employees are perceptive, have an eye for detail, and follow
a job through to its completion. They are loyal to the City, and are expected to support and follow
supervisory direction.
(c)
Bountiful City encourages and conducts most of its work on a team basis. Because
of this, employees are expected to cooperate and work together in carrying out their responsibilities.
As clear communication is the key to successful team efforts, any pertinent information related to
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City projects should be shared with other employees. This type offreeexchange of information will
enable the City to achieve its goals in an efficient manner while improving the quality of life within
the work place.

202. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
(a)
It is the policy of the City of Bountiful to comply with Federal and State Equal Employment
Opportunity laws and guidelines. All employment decisions will be made without regard to, and the
City will not engage in any unlawful discrimination based upon, race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, pregnancy, age, marital status, political belief, or disability (except where physical or mental
abilities are a bona fide occupational qualification).
(b)
It is the obligation of each officer, manager and supervisor of the City to conduct
himself/herself in conformity with the principle of Equal Employment Opportunity at all times. All
employment activities, including but not limited to hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer,
recruitment, advertising, discipline, layoff, termination, compensation and training, shall be
conducted without unlawful regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, marital status,
political belief, or disability (except where physical or mental abilities are a bona fide occupational
qualification).
(c)
It is the responsibility of every employee who believes that he/she has been
unlawfully discriminated against to inform his/her Department Head, who shall immediately report
the complaint to the City Manager and the City Attorney. If it is believed that the Department Head
is the source of the unlawful discrimination, the employee may report the complaint directly to the
City Manager.

203. CREATION OF JOB POSITIONS
(a)
All full-time, regular positions must be created by authorization of the City Council.
The Council shall establish the classification and grade of the new positions, and may unilaterally
re-classify and re-grade existing positions. All department heads wishing to create new, full-time
regular positions within their respective departments shall submit a request to the City Manager, who
shall review the position requested, its classification, job description, and proposed pay range. Upon
approval of the City Manager, the proposed position shall be submitted to the City Council for its
consideration.
(b)
All job openings for part-time regular, part-time temporary or full-time temporary
employees may befilledby the department head, provided that sufficient funds are budgeted. Each
department head is responsible for developing and implementing recruitment and selection
procedures for these positions in the department. Upon filling the position, however, the appropriate
payroll forms must be completed and approved by the City Manager.

204. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
Recruiting, selecting and hiring of all applicants for job positions within the City shall be

BOO1286

conducted in a manner consistent with this policy.
(a)
When a full-time, regular job position needs to be filled, an up-to-date job description
for that position will be prepared and approved by the department head and City Manager.
(b)

Recruitment for the position shall be made as follows:

(1)
Departmental Recruitment. The department head shall post an announcement on the
departmental information board%
i^ilKat'no^S^iBj^ee"
d^arfm^lsl^
omitted. If no applications are received,
then recruitment shall proceed to the next step.
If applications are received from within the department from employees of suitable
qualifications, the department head shall consider whether any such applicant is the appropriate
person for the position on the basis of ability, qualifications, experience and potential, and loyalty
to the applicant's supervisor, to management of the department, and to management of the City. If
the department head determines that it would be in the best interests to hire an applicant from within
the department, he/she may do so.
If the department head determines that it is in the best interests of the City to consider further
applications, then recruitment shall proceed to the next step. However, applications from within the
department shall remain pending, and shall be considered until a final selection is made.
(2)
Citv Recruitment The department head shall announce the position
by posting an announcement at the Payroll office, and by distributing announcements
to all other Department Heads, who shall post it at their respective departmental
information boards. Any applications from within the City must be made within five
working days of the posting of the announcement. If it is known that no employee
within the City is qualified for the position, this step may be omitted. If no
applications are received, then recruitment shall proceed to the next step.
If applications are received from within the City from employees of suitable qualifications,
the Department Head shall consider whether any such applicant is the appropriate person for the
position on the basis of ability, qualifications, experience and potential, and loyalty to the applicant's
supervisor, to management of the department, and to management of the City. If the department
head determines that it would be in the best interests to hire an applicant from within the City, he/she
may do so.
If the Department Head determines that it is in the best interests of the City to consider
further applications, then recruitment shall proceed to the next step. However, applications from
within the City shall remain pending, and shall be considered until a final selection is made.
(3)
Outside Recruitment. The Department Head shall announce the position by
publishing it in the appropriate media, as approved by the City Manager. Applications must be made
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within ten working days of the publishing of the announcement, unless in the reasonable discretion
of the Department Head the period need be lengthened or shortened.
(c) Each applicant shall submit all necessary application forms and supply such other
pertinent information regarding their training and experience as may be required. The applicant
should be advised that such information will be verified. Each applicant shall be requested to sign
a consent to inquire into his job performance in prior jobs, the refiisal of which shall be grounds for
not hiring that applicant.
(d) The Department Head or his/her designee shall make appropriate inquiries to verify
experience, character, education and history of any applicant.
(e) The Department Head shall select for interview such applicants as are reasonably
considered to be candidates for the position on the basis of ability, qualifications, experience and
potential.
(f) The interview shall be conducted by the Department Head or by such persons as he/she
may designate. Only job-related questions or ones which assess the candidate's experience, skill and
training will be asked.
If appropriate, interviewers may request applicants to demonstrate job-related skills by
completing a test or exercise that measures knowledge or skills for the particular job and which are
a valid prediction ofjob performance. All interviewed applicants must be given the same exercise.
(g) Selection of an applicant for the position shall be made by the Department Head on the
basis of ability, qualifications, experience and potential to perform the duties set forth in the job
description.

205. CONDITIONAL OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT
Any applicant who is selected for a job position with the City shall be given a Conditional Offer
of Employment, which shall set forth the requirements which must be met prior to the actual
hiring of the applicant. Such conditions shall require that each such applicant shall submit to the
City a certified copy of the applicant's criminal record from the Utah Bureau of Criminal
Identification.

206. PRE-EMPLOYMENT EXAMINATIONS
(a)

All applicants must take and pass a drug test as a condition of employment.

(b)
It is the policy of the City that applicants to whom a conditional offer of employment
has been extended may be required as a condition of employment to pass a medical, psychological
or other tests or examinations to establish both their fitness to perform the jobs for which they have
applied and their fitness to do so without endangering the health and safety of themselves or others.
If the City determines that an examination is appropriate to a particular position, all applicants for
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the job to whom a conditional offer of employment has been made are to be examined.
(c)
Once the City has extended a conditional job offer to the applicant, a medical
interview or examination may be conducted by a health professional chosen by the City to determine
an applicant's ability to fulfill essential job functions, with or without an accommodation. All costs
for required interviews or examinations shall be p&id by the City. The applicant must sign a written
release of this information to the City.
(d)
Medical examinations paid for by the City are property of the City and will be treated
as confidential. However, records of such examinations, if required by law or regulation, will be
made available to the applicant, persons designated and authorized by the applicant, public agencies,
relevant insurance companies, or the applicant's doctor.
207. EMPLOYMENT OF RELATIVES
As used in this section, the term "immediate family" means the spouse, mother, father,
stepmother, stepfather, foster-mother, foster-father, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister, brother,
child, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first
cousin, grandparent, grandparent-in-law, and any other relative by blood or law residing within the
employee's household.
A member of an employee's immediate family will be considered for employment by the
City, provided the applicant meets the requirements for employment. An immediate family member
may not be hired, however, if such employment would:
(a)
member, or
(b)

create either a direct or indirect supervisor/subordinate relationship with a family

create either an actual conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest.

Non-regular employment positions are exempt from this provision. These criteria will also
be considered when assigning, transferring or promoting an employee. No relatives will be hired or
assigned in violation of State law.
208. PROBATION
(a)

New Employees.

(1)
All regular City employees hired from outside of the current City employees shall be
subject to a probationary period of one year. This probationary period is considered part of the
selection process. Its purpose is to allow City management sufficient time to evaluate an employee's
ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the assigned position.
(2)
It is the policy of the City that all new employees are to be carefully monitored and
evaluated during their probationary period. Supervisors are to observe carefully the performance of
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each probationary employee. Where appropriate, weaknesses in performance, conduct, or attitude
are to be brought to the employee's attention for correction. Employees who successfully complete
their probationary period shall, with the approval of the Department Head and the City Manager,
become permanent regular employees of the City.
(3) At the conclusion of the probationary period, a department head may, with the consent
of the City Manager, extend probation for a period of six additional months. In such case the
employee shall be so advised in writing and the employee must consent in writing to the extension
of time, acknowledging that during such time the employee shall remain strictly probationary and
will not have the rights of regular employees.
(b)
Promoted or Transferred Employees. Current City employees who are promoted to
a position of greater salary or responsibility, or who are transferred to another position within the
City that is of equal or lesser salary, shall serve a one year probation. In the event that the promoted
or transferred employee does not perform the new job satisfactorily, that employee may be returned
to that employee's previous position prior to the promotion or transfer.

209. FALSE STATEMENTS IN JOB APPLICATIONS
It is the policy of the City that false statements given in the job application process, whether
in writing or verbal, are not tolerated. If a false statement is discovered during the hiring process,
the applicant will no longer be considered for employment. If a false statement is discovered after
an employee has been hired, the employee may be terminated, depending upon the severity of the
statement.

SECTION 300
COMPENSATION
301. POSITION CLASSIFICATION
(a)
Every full-time permanent position in the City shall be assigned a classification and
a grade. Each position shall have a job descri ption which sets forth the abilities necessary to perform
the job, the job duties and responsibilities, the reporting relationship of the position to management,
minimum qualifications and other pertinent job information.
(b)
The City Council may,fromtime to time, re-classify a position in order to stay within
the employment marketplace for that position. In such event, any employee whose position is
re-classified from one class to another shall continue to receive the same salary, unless it fails below
the minimum salary of the new range, or unless, in the opinion of the City Manager, an immediate
salary adjustment within the range is needed. Such changes will not alter an employee's scheduled
anniversary date insofar as advancement to the next step of the salary range is concerned.
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302. ANNIVERSARY DATES
The date the employee begins his/her foil-time employment with the City shall be that
employee's anniversary date. If an employee is promoted, the effective date of the promotion shall
be the new anniversary date for that employee. Each employee shall be given a performance
evaluation on or shortly after each anniversary date and, if eligible and approved by the Department
Head and the City Manager, may receive a step increase in accordance with the salary schedule and
plan of the City.
303. TRANSFERS, PROMOTIONS, AND DEMOTIONS
(a)
In the event that an employee is promoted to aposition of greater responsibility within
his/her careerfield,the employee shall be moved to thefirstsalary step in the new range or receive
a five per cent promotional increase, whichever is greater. Persons promoted to a higher
classification in a different career field shall start at thefirststep of the applicable salary range and
will be eligible for a step increase after one year of satisfactory service in the new career field. In
each case, the employee's anniversary date shall be the first full day of work in the higher
classification (in the case of a promotion), or the first full day in the new career field. Any
exceptions to this policy must be specifically approved by the City Manager.
(b)
An employee who, for disciplinary reasons, is demoted to a position assigned a lower
salary range, shall receive the salary in the new range, at the same step he/she was at before the
demotion. Persons demoted to a classification in a different career field shall start at the first step
of the applicable salary range and will be eligible for a step increase after one year of satisfactory
service in the new field. The employee's anniversary date shall be the first full day of work in the
position to which he/she was demoted. Any exception to this policy must be specifically approved
by the City Manager.
(c)
Employees filling non-regular employment positions may be transferred, promoted,
or demoted at the discretion of the Department Head. The hourly wage of a non-regular employee
may also be adjusted at the discretion of the department head as part of any of these actions.
304. HOURS OF WORK AND W O R K WEEK
It is the policy of the City that the normal work week shall be 40 hours, except in the case of
firefighters. Exceptions to this must be approved by the Department Head and the City Manager.
Employee work schedules will be made by each Department Head in order to best meet the
operational needs of the City. Each pay period will begin on Sunday at 12:00 midnight and end
14 days later on Saturday at 12:00 midnight. Each work period will be 28 days and will consist
of two pay periods as described above. Employees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement
activities qualify for the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 207(k) exemption.
305. SALARY
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(a)
An employee's wage or salary shall be based on the wage and salary schedules
approved by the City Council. The employee's actual salary within the authorized range shall be
dependent upon performance evaluations. Employees shall be eligible for increases as set forth in
the salary schedule applicable to their position.
(b)
Those positions designated ELS lf management" positions within the City shall have an
open salary range - that is, there will be no steps and the range will simply consist of a beginning
salary and a top salary. Employees may be assigned by the City Manager to a position anywhere
within the salary range, and may receive annual increases of up to 5% depending on their
performance and evaluation.
306. SALARY ADJUSTMENTS
(a)
Step increases based on employee evaluations and time in service shall be made
consistent with the salary range and steps established for that position. Employees shall be eligible
for a step increase upon their anniversary date and shall receive an evaluation and recommendation
from their supervisor and department head, which shall be forwarded to the City Manager for his
approval, with copies placed in the employee's personnel file and in the payroll department.
(b)
The salary schedule may be adjusted annually by the cost of living increase approved
by the City Council. Cost of living increases shall be effective at the beginning of the first pay
period of the newfiscalyear, unless the City Council shall direct otherwise.
307. O V E R T I M E
Supervisory personnel should organize their department workloads to avoid overtime
payments. Scheduled overtime will be approved only on an emergency or special need basis.
Overtime work must have the prior approval of the supervisor. Overtime work will be compensated
as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) unless departmental policy exceeds these
standards. Part-time employees shall not accumulate compensation time.
308-ON CALL DUTY
Subject to approval of the City Manager, each department may adopt on call duty policies
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the department.
309. SALARY ADVANCES
It is the general policy of the City that payroll advances are not made. However, if approved
by the City Manager due to unusual circumstances, advances can be made not to exceed the amount
due for the next pay period.

310. PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS
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(a)
The City is required by law to deduct Social Security, Medicare, retirement and
federal and state income tax withholding in accordance with the employee's salary and number of
dependents. In addition, the City will deduct those items specifically authorized by the City and
approved in writing by the employee, including but not limited to deductions for insurance, and
voluntary retirement plans. These elective deductions shall be made as set forth by the payroll
department.
(b)
If an employee is indebted to the City for any reason, the City may deduct such debt
from the net pay of the employee (i) if the employee has been given notice of the debt and has failed
to pay it, or (ii) if the employee's employment with the City is terminating.
311. BENEFITS
(a)
Social Security. Bountiful City participates in the Social Security and Medicare
program established by the federal government. In accordance with this program, the City pays the
employer's share to the federal government and withholds the employee's share from the employee's
pay.
(b)

Workers Compensation.

(1)
Employees of Bountiful City are covered by Workers Compensation as required by
State law. State law shall determine the eligibility for, the amount of, and the period of,
compensation granted to injured employees.
(2)
Any injury occurring on the job must be reported immediately to the employee's
supervisor no matter how slight the injury may seem. Failure to report may result in benefits being
lost or reduced. Supervisors must notify the City Benefits Administrator immediately (as soon as
it is possible), so that the Employer's First Report of Injury form may be completed and submitted
to the Industrial Commission of Utah. Departments must also notify the Benefits Administrator
when an employee is placed on, or returns to work from, Workers Compensation leave.
(3)
Employees injured while on the job shall visit a physician designated by the City
when medical attention is necessary. After the initial visit, the employee may switch to a physician
of his choice, but only as permitted by State Workers' Compensation rules. Employees failing to use
an approved physician or medical provider may be responsible for payment of medical bills.
(4) Employees injured on the job who receive a medicine prescription in
connection with the injury shall have that prescription filled only at City-designated
pharmacies. If prescriptions arefilledelsewhere, the City shall pay only the cost that
the City negotiated with the City-designated pharmacy, and the employee shall be
responsible to pay any difference.
(5)
Employees who are injured while on the job shall comply with all regulations of the
Workers' Compensation Act as provided in the Utah State Code.
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(6)
Utah State law requires that n o compensation from the Workers' Compensation Fund
shall be paid for the first three days following the day of the injury. However, employees injured
while on the job may use sick leave, vacation leave or compensatory time, if available, for the
remaining work hours of the day of the injury and the first three calendar days following the day of
the injury. Beginning the fourth day, Workers' Compensation benefits shall be utilized.
(7)
Workers' Compensation benefits shall be those set by State law. These benefits may
be supplemented by the employee's accrued sick, vacation or other leave up to the employee's fully
salary. Initially the employee must use sick or vacation leave to compensate for the hours on
industrial leave. However, once the City's workers' compensation administrator issues a check for
lost work time, the employee will be recited back the number of hours that the reimbursement check
represents.
(8)
Employees who have been on Workers' Compensation shall resume the same or
comparable position of the same grade and classification. If the employee, in the opinion of a
treating doctor, cannot perform the duties of the position from which leave was taken, the City is not
required to accept the employee for work. The City may at its discretion request a second opinion
to verify the physician's findings. A list of duties should be sent to the verifying physician. If the
employee does not return to work when released to do so by the treating physician, the Benefits
Administrator shall notify the employee that he/she is on unapproved leave and expected to return
to work immediately. An employee who does not report as directed and makes no contact with the
Benefits Administrator within three (3) days following notice shall be considered to have resigned
from City employment.
(9)
The City may require an employee to present medical certification from his doctor
of fitness to continue or resume work, or of physical inability to continue or resume work. It is the
duty of every employee to immediately disclose to his/her department head any doctor's release to
return partly or fully to work, and any doctor's certification of inability to work.
(10) All medical expenses including prescription drugs incurred while treating on-the-job
injuries shall be submitted by the employee to the Workers' Compensation Fund and not through
City health insurance programs.
(11) When a doctor certifies that an employee can do "light duty work" only, whether from
a job-related injury or an off-duty injury, the injured party may be returned to work only if the
department head determines that light duty work is available and appropriate. If the department head
determines that light duty work is not availab le or not appropriate, the injured employee shall remain
on temporary total disability until fully released to return to work by the physician.
(12) Employees must direct their medical care providers to communicate directly to the
Benefits Administrator as to work restrictions, work releases, billings, and medical examinations and
records. Failure to do so may result in termination of workers compensation benefits.
(c)

Uniform Allowance. The City is proud of the image its employees maintain before

B001294

area residents. Accordingly, each City employee should make every effort to maintain a clean, wellgroomed appearance. Some employees may be required to wear identifying uniforms and will be,
at the City's option, either furnished their uniforms or compensated with a uniform allowance. This
allowance will be in addition to the employee's regular compensation. If the City is required by
Federal or State law to subject this allowance to taxes, the City will deduct themfromthe employee's
paycheck in accordance with the law.
(d)

Retirement Systems.

(1)
Bountiful City is a member of the Utah State Retirement System. Eligible City
employees participate in the Public Safety Retirement System, the Fireman's Retirement System and
the Public Employees Retirement System, as appropriate, subject to the rules and regulations of the
respective systems.
(2)
The City also has established 401(k) and 457 plans which shall consist of such
programs, contributions and eligibility as may be established by the City Council and the respective
plans.
(e)

Medical Insurance.

(1) Ail regular employees, and such other employees whose positions are designated by the
City Manager, are eligible to participate in the City's health, dental, and life insurance programs.
Enrollment cards and a detailed schedule of benefits will be provided to eligible employees. The
City's contributions to health, dental and life insurance programs shall be set by the City Council.

(2) Regular employees, appointive officers and elected officials who retire or terminate while
participating in the current group insurance program of the City, are eligible for further group
insurance coverage as indicated if they qualify upon the following grounds:
(i) If an individual leaves the City with 30 years of cumulative service and is 55 years of age
or older, the City will pay the cost of single coverage under the current group insurance program
until the individual is eligible for Medicare coverage. (If the individual leaves with 30 years of
service but is under age 55, the individual may stay with the group insurance by personally paying
the applicable premium until reaching the age of 55, at which time the City will pay the premium
until eligible for Medicare.)
(ii) If an individual leaves the City with 25 years of cumulative service and is 60 years of age
or older, the City will pay the cost of single coverage under the current group insurance program
until the individual is eligible for Medicare coverage. (If the individual leaves with 25 years of
service but is under age 60, the individual may stay with the group insurance by personally paying
the applicable premium until reaching the age of 60, at which time the City will pay the premium
until eligible for Medicare.)
(iii) If an individual leaves the City with 20 years of cumulative service, the individual may
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stay with the City's group insurance until the individual is eligible for Medicare coverage by
personally paying the applicable premium.
(iv) Under sections (2)(i), (ii) and (iii), the spouse of such an employee may also stay with
the City's group insurance until the spouse is eligible for Medicare coverage by personally paying
the applicable premium. In the event the employee dies, the surviving spouse will then be eligible
only for such further group insurance as COBRA may provide.
(f)

Education Allowance.

(1)
The City has a policy of encouraging its employees to continually update and increase
their level of education To further this policy, the City will give financial assistance to employees
enrolled in City-approved educational programs of direct benefit in aiding the employee to improve
performance and skills in his/her position with the City. To this end, 50% of tuition and book fees
will be paid for classes or coursework of direct benefit after proof of registration. Approval of
eligibility of the course shall be obtained from the employee's department head prior to taking the
course if reimbursement is going to be requested. At the end of the class, the employee must provide
evidence of satisfactory completion of the course. If the employee does not complete or
satisfactorily pass the class, the employee must reimburse the City for the tuition and books paid by
the City for that class.
(2)
Employees must agree in writing to remain with the City following completion of the
course for at least one year, or to re-pay the City for the tuition and books fees paid by the City.
(3)
The City will pay fees for approved conferences, seminars and courses approved by
the department head.

312. LEAVES OF ABSENCE
(a)

Holidays.

(1)
The City observes the following paid holidays each year: New Year's Day, President's
Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Pioneer Day, Labor Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving Day,
the day after Thanksgiving, and Christmas Day.
(2)
In addition to the above holidays, the City grants two "floating" holidays, which
employees may take at any time with the approval of the department head. Eight hours of vacation
time shall be accrued to employees twice per year as directed by the City Manager
(3)
Holidays falling on Sunday will be observed on the following Monday. Holidays
failing on Saturday will be observed the preceding Friday. Department heads will schedule work
assignments so that whenever possible employees may observe the holiday schedule.
(4)

FLS A-eligibie employees who are required to work on a holiday shall be paid straight
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time pay. and shall be credited with eight hours of vacation time. FLS A-exempt employees who are
required to work on a holiday shall be allowed to take another day off in lieu of the holiday worked.
Temporary employees and part-time employees working less than 20 hours per week shall not
receive holiday pay but will be paid straight time for all hours worked on a holiday.
(b)

Vacation Leave.

(1)
Vacation leave is provided for the purpose of rest and relaxation and also for
attending to personal business.
(2)
Except for firefighters who shall accrue and accumulate vacation leave at a rate
established by the City, vacation leave for full-time regular employees shall accrue at the following
rate:
0 - 5 years of service: 3.692 hours per pay period (12 days per year)
6-10 years of service: 4.615 hours per pay period (15 days per year)
11-15 years of service: 5.538 hours per pay period (18 days per year)
15+ years of service: 6.461 hours per pay period (21 days per year)
(3)
Employees may accumulate up to 240 hours of vacation time which can be carried
forward to a new calendar year. Unused vacation in excess of this amount will be forfeited without
compensation each December 31 st. Employees are encouraged to take their vacation leave annually.
However, an extension of the December 31st forfeiture date may be approved in writing by the City
Manager.
(4)
Accrued vacation leave will be credited to an employee's account each pay period.
Vacation leave is to be scheduled at the mutual convenience of the City and the employee, and must
be scheduled by the employee with the approval of the department head. Paid holidays occurring
during vacation leave will not be charged as vacation time.
(5)
Once each fiscal year, an employee may elect to convert up to 40 hours of vacation
leave to cash at the current rate of pay. Department Heads may elect to convert up to 80 hours of
vacation leave to cash at the current of pay. Employees wishing to do this should notify the payroll
department on an approved form. In the alternative to cash, employees may have these funds
deposited into their City 401 (k) or 457 plan to which they belong, if permitted under applicable plan
regulations.
(6)
Terminating employees are entitled to payment at their current rate of compensation
for ail unused vacation leave which has been accrued, up to 240 hours.
(7)
Ongoing part-time employees working 32 or more but less than 40 hours per week,
whose positions are expressly approved by the City Manager for compensation with vacation leave,
shall accrue vacation on a prorated basis. Employees working less than 32 hours per week, and
temporary employees, shall accrue no vacation leave.
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(8)

Employees may not take vacation leave in advance of its actual accrual.

(c)

Sick leave.

(1)
Except for firefighters who shall accrue and accumulate sick leave at a rate
established by the City, all regular employees will be credited with 3.692 hours of sick leave for
each full pay period of service with the City.
(2)
Ongoing part-time employees working 32 or more but less than 40 hours per week,
whose positions are expressly approved by the City Manager for compensation with sick leave, shall
accrue sick leave on a prorated basis. Employees working less than 32 hours, and temporary
employees, shall accrue no sick leave. Accrued sick leave will be credited to the employee's account
each pay period.
(3)
Employees may accrue sick leave without limitation. Unused sick
leave should be valued as an insurance against protracted illness. Sick leave may be
used for (i) employee illness or injury, (ii) illness or injury in the employee's
immediate family, and (iii) medical and dental appointments. The term "illness11
includes illness from a pregnancy. In this section the term "immediate family" means
the employee's spouse or child residing within the employee's household.
(4)
An employee shall notify his/her supervisor prior to or at the beginning of scheduled
work that he/she will be absent from work because of sick leave circumstances. In the event of an
extended absence, the employee shall keep his/her supervisor informed of his/her condition. In the
event that the absence from work exceeds three working days, the City may require the employee
to present a medical statement justifying the absence from work and containing a clearance to return
to work, or stating a physical inability to resume work.
(5)
Any absence or sick leave that extends beyond accrued sick leave will result in the
employee being carried on vacation leave status until all accrued vacation and compensatory time
balances have been used, and then the employee shall be carried on a leave-without-pay status. This
provision does not give a right to an employee to be carried on any such status.
(6)
Employees may convert a maximum of 32 hours of sick leave each calendar year to
cash at their current rate of pay, provided that any sick leave used during the year will be deducted
from the 32 hours. Department Heads may convert a maximum of 80 hours of sick leave each
calendar year to cash at their current rate of pay, provided that any sick leave used during the year
will be deducted from the 80 hours. In order to participate in this conversion, employees must have
a minimum of 120 hours of sick leave remaining after the conversion permitted in this section. In
the alternative to cash, employees may have these funds deposited into their City 401 (k) or 457 plan
to which they belong, if permitted under applicable plan regulations. Employees desiring to convert
sick leave to cash shall notify the payroll department prior to November 30th. Sick leave conversion
shall be reflected in a December payroll designated by the City Manager.
(7)

Employees retiring from the City under the City's retirement program may convert
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20% of their accrued but unused sick leave, up to a maximum of 288 hours, to cash at their current
rate of pay.
(d)
Parental leave. If accrued sick leave is available, employees who are the
mother or father of a child being bom may take up to forty hours for parental leave
at the time of birth, which shall be counted against the sick leave of the employee.
Any additional leave taken in connection with this birth under the Family Medical
Leave Act shall be unpaid leave unless taken from accrued paid vacation leave.
(e)

Military leave.

(1)
Employees who are drafted or called into active military duty will be granted leaves
of absence without pay for the duration of military service.
(2)
Regular employees who serve as reserve members of the armed forces shall be
granted military leave of up to 15 working days per year for attendance at annual training programs.
Where the military pay is less, the City shall pay the employee's regular salary and the employee will,
within one week of receipt from the military, reimburse the City the compensation received during
such periods.
(3)
An employee on military leave for a period exceeding three months will be returned
to his/her former position, or to one of like status and pay.
(f)

Bereavement leave.

(1) Regular employees, after notifying their supervisor, shall be granted actual time off up
to three days with pay in the case of the death of a member of the immediate family. Immediate
family means spouse, children, step-children, mother, father, stepmother, stepfather, mother-in-law,
father-in-law, grandfather, grandmother,
sister, sister-in-law, brother, brother-in-law,
daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grandparent-in-iaw, or other relative by blood or law living in the home
of the employee.
(2) Regular employees, after notifying their supervisor, shall be granted
actual time off or one day with pay in the case of the death of a nephew, niece, aunt
or uncle.
(g)

Jury duty.

(1)
Employees who have been summoned to jury duty, or who have been subpoenaed (as
opposed to being retained) to appear as a witness, will be allowed full pay during the time of their
absence. Payment does not apply to court appearances falling on the employee's personal time, or
to court appearances when an individual is appearing in court on his/her own behalf.
(2)
Any compensation received by employees for jury or witness duty while he/she is
being paid by the City, shall be turned into the City, with the exception of any reimbursement for
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travel to and from the courtroom.
(3)
It is the employee's responsibility to notify his/her department head as soon asf ormai
notice regarding jury duty is received. The department head shall make arrangements for coverage
during this time period.
(4)
If the employee is excused from j ury duty or otherwise released during the employee's
scheduled work, the employee shall report to work for the balance of the day.
(h)

Subpoenas.

(1)
If lawfully subpoenaed to appear in court, it is the employee's responsibility to notify
his/her department head as soon as formal notice is received. The department head shall make
arrangements for coverage during this time.
(2)
Appearances in court under subpoena are normally considered as excused time with
pay. However, individual circumstances may vary. Any compensation for such appearances shall
be turned into the City, except for travel.
(3)
Time for appearance in court on personal matters will be the employee's
responsibility. Vacation leave can be used for this purpose.
(i)
Leaves without Pav. Leaves of absence without pay may be granted in writing by
the City Manager, if the City's services and needs will not be adversely affected. This provision does
not give an employee a right to leave without pay.
(j)
Family Medical Leave. It is the policy of the City to fully comply with the Federal
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, and to grant employees leaves of absence in accordance with
its provisions.
(1)
Eligibility. An employee who has both (1) been employed by the City for at least 12
months, and (2) has worked for the City for at least 1,250 hours during the 12 months immediately
prior to the intended leave to be taken, is eligible for family and medical leave.
(2)
Leave. An eligible employee is entitled to a total of 12 work weeks of family and
medical leave during any one year, which year shall commence on the day the employee first takes
family medical leave.
(3)
Reasons for Leave. Eligible employees may take family or medical leave (1) to take
care of a child upon birth, or upon placement for adoption or foster care; (2) to care for a parent,
spouse, or child with a serious health condition; or (3) when an employee is unable to work because
of the employee's own serious health condition. FMLA leave will not be granted for reasons not
specified in the FMLA.
A "serious health condition" means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental
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condition that involves: (1) any period of incapacity or treatment connected with inpatient care (i.e.,
an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical-care facility; (2) any period of
incapacity requiring absence of more than three calendar days from work, school, or other regular
daily activities that also involves continuing treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care
provider; or (3) continuing treatment (by or under the supervision of) a health care provider for
prenatal care or a chronic or long-term health condition that is so incurable or so serious that, if not
treated, would likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three calendar days.
"Health care provider" means: (1) doctors of medicine or osteopathy authorized to practice
medicine or surgery by the state in which the doctor practices; (2) podiatrists, dentists, clinical
psychologists, optometrists, and chiropractors (limited to manual manipulation of the spine to correct
a subluxation as demonstrated by X-ray to exist) authorized to practice, and performing within the
scope of their practice, under state law; (3) nurse practitioners and nurse midwives authorized to
practice, and performing within the scope of their practice, as defined under state law; or (4)
Christian Science practitioners listed with the First Church of Christ Scientist in Boston,
Massachusetts.
Leave for birth, or placement for adoption or foster care, must conclude
within 12 weeks of the birth or placement. Spouses who are both employed by the
City are jointly entitled to a combined total leave of 12 weeks of family care for (1)
the birth of a child, or placement for adoption or foster care, or (2) care of a parent
who has a serious health condition.
Eligible employees may take family and medical leave intermittently (for example, in blocks
of time or by reducing a work schedule) in certain circumstances. If leave is taken to care for a child
after the birth or placement for adoption or foster care, employees may take such leave intermittently
only with the permission of the City Manager. If leave is taken because of the employee's own
serious illness or to take care of a seriously ill family member, the employee may take the leave
intermittently if it is medically necessary.
(4)
Notice and Certification. Employees who want to take FMLA leave ordinarily must
provide the City at least 30 days notice of the need for leave, if the need for leave is foreseeable. If
the employee's need is not foreseeable, the employee should give as much notice as is practicable.
When leave is needed to care for an immediate family member or for the employee's own illness and
is for planned medical treatment, the employee must try to schedule treatment so as not to disrupt
the City's operations unduly.
In addition, employees who need leave for their own or a family member's serious health
condition must provide medical certification of the serious health condition. The City also may
require a second or third opinion (at the City's expense), periodic recertification of the serious health
condition, and, when the leave is a result of the employee's own serious health condition, a fitness
for duty examination prior to returning to work. The City may deny leave to employees who do not
provide proper advance leave notice and will deny leave for failure to provide the required medical
certification.
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(5)
Accrued Paid Leave. Employees may, but need not, first use any accrued paid
vacation, and sick leave as paid FMLA leave prior to unpaid FMLA leave.
(6)
Benefits During Leave. Employees taking leave under the FMLA are entitled to
receive health and City-paid life insurance benefits during the leave at the same level and terms of
coverage as if they had been working throughout the leave. If applicable, arrangements will be made
for employees to pay their share of health insurance and life insurance premiums while on leave.
As provided by federal law. the City may recover premiums it paid to maintain health coverage for
an employee who fails to return to work from FMLA leave.
The employee's use of FMLA leave will not result in the loss of any employment benefit that
accrued prior to the start of the employee's leave. However, other than the continuation of health
benefits, no other employment benefits shall accrue during the period of unpaid leave.
(7)
Job Restoration After Leave. The City will reinstate an employee returning from
FMLA leave to the same or equivalent position with equivalent pay. benefits, and other employment
terms and conditions. However, an employee on an FMLA leave does not have any greater right to
reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than if the employee had been
continuously employed during the FMLA leave period. An employee on FMLA leave must file
every fourth week a written and signed statement that the employee intends to return to work at the
conclusion of FMLA leave. Failure to do so may result in the termination of FMLA leave.
(8)
Management Officers.
Salaried executive, administrative, and professional
employees of the City who meet the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") criteria for exemption from
minimum wage and overtime do not lose their FLSA-exempt status by using any unpaid FMLA
leave. This special exception to the "salary basis" requirements for the FLSA's exemptions extends
only to eligible employees' use of leave required by the FMLA.

Section 400
EMPLOYMENT POLICIES
401. CERTIFICATION AND LICENSING
Where certification or licensing is essential to the performance of one's job, employees are
required to provide evidence of such certification or licensing (or recertification or rehcensing) as
a continuing condition of employment.

402. FITNESS FOR DUTY
It is the continuing responsibility of each employee to maintain the standards of physical and
mental health fitness required for performing the duties of his or her position. If an employee is not
able to safely and properly perform his or her duties for any reason, it is the responsibility of the
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employee to report this fact to the supervisor. The employee should then take sick leave or other
appropriate leave until he or she is fit to perform the duties of the position.
If a superior reasonably believes that an employee is for any reason not fit to perform duties,
it shall be brought to the attention of the department head. If the Department Head reasonably
believes that an employee is notfitto perform duties, the employee may be asked for an explanation,
sent home, relieved of certain duties, assigned to different duties or assigned to light duty, or require
the employee to undergo a fitness for duty examination by the appropriate person selected by the
City. The employee must cooperate with the decision of the Department Head.
If an employee is unable to perform his or her duties, he/she shall be relieved of those duties
until such time as the employee is certified by a physician or health care provider acceptable to the
City that the employee is physically and/or mentally able to return to full or light duty.
This policy will be interpreted and applied so as to conform with applicable law.
403. PERSONNEL RECORDS
It is the policy of the City to maintain personnel records concerning its employees. It is the
City's policy to allow access to personnel records in accordance with applicable law.
Employees may have reasonable access to their own personnel files during regular business
hours. Copies from the file may be made at employee expense. Privileged information, as defined
by law, is not to be accessed or copied by the employee.
If the City receives a subpoena for personnel records, it is the policy of the City to comply
with the requirements of the law. The City will notify the employee whose records have been
subpoenaed, and will furnish to the employee a copy of the subpoena and of the records provided
in response to it.
404. EMPLOYEE EVALUATIONS
(a)
Employee evaluations shall be used to assess employee performance, review
employee strengths and weaknesses, improve employee effectiveness, set goals and objectives, and,
as appropriate, to evaluate salary advancements. The format of the evaluation shall be determined
by the department head and approved by the City Manager. Performance review factors which ought
to be considered include work productivity, work quality, attendance, cooperation, job knowledge,
initiative, and attitude.
Each regular employee shall receive at least one annual evaluation of their performance at
or near their anniversary date. Evaluations will be made by an employee's immediate supervisor
and/or Department Head, as directed by the Department Head. The evaluation shall be reviewed
with the employee. Employees may respond in writing to any performance evaluation. A copy of
each employee evaluation will be provided to the employee, and a copy the evaluation and any
response shall be transmitted to the City Manager, who shall place them in the employee's personnel
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file.
(b)

Employees have a right to appeal ail or part of their evaluation to the City Manager.

(1)
Employees desiring to appeal their evaluation should do so by filing with the
Department Head, within ten days of the delivery of the evaluation, a written statement of the appeal.
The supervisor and/or Department Head shall file a written response to the appeal within five days
from the date of filing, a copy of which shall be furnished to the employee. Within five days of the
filing of the appeal, the Department Head shall deliver to the City Manager copies of the evaluation,
the statement of the aggrieved employee, and the response of the supervisor and/or Department
Head.
(2)
The City Manager shall meet informally with the aggrieved employee
and, at the option of the City Manager, the supervisor and/or Department Head. The
City Manager shall, within fifteen days of receipt of the appeal, make a decision to
affirm or modify the evaluation.
(3)

The decision of the City Manager is final.
405. EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES

Only the City Manager and Department Heads are authorized to answer on behalf of the City
inquiries about employment references, termination or retirement concerning present or former
employees. However, the Payroll Administrator may give information confirming employment and
giving the dates of such employment.
406. WORK ENVIRONMENT
It is the policy of the City to promote a productive work environment that is a clean, safe, and
hospitable place in which employees may fulfill their responsibilities. Accordingly, City policy will
not tolerate verbal or physical conduct by any employee which harasses, disrupts, or interferes with
another's work performance or which creates an intimidating, offensive, or hostile environment, nor
will the City tolerate any such behavior toward, or from, members of the general public. Employees
are expected to act in a positive manner and contribute to a productive environment.
407. DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE
(a)
It is the policy of the City to maintain a workplace that is freefromthe effects of drug
and alcohol abuse. An employee must notify his/her Department Head of any criminal drug
conviction for a violation occurring in the workplace within five days after such conviction.
(b)
Employees are prohibitedfromthe use, sale, dispensing, distribution, possession, or
manufacture of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs and narcotics on City premises or work sites.
In addition, employees are prohibited from the off-premises use of alcohol and possession, use, or
sale of drugs if such activities are illegal or adversely affect job performance, job safety, or the City's
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reputation in the community.
(c)
Employees working the golf course snack bar are exemptfromthe provisions of this
policy addressing the sale, dispensing, and distribution of alcohol. Employees serving alcohol at the
golf course facilities are, however, subject to ail applicable State law and licensing requirements.
(d)
Employees and supervisors should report immediately to their Department Head any
action by an employee who demonstrates an unusual behavior pattern. Employees reasonably
believed to be under the influence of drugs, narcotics, or alcohol will be required to leave the work
site and may be required to immediately submit to drug and/or alcohol testing. The City Manager
shall be informed of each incident of this nature.
(e)
Employees who need to use prescribed drugs while at work, and where such use may
impair their ability to perform their job safely and effectively, must report this to their Department
Head and. if requested, provide acceptable medical documentation. Depending on the
circumstances, employees may be reassigned, forbidden to perform certain tasks, or even not allowed
to work if they are judged not to be able to perform their jobs safely and properly while taking their
prescribed medication. In the latter situation, the employee will be placed on sick leave.
(f)
The City shall require employees to submit to drug testing in the following
circumstances: pre-employment hiring, following on-the-job injuries or accidents, reasonable
suspicion situations, pre-announced periodic testing, rehabilitation programs, and random testing in
safety-sensitive positions.
(1)
The collection of drug testing samples shall be performed under reasonable and
sanitary conditions.
(2)
Samples shall be collected and tested in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the
individual being tested and in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or interference
with the collection or testing of reliable samples.
(3)
Samples shall be labeled and sealed so as to reasonably preclude the probability of
erroneous identification of test results.
(4)
People being tested will have the opportunity to provide notification
to the City of any information they consider relevant to the test, including
identification of currently or recently used prescription or non-prescription drugs, or
other relevant medical information.
(5)
Sample collection, storage and transportation to the place of testing shall be
performed in a manner that reasonably precludes the probability of sample misidentification,
contamination or adulteration.
(6)
procedures.

Sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted analytical methods and
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(7)
Before the result of any test may be used in a disciplinary action, any positive initial
screening shall be verified by gas chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or other
comparably reliable analytical methods. The person tested shall be notified as soon as possible by
telephone and in writing of the initial test result, if it is positive, and where a new test may be
obtained if the employee wants a second test taken. In addition to the initial test results, these new
test results shall be considered in any disciplinary action.
(8)
Testing shall occur during or immediately after work, and shall be considered as work
time for purposes of compensation.
(9)

All costs of testing shall be paid by the City.

(10) If an applicant for employment refuses a test, that applicant will not be hired. If an
employee refuses to provide a sample for tesiing, that refusal may be considered in a disciplinary
action.
(11) If verified positive test results indicate a violation of City policy, the City may as a
part of any disciplinary action require the employee to enroll in a rehabilitation, treatment,
counseling or education program approved by I he City, suspend the employee without pay, terminate
the employee from employment, refuse to hire a prospective employee, or impose other disciplinary
measures.
(12) This drug testing policy shall be administered in a discrete manner in order to protect
employee embarrassment or public notice as much as reasonably possible.
(g) In the event of violation of the drug-free workplace policy, the City may require
employees to submit to reasonable monitoring by periodic blood or other testing for compliance.
(h) It is the policy of the City that no employee shall be in the workplace with any measurable
amount of alcohol or any illegal drug in the employee's blood. If such an event occurs, the
employee shall be sent home without pay for the remainder of that day's scheduled work, and shall
be subject to further disciplinary action.
408. WORK PLACE VIOLENCE
It is the policy of the City to provide, as far as possible based on the nature of our duties, a
work environment that is free of threatening conditions, violent behavior and criminal activity. Oral
or written threats, physical assault, harassment, intentional damage, and every other act or threat of
violence by City employees is strictly prohibited.
It is the responsibility of ail employees to notify the Department Head when there has been
an act or threat of violence, whether actual, express, or implied. In a situation of immediate danger,
the Police Department should be immediately notified.
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All incidents of work place violence are to be reported immediately to the Department Head,
who shall in turn notify the City Attorney. It is the responsibility of all employees to fully cooperate
with any City investigation into an incident of work place violence.
Work place violence is grounds for termination of employment from the City.

409, SEXUAL AND OTHER HARASSMENT
(a)
It is the policy of the City that the working environment of City employees be free
from harassment and discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or
disability.
(b)
Any behavior or conduct of a harassing or discriminating nature, including that of a
sexual nature, which is pervasive, unwelcome, demeaning, ridiculing, derisive or coercive, or results
in a hostile, abusive or intimidating work environment, constitutes harassment and shall not be
tolerated by the City.
(c)
It is the responsibility of each supervisor and Department Head to maintain a work
place free of any form of sexual or other harassment and discrimination. No supervisor is to threaten
or insinuate, either explicitly or implicitly, that an employee's refusal to submit to sexual advances
will adversely affect the employee's employment, evaluation, wages, advancement, assigned duties,
shifts, or any other condition of employment or career development. In addition, no supervisor is
to favor in any way any applicant or employee because that person has performed or shown a
willingness to perform sexual favors for the supervisor.
(d)
All sexually harassing conduct in the work place, whether committed by supervisors
or non-supervisory personnel, is prohibited. Such prohibited conduct includes, but is not limited to:
(1)

Sexual flirtations, touching, advances, or propositions;

(2)

Verbal abuse of a sexual nature;

(3)

Graphic or suggestive comments about an individualfs dress or body;

(4)

Sexually degrading words to describe an individual; and

(5)
The display in the work place of sexually suggestive objects or pictures, including
nude photographs.
(e)
Any employee who believes that the actions or words of a supervisor or fellow
employee constitute unwelcome harassment or discrimination has a responsibility to report or
complain as soon as possible to his/her Department Head. If the complaint involves a Department
Head it should be directed to the City Manager. All complaints of this nature should be in writing
and should document specific information regarding the harassment. This information should
include dates, times, places, witnesses, and specific types of harassment Malicious or frivolous
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complaints of harassment or discrimination may result in disciplinary action against the accuser.
(f)
Upon receiving a complaint of harassment, Department Heads (or the City Manager,
when appropriate) shall investigate the complaint in a prompt, impartial, and confidential manner.
The City Manager and the City Attorney shall be immediately notified upon the receipt of a
complaint. The Department Head shall notify the employee in writing of his findings and
conclusions as quickly as possible.
(g)
If an employee is not satisfied with either the handling of a complaint or the action
taken by the Department Head, he or she shall bring the complaint to the attention of the City
Manager. The City Manager shall then investigate the charges and respond in writing to the
employee as quickly as possible.
(h)
Any employee, supervisor, or Department Head who is found to have engaged in
harassment of another employee will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and
including termination. The severity of the discipline depends- upon the circumstances of the
harassment and the prior disciplinary histoiy of the person involved.
(i)
No City official or employee shall harass, coerce, intimidate, threaten or discipline
employees who exercise their rights under this procedure in good faith. Any such form of reprisal
will render the official or employee subject to disciplinary action.
410. W O R K A R E A S
(a)
It is the policy of the City that work areas must be kept safe, clean, and orderly at ail
times, and in such a manner as to promote an efficient work environment. All employees are
responsible for carrying out this policy in their own work areas. They should refrain from bringing
unnecessary or inappropriate personal property to work.
(b)
Employees should conduct their work sites in such a manner as to avoid adversely
impacting the work areas of others.
(c)
Employees should not bring personal items to work which they wish to remain
private. There is no expectation of privacy for employees as to their desks, filing cabinets,
equipment, lockers, containers, or City-issued vehicles under their control, while on City premises
or while conducting City business. Prescription drugs properly prescribed on City premises shall not
be subject to search and seizure without reasonable suspicion.
411. E M P L O Y E E S A F E T Y
(a)
It is City policy to comply, and for all employees to comply, with all applicable Federal, State
and local health and safety regulations and to provide a work environment as free as possible from
hazards.
(b)

It is the responsibility of all employees to ensure that working conditions are safe,
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healthful, and in compliance with all Federal and State safety regulations. Although the following
list is not all-inclusive, employees are therefore responsible to:
(1)
Familiarize themselves with all safety and health procedures relevant to the operations
in their departments and work with their supervisors to identify,
reduce, and eliminate unsafe
working conditions or potential hazards;
(2)
Make regular safety inspections of all work areas, machinery, equipment, lift trucks,
grounds, and any other potentially hazardous areas;
(3)
Report all accidents and injuries to the City Risk Manager and the Benefits
Administrator as quickly as possible, although never later than the end of the work day;
(4)
Never operate any machine or equipment unless specifically authorized to do so by
the supervisor;
(5)
Never operate defective equipment, or use broken hand tools, and to report defective
or hazardous equipment to the supervisor;
(6)
Obtain full instructions from the supervisor before operating a machine with which
the employee is not familiar:
(7)
Never start on any hazardous job without being completely familiar with the safety
techniques which apply to it, and to check with the supervisor if in doubt;
(8)
Make sure all safety attachments are in place and properly adjusted before operating
any machine;
(9)

Never operate any machine or equipment at unsafe speeds:
(10)

Shut off equipment which is not in use;

(11) Wear all protective garments and equipment necessary to be safe on the j ob, including
proper shoes;
(12)

Not wear loose, flowing clothing or long hair while operating moving machinery;

(13) Never repair or adjust any machine or equipment unless specifically authorized to do
so by the supervisor;
(14)

Never oil, clean, repair, or adjust any machine while it is in motion;

(15) Never repair or adjust any electrically-driven machine without opening and properly
tagging the main switch;
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(16)

Put tools and equipment away when not in use;

(17)

Not lift items alone which are too bulky or too heavy to be handled by one person;

(18)
spillage;

Keep all aisles, stairways, and exits clear of skids, boxes, air hoses, equipment
and
n r
'

(19) Not place equipment and materials so as to block emergency exit routes, fire boxes
sprinkler shutoffs, machine or electrical control panels, or fire extinguishers;
(20)

Stack all materials neatly and make sure piles are stable;

(21)

Not participate in horseplay, or tease or otherwise distract fellow workers; and

(22)

Never take chances, and be governed by common sense.

(c)
Employees are encouraged to submit suggestions to their supervisor concerning safetv
J
and health matters.

412. COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSES
(a)
Employees operating a commercial vehicle (as defined by applicable State and/or
Federal law) must comply with all of the requirements of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act
and all other applicable Federal and State laws and regulations.
(b)

Employees operating a commercial vehicle shall:

(1)
Notify their immediate supervisor within 30 days of a conviction for any traffic
violation except parking citations.
(2)
Notify the Drivers License Division within 30 days if they are convicted in any other
state of any traffic violation except parking citations.
(3)
Notify their immediate supervisor if their license is suspended, revoked, or canceled,
or if they are disqualified from driving.
(4)

Not drive without a valid Commercial Driver's License (CDL).

(5)
Not be allowed to drive if they possess more than one license or if their CDL is
suspended or revoked.
(c)
When it is necessary for employees to renew their CDL, the City shall pay the cost
for the written test, the cost for the skills test, and the total amount for all endorsements required by
the City. Employees shall pay any remaining costs of the written and skills tests and for all
endorsements not required by the City. The City shall also pay the entire cost for required physical
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examinations. The employee shall undergo the exam at a medical facility determined by the City.
In specifying a medical facility, insurance coverage may be taken into consideration.
(d)
New employees may be expected to have a valid CDL upon hire and bear the entire
cost of obtaining a CDL including medical examination costs. At its discretion, the City may bear
the cost of licensing for new employees and employees promoted or placed in positions requiring
a CDL.
413. MEAL BREAKS
It is the policy of the City to provide meal breaks during the course of each workday. The
duration and timing of these breaks will depend upon the needs of the respective departments.
Supervisors are responsible for scheduling meal breaks. Meal breaks are not considered as time
worked, except in the case of certain police officer and firefighter positions. In the event that an
employee for any reason works through the meal break, the employee will still have to work eight
full hours to receive credit for eight hours of work.
414. REST BREAKS
(a)
During normal working hours, employees may take two (2) rest breaks, not to exceed
fifteen (15) minutes each. These break times will be scheduled by department supervisors and will
be compensated as working time.
(b)
Employees who choose to remain at work during rest breaks are not entitled to leave
before the normal quitting time and will not receive extra pay for the time worked. Employees may
not accumulate rest breaks for the purpose of off-setting other time off work, such as doctor
appointments, extended meal breaks, or other personal errands requiring more than the allowed 15
minute break, unless pre-approved by the Department Head and, even then, only on an occasional
basis.
(c)
During rest breaks, employees shall not interfere with fellow employees who are
continuing to work.
415. TELEPHONE USE
Office telephone facilities are provided for City business purposes. However, personal
telephone call by employees are permitted if they are very short and infrequent. Employees may not
make personal long-distance calls at City expense. Work telephone numbers are not to be given as
business numbers for the conducting of a commercial business by any employee.
If the telephone is equipped with voice mail, answering machine or other recording device,
there is no employee right of privacy with respect to messages left on these devices.
416. COMPUTER USE
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(a)

Office computers are provided for City business purposes.

(b)
Employees have no right to privacy with respect to City computers, software, disks,
electronic mail or other computer-related items. They are subject to supervision, review, reading,
inventorying, copying, and other examination by supervisors at any time and without notice.
Employees must inform their supervisors of any and all passwords on their computers unless excused
in writing by their Department Head.
(c)
Employees shall use computer software only in accordance with the license agreement
applicable to that software.
(d) Employees must honor any City policy or agreement relevant to the use of computers
they may enter into.
417. P E R S O N A L MAIL
Employees shall not use their work address for personal mail unless approved by the
Department Head under individual circumstances. City stationery and letterhead shall not be used
for personal or unauthorized correspondence, and the City postage meter shall not be used for the
mailing of personal correspondence.
Facsimile transmission machines are for City business purposes. Any private use by
employees must be approved by the department head and payment made to the City for the cost of
the use. There is no employee right of privacy with respect to facsimile transmissions.
418. T O B A C C O
It is the policy of the City to follow the Utah Indoor Clean Air Act. Smoking and chewing
tobacco are prohibited within any City buildings, and within any City vehicles that are or may be
used for the transportation of any member of the public or of any other City employee.
419. A U T O M O B I L E USAGE
(a)
Employees may not drive City vehicles on City business without the prior approval
of their supervisor. These employees must be licensed to drive by the State and be able to meet their
department's driver approval standards at all times.
(b)
It is the responsibility of all employees to immediately notify their supervisor of any
suspension, revocation, or other limitation upon their driver license and of any offense which may
affect their ability or right to drive. Failure to do so will subject the employee to disciplinary action.
(c)
Employees who need transportation in the course of their work may be assigned a
City vehicle for their use. Such vehicles are to be used for City business and only a deminimus
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personal use. Ail other employees needing transportation for City business may use vehicles
assigned to their department provided the employee meets his department's driver standards and has
received his supervisor's prior approval. If no City vehicles are available, employees may use their
own cars for business purposes, but only with the prior approval of their supervisor.
(d)
Employees who drive a vehicle on City business must exercise due caution and drive
safely. Accordingly, employees must wear seat belts at ail times while driving on City business. As
pan of their precautionary efforts, employees should ensure that the vehicle they are driving meets
any City or legal standards for insurance, driveability, safety, and mechanical fitness.
(e)
Employees are not permitted, under any circumstances, to operate a City vehicle, or
a personal vehicle for City business, when any physical or mental impairment causes the employee
to drive unsafely. This prohibition includes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which the
employee is temporarily unable to operate a vehicle safely or legally because of illness, medication,
or intoxication.
(f)
Employees are solely responsible for any willful or negligent driving violations or
fines as a result of their driving.
(g)
In order to assess the safe driving behavior of City employees who are required to
drive in the performance of their job duties, it is the policy of the City to conduct periodic reviews
of the State Division of Motor Vehicle's records. Any pattern of traffic violations suggesting that
an employee is an unsafe driver may be cause for disciplinary action against the employee, and/or
for revoking the authority of the employee to drive a City vehicle or his own vehicle upon City
business.
(h)
Employees who use their personal car for approved City business will receive a
mileage allowance based on the Internal Revenue Service mileage allowance for business use. This
allowance is to compensate for the cost of gasoline, oil, depreciation, and insurance.
(i)
An employee must report any accident involving a City vehicle or a private vehicle
being used to conduct City business to both their Department Head and the City Attorney. There is
no exception to this policy, regardless of the extent of damage or lack of injuries. Such reports must
be made as soon as possible and no later than 24 hours after the accident. Employees are expected
to cooperate fully with authorities in the event of an accident.
(j) Employees may have family members or other non-employees in City vehicles only
when authorized by their supervisor.

420- TRAVEL AiND TRAINING
It is sometimes necessary for employees to travel or receive training in order to fulfill their
work responsibilities. All business travel and training must be approved in advance by the
Department Head. Whenever travel or training is required, the City will pay for reasonable expenses
incurred. The City will pay costs actually incurred up to the standard room rate associated with the
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conference hotels.
Employees should provide their Department Head with a copy of their itinerary before
leaving on business travel. Employee expenses will be advanced, paid, or reimbursed when properly
documented. Meal expenses will be paid by an allowance of $25.00 per day, and no receipts are
required. However, should the economy in the area of the meeting dictate more than the $25.00, the
full cost of meals may be allowed providing receipts submitted verify the greater amount.
Automobile usage will be compensated as provided in these policies.

421. POLITICAL ACTIVITY
(a)
City employees shall not engage in the distribution or publication of materials
approving or favoring a candidate for nomination or election to public office during working or
office hours or in any City building, except as a public information service approved by the City
Manager. An employee may not engage in political activity during working or office hours.
Employees shall not use their office or position with the City for the political enhancement of any
individual or group.
(b)
(1) An employee may not be a candidate for public office in the general election of
Bountiful City unless the employee takes a leave of absence or submits a resignation
from City employment beginning the day after the primary election*
(2) An employee elected to either the Bountiful City Council or to any full time
elective position shall resign his or her employment with the City prior to beginning
the duties of such office.
(3) An employee elected to a part-time elective position (other than Bountiful City
Council) shall be granted a leave of absence without pay while being monetarily
compensated for service in such position. Employees shall not receive annual leave
while serving in political office.
(c)
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to interfere with the right of an employee
to become a member of a political club or organization, to attend political meetings, to express an
opinion on all political subjects and to enjoy freedom from interference in voting or to contribute
freely to political causes.

422. C03NTIDENTIALITY
Information obtained by employees in the course of their job duties is confidential. An
employee shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any information acquired in the course of
employment other than public information as defined by applicable law.

423. INCENTIVE AWARDS
Employees who make proposals that result in substantial savings of tax dollars may be
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rewarded if the savings achieved are documented and result directlyfromthe proposal. An employee
who makes a cost-saving proposal should first present and explain the proposal to the Department
Head.
An employee who develops a successful cost-saving proposal may be granted a bonus
payment equal to five percent of the saving achieved, up to a maximum of $500. If two or more
employees collaborate in developing a successful proposal each shall share equally in the award.
Ail employees below the level of Department Head are eligible for incentive awards. A
recommendation for an award must be submitted in writing by the Department Head. All incentive
awards must be approved by the City Council.
424. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
It is the policy of the City to provide a method for employees to register complaints or
problems concerning working conditions or other matters related to employment
If an employee has a complaint, problem or misunderstanding concerning employment, it
should be taken up with the employee's immediate supervisor as soon as possible. The supervisor
will discuss the problem fully with the employee at a mutually convenient time. The supervisor may
investigate the matter as appropriate, and reply to the employee within five working days.
In the event the employee feels the problem remains unresolved, or if the problem concerns
the supervisor, the employee should take it up with the Department Head. The Department Head
may investigate the matter as appropriate, and reply to the employee within ten working days.
In the event the employee feels the problem remains unresolved, or if the problem concerns
the Department Head, the employee should take it up with the City Manager. The City Manager may
investigate the matter as appropriate, and reply to the employee within fifteen working days.

425. CITY RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
Full time regular employees may utilize the City's recreational facilities as established by the
City Council. These recreational privileges shall not extend to family members or non-regular
employees.

Section 500
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
501.

ATTENDANCE
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(a)
Regular and consistent attendance at scheduled work is an essential job function of every City
position.
(b)
Employees shall be in attendance at their work in accordance with these policies and
with department regulations. Any employee unable to report for duty on a work day shall notify the
supervisor of that fact no later than the beginning of work, unless department rules require an earlier
reporting time. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action.
(c)
The normal work day for full-time employees shall be eight (8) hours and the normal
work week shall be forty (40) hours, except in certain circumstances when it is considered to be in
the best interest of the public and of the City to work shifts of extended hours. Work shall generally
begin at 8:00 a.m. and end at 5:00 p.m., with one hour for lunch. Employees should report to work
fully dressed/uniformed, equipped and ready to begin work at the scheduled time.
(d)
Failure to report to work, or to notify of non-attendance as provided in (b)> for three
consecutive days shall constitute resignation from employment with the City.
502. PUNCTUALITY
It is the policy of the City to require good attendance and punctuality on the part of its
employees. The City recognizes, however, that circumstances are occasionally such that an
employee cannot arrive to work on time, if at all In the event this occurs, an employee should
contact his supervisor as quickly as possible but no later than fifteen minutes of the beginning of the
scheduled start of work. This will enable the supervisor to make any necessary adjustments in the
allocation of the department's work.
503. EMPLOYEE APPEARANCE
Because employees represent the City before its citizens, it is City policy that employee's
dress and grooming should be appropriate to the work situation and to community standards.
Radical departures from conventional dress or personal grooming standards shall not be permitted,
regardless of the nature of the job performed. Employees are expected to dress in a manner that is
normally acceptable in their line of work. All employees shall wear shirts, pants or dresses and
shoes, except for swimming pool personnel as permitted by the Department Head. The wearing of
earrings by males is prohibited. Office employees, particularly those who interact or meet with the
public, are expected to wear businesslike attire. The wearing of suggestive attire or of shorts,
T-shirts, tank tops, and similar items of casual attire is not permitted. Casual attire may be permitted
in those departments where such apparel is deemed appropriate by the Department Head. Employees
who are uncertain about the appropriateness of their work attire or hair styles, should address their
questions to their supervisors or Department Head.
504. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(a)

City policy prohibits employees from engaging in any activity, practice, or act which
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conflicts with, or appears to conflict with, the interests of the City, its citizens, or the employee's job
duties. Employees are expected to represent the City in a positive and ethical manner, and to avoid
conflicts of interest and the appearance of a conflict of interest
(b)
Employees are not to engage in, directly or indirectly, any conduct which is disloyal,
disruptive, competitive or damaging to the City or its interests.
(c)
Employees are not to give, offer, or promise, directly or indirectly, anything of value
to any individual, firm, or organization with whom the City conducts business either currently or
potentially.

505. OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT
(a)
It is the policy of Bountiful City that employees who wish to have employment
outside of their duties with the City may do so subject to the condition that the outside employment
must not interfere with efficient performance of the employee's position with the City, conflict with
the interests of the City, or be of a type that would reasonably give rise to criticism or suspicion of
conflicting interests or duties. Furthermore, the outside employment must not be directly connected
with nor contingent upon a representation that the employee is in any way representing the City of
Bountiful, either directly or indirectly.
(b)
Prior to accepting or engaging in outside employment, all regular employees shall
submit a request in writing to their Department Head. Approval by the Department Head shall be
given if the outside work meets the requirements of this policy.
(c)
Promoting or conducting outside employment on City premises with other City
employees, suppliers to the City, or any member of the public is prohibited. "Promoting outside
employment" means selling items, giving sales pitches, asking people to buy or attend sales pitches
outside of work, discussions of any kind relating to the outside employment, and any other act which
is calculated in any way to promote the outside employment of the employee. Such actions may
make other employees, suppliers or citizens uncomfortable with being at work or with coming to the
City. It has an appearance of impropriety and in some cases of unfair advantage, even when all
connection to the City is expressly disclaimed. This prohibition holds true so long as the employee
is on City premises, whether "on" or "off the City clock. It applies to all City employees, whether
full-time or part-time.
(d)
Should outside employment become an impairment to an employee's work
performance with the City, the employee may be requested to discontinue one of the jobs.
(e)
Department heads may determine whether any particular situation violates these
policies on a case by case basis.

507. OFF-DUTY CONDUCT
In general, the City applies its policies and procedures and its disciplinary actions to on-duty
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conduct. However, off-duty conduct may be an appropriate concern of the City under certain
circumstances.
It is impossible to list all potential off-duty conduct that may affect the City's interest, but the
following conduct is prohibited off-duty:
(a)
Conduct, while wearing or using City-identified uniforms, equipment or other items,
which is either illegal or which tends to bring discredit to the City of Bountiful;
(b)
Conduct, while identifying one's self as a City employee, which is either illegal or
which tends to bring discredit to the City of Bountiful;
(c)

Harassment of any kind of other employees or of the public;

(d)

Conduct that causes the employee to not be able to perform his/her job duties;

(e)

Disclosure of confidential information;

(f)

Unauthorized use of City property.

508. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
(a)
Employment is subject to meeting the performance and conduct requirements of the
employee's job to the satisfaction of the City. Employees who fail to satisfy these requirements may
be subject to disciplinary action from warnings to termination. The standards set out below are as
complete as can reasonably be made, but are not necessarily all-inclusive.
(b)
Employees are expected at all times to conduct themselves in a positive manner so
as to promote the best interests of the City and the public. Such conduct includes:
(1)

Applying one's self fully to assigned duties during work hours.

(2)
Reporting to work punctually as scheduled and being at the proper work station, ready
for work, at the assigned starting time.
(3)

Giving proper advance notice whenever unable to work or report on time.

(4)
When away from work for any reason, keeping supervisors informed as to the reason,
expected duration, and date and/or time of anticipated return, and, when required, furnishing medical
or other documentation justifying the absence.
(5)

Prudent and frugal use of City funds, equipment, vehicles, and supplies.

(6)

Complying with ail safety and security regulations.
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(7)

Wearing clothing appropriate for the work being performed.

(8)

Maintaining work place and work area cleanliness and orderliness.

(9)

Treating the public, visitors and co-workers in a courteous manner.

(10) Refraining from conduct that is offensive or undesirable, or which is contrary to the
City's best interests.
(11)

Performing assigned tasks efficiently and in accord with established quality standards.

(12) Reporting to management suspicious, unethical or illegal conduct by the public,
visitors or co-workers.

(13)

Co-operating with City investigations.

(c)
The following conduct is prohibited and may subject the individual involved to
disciplinary action, up to and including termination:
(1)

Violation of City or departmental policies and procedures.
. >

(2)
The use of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs during working hours, reporting to
work under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or the use, sale, dispensing or possessing of alcohol
and/or illegal drugs or narcotics on City premises.
(3)

The use of profanity or abusive language.

(4)

Chronic tardiness.

(5)
The possession of firearms or other weapons on City property, unless connected with
the City work assignment of the employee.
(6)
Insubordination, or the refusal by an employee to follow managements instructions
concerning a job-related matter, or the refusal to perform a function of the job when capable of doing
so.
(7)

Violence,fighting,or assault on a co-worker or member of the public.

(8)
Unauthorized possession or use, theft, destruction, defacement or misuse of City
property, or that of another employee or member of the public.
(9)
Recording conversations with other employees or supervisors withoutthe knowledge
of all the parties involved.
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(13)

(16)
policies.
(17)
(18)
uniforms.
(19)

(10)

Gambling on City property.

(11)

Falsifying or altering any City record or report.

(12)

Threatening or intimidating co-workers or members of the public.

Absence from work or work station without authorization or excuse.
(14)

Smoking where prohibited.

(15)

Sleeping while on duty.

Failure to wear assigned safety equipment or failure to abide by safety rules and

Conduct endangering the safety of employees or the public.
Improper attire or inappropriate personal appearance, or failure to wear required

Inducing or attempting to induce any City employee to violate any City policy.
(20)

Engaging in any form of sexual or other harassment.

(21) Incompetency, inefficiency, poor workmanship, misfeasance, malfeasance or
nonfeasance in the performance of job duties, or neglect of job duties.
(22)

Dishonesty in word or conduct.

(23)

Failure to be courteous or cooperative with the public, co-workers or supervisors.

(24)

Falsification of City records or reports.

(25)
the position.

Failure to conduct one's self in a professional and competent manner appropriate to

(26)

Unauthorized use, or abuse, of City vehicles or equipment

(27)

Unauthorized performance of City services.

(28) Failure to maintain eligibility for a driving license, when driving is necessary to the
discharge of City duties.
(29) Failure to maintain skills and professional licensing, when such skills or licensing are
necessary to the discharge of City duties.
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(30)
(31)

Violation of the criminal laws, whether Federal, State or local.

Unlawful discrimination of any nature.

(32) Failure to keep confidential City matters which are of a delicate, sensitive, or private
nature by law, custom, policy or instruction of supervisors.
(33)

Abuse of sick leave, bereavement leave, jury duty or other paid or unpaid leave.

(34)

Unauthorized possession of a firearm or other deadly weapon.

(35) Conduct off the job which discredits the City or affects the employee's ability to
perform his/her duties effectively.
(36)

Failure to cooperate with an investigation.

(37)

Unjustified interference with the work of other City employees.

(38) Failure to comply with any policy or agreement with the City concerning the use of
equipment, including personal cellular telephone agreements.

Section 600
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
601. GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
It is the policy of the City that all employees are expected to comply with the City's standards
of conduct and performance, including all matters set forth in this manual, City policies as may be
elsewhere expressed, and any applicable departmental policies and procedures, and that any
non-compliance with these standards may be remedied by appropriate disciplinary action.

602. DISCIPLINARY MEASURES
(a)
Under normal circumstances, the City endorses a policy of progressive discipline in
which it attempts to provide employees with notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve.
However, where the non-compliance is grave, more serious discipline may be applied, up to and
including termination, even when there is no prior disciplinary history.
(b)
An employee whose conduct violates these policies and procedures may be subject
to one or more of the following actions, depending upon the judgment of the supervisor and/or
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Department Head of the severity of the offense and the employee's previous performance record:
(1)
An oral warning, to be documented and placed in the employee's personnel file. The
fact that the oral warning is documented does not convert it into a written reprimand. An immediate
supervisor, a Department Head or the City Manager, may issue an oral warning
(2)
A written reprimand, with a copy to be placed in the employee's personnel file. A
Department Head or the City Manager may issue a written reprimand.
(3)
Suspension or other time off without pay, or forfeiture of accrued leave, of up to 30
days. A Department Head or the City Manager may issue an order of suspension. An employee on
suspension shall be responsible for the continuation of his/her employment benefits.
(4)
Demotion by either moving an employee to a position of lesser
responsibility and
compensation, or by keeping the employee in the current position but at a lesser compensation.
A Department Head or the City Manager may demote an employee.
(5)
Termination from employment with the City. A Department Head or the City
Manager may terminate an employee.
(c)
Pending a full investigation into the alleged violations, the City may, when it deems
it to be in the best interests of the City and/or the employee, (1) suspend an employee and relieve
him/her of all City duties, with pay, or (2) temporarily reassign an employee to another position or
work location at the same rate of pay. In such a case, if the employee is found to be innocent, he/she
shall be reinstated without loss of seniority or credits of any kind.
(d)
An employee will be informed of the alleged violation and given an opportunity to
present his/her explanation of the event or conduct in question prior to any disciplinary action being
taken. Discipline shall not be imposed until there is a determination that facts sufficient for
discipline exist.
(e)
Except for oral warnings, an employee will be given a notice, in writing, of the
disciplinary action and of his/her right to appeal the same.

603. DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIONS
(a)
Before any disciplinary action (except for oral reprimands) may be taken against an
employee, the following steps shall be taken:
(1)

The employee should be given written notice of the claims against him/her.

(2)
Prior to a determination of what discipline is to be imposed, if any, the employee shall
be given the opportunity to respond verbally and/or in writing to the claims alleged. A record of the
response shall be made. No disciplinary decision shall be made at the time of the employee's
explanation.
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(3)
If, after due deliberation, it is determined by the Department Head that discipline is
appropriate, the employee shall be advised in writing of the findings and discipline.

604. DISCIPLINARY APPEALS
Once the Department Head has determined upon a disciplinary action, it shall be
implemented immediately. A regular employee has the right of appeal, but except in the case of
suspensions, during the pendency of the appeal the action taken shall be in effect. In the event that
the action taken is overturned on appeal, the employee shall be reinstated without loss of pay,
seniority or credits of any kind. Suspensions shall not be implemented until after all appeals have
been concluded.
There shall be a right of appeal of discipline in regular employees, as follows:
(a)

Oral Warnings.

(I)
If given by a supervisor, an oral warning may be appealed to the Department Head.
If an oral warning is given by the Department Head or the City Manager, there is no right of appeal.
(2)
The appeal shall be made by the aggrieved employee byfilingwith the
Department Head, within ten days of the issuance of the oral warning, a written
statement of the appeal. The statement shall set forth the nature of the oral warning,
the circumstances in which it arose, and the reasons why the employee is appealing
its issuance.
(3)
The Department Head shall immediately notify the supervisor of the appeal. Unless
extenuating circumstances are present, the supervisor shall file a written response to the appeal
within ten daysfromthe date of thefilingof the appeal. The employee shall be furnished a copy of
the response.
(4)
Within ten days, or as soon thereafter as is practical,, of the filing of the appeal, the
Department Head shall review the appeal and the response. The employee shall be given the
opportunity in person to informally review the appeal with the Department Head. At the request of
the Department Head, the supervisor shall also be present. Withinfifteendays, or as soon thereafter
as is practical, of the filing of the appeal, the Department Head shall determine whether to uphold,
modify or disallow the oral warning. The Department Head may not increase the severity of the
discipline, such as by increasing an oral warning to a written reprimand. The employee shall be
notified in writing of the decision of the Department Head.
(b) Written Reprimands and Suspensions.
(1)
A written reprimand or a suspension may be appealed from the Department Head to
the City Manager, but there is no further right of appeal. A written reprimand or suspension from
the City Manager may not be appealed.
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(2)
The appeal shall be made by the aggrieved employee by filing with the Department
Head, within ten days of the issuance of the written reprimand, a written statement of the appeal.
The statement shall set forth the nature of the written reprimand or suspension, the circumstances
in which it arose, and the reasons why the employee is appealing its issuance.
(3)
The Department Head shall immediately notify the City Manager of the appeal.
Unless extenuating circumstances are present, the Department Head shall file a written response to
the appeal within ten days from the date of the filing of the appeal. The employee shall be furnished
a copy of the response.
(4)
Within ten days of the filing of the appeal, or as soon thereafter as is practical, the
City Manager shall review the appeal and the response. The employee shall be given the
opportunity in person to informally review the appeal with the City Manager. At the request of the
City Manager, the supervisor and/or Department Head shall also be present. Within fifteen days of
the filing of the appeal, or as soon thereafter as is practical, the City Manager shall determine
whether to uphold, modify or disallow the written reprimand or suspension. The City Manager may
not increase the severity of the discipline, such as by increasing a written reprimand to a suspension,
or a suspension to a demotion. The employee shall be notified in writing of the decision of the City
Manager.
(c) Demotions and Terminations.
(1)
Demotions and terminations may be appealed to the City Manager, the Board of
Appeals, and the City Council.
(2)
City Manager. The appeal to the City Manager shall be made in the same manner as
described in the preceding section for Written Reprimands and Suspensions.
(3)

Board of Appeals.

(i)
If the aggrieved employee wishes to appeal further, the appeal shall be made by the
aggrieved employee byfilingwith the City Recorder, within ten days of the issuance of the decision
of the City Manager, a written request that the appeal be heard by the Board of Appeals.
(ii)
The City Recorder shall immediately notify the Board of Appeals of the appeal. The
Board shall be furnished with the written appeal documents of the aggrieved employee, the response
of the supervisor and/or Department Head, and the written decision of the City Manager.
(iii) The Board of Appeals shall take and receive evidence and fully hear and determine
the appeal. The aggrieved employee shall be entitled to appear in person, be represented by counsel,
have a public hearing, confront the witnesses whose testimony is to be considered, examine the
evidence to be considered by the Board, and call such witnesses and submit such relevant evidence
as he/she deems desirable. The City Attorney or his/her designee shall present the case in support
of the disciplinary action, may present such witnesses and relevant evidence as he/she deems
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desirable, and may cross-examine the witnesses presented by the appellant.
(iv) Within fifteen days of the filing of the appeal, the Board of Appeals
shall hold a hearing and determine whether to uphold, modify or disallow the
disciplinary decision of the City Manager. The Board of Appeals, after concluding
the hearing, may deliberate in private. Its decision shall be made by secret ballot.
A majority vote of the Board is required to sustain the disciplinary action. The Board
may not increase the severity of the discipline originally imposed by the Department
Head, such as by increasing a demotion to a termination. However, if the City
Manager lessened the original discipline, the Board may in its discretion increase the
severity of discipline back to that originally imposed by the Department Head. The
employee shall be notified in writing of the decision of the Board of Appeals.
(4)

The City Council.

(i)
If the aggrieved employee wishes to appeal further, the appeal shall be made by the
aggrieved employee by filing with the City Recorder, within fourteen days of the issuance of the
decision of the Board of Appeals, a written request that the appeal be heard by the City Council.
(ii)
The City Recorder shall at the next City Council meeting notify the Council of the
appeal. The City Council shall be furnished with the written appeal documents of the aggrieved
employee, the response of the supervisor and/or Department Head, the transcript or tape recording
of the proceedings before the Board of Appeals, and the written decisions of the City Manager and
the Board of Appeals.
(iii) The City Council shall hear the appeal in the nature of an appellate court. No new
evidence may be submitted, and no witnesses may be called. The aggrieved employee shall be
entitled to appear in person, be represented by counsel, have a public hearing, submit written
argument based on the existing record at least five days prior to the hearing, and make oral
arguments before the Council either himself/herself or through counsel at the hearing, or both. The
City Attorney or his/her designee shall present the case in support of the disciplinary action, may
submit written argument based on the existing record at least two days prior to the hearing, and may
make oral arguments before the Council at the hearing.
(iv)
Withinfifteendays of the notification of the appeal by the City Recorder, or as soon
thereafter as is practical, the City Council shall hold a hearing and determine whether to uphold,
modify or disallow the disciplinary decision of the Board of Appeals. The City Council, after
concluding the hearing, may deliberate in executive session. Its decision shall be made in open
session. A majority vote of the Council is required to sustain the disciplinary action. The Council
may not increase the severity of the discipline originally imposed by the Department Head, as by
increasing a demotion to a termination. However, if the City Manager or Board of Appeals lessened
the original discipline, the Council may in its discretion increase the severity of discipline back to
that originally imposed by the Department Head. The employee shall be notified in writing of the
decision of the City Council.
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(v)

The decision of the City Council is final.

Section 700
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
701. T E R M I N A T I O N O F E M P L O Y M E N T
(a)
Department Heads are authorized to terminate at their discretion the employment of
any employee filling a non-regular employment position.
(b)
Non-regular employees are free to resign from employment at any time. The City
requests, however, that such employees provide their supervisor or Department Head with as much
prior notice as possible. This will enable the City to find an adequate replacement in a timely
manner.
702. R E D U C T I O N IN F O R C E
Reductions in force may be required by changes in funding by the City Council, change of
work load, or lack of work. Cost saving mechanisms, hiringfreezesor temporary furloughs shall
be considered prior to implementing permanent reductions. Reductions in force shall be made by
each Department Head after conferring with the City Manager. Each Department Head shall be
responsible for determining which positions and employees should be retained in order to best serve
the interests of the City; provided, however, that where performance and ability are judged to be
equal employees shall be retained on the basis of seniority. Regular employees will be retained
before probationary employees.
703. R E - E M P L O Y M E N T
The following policy shall apply to re-employment of former City employees:
(a)
Military re-employment. Former employees returningfrommandatory (as opposed
to voluntary) military service, will be re-hired in their former, or comparable, positions, even though
this may result in the lay-off of more recently hired employees. Such employee shall be reinstated
with his/her accrued sick leave and credited with his/her former full-time period with the City for
purposes of determining vacation leave and other benefits.
(b)
Voluntary termination. Any employee hired to a Council-authorized and budgeted
position who voluntarily terminates employment with theCity must compete with other individuals
interested in filling vacancies within the City. In the event that such an employee is re-hired, he/she
shall receive no consideration for past time with the City.
(c)

Involuntary termination due to reduction in force. Employees who have been
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involuntarily terminated due to lay-off or reduction in force shall be eligible for reinstatement for up
to twelve months after their termination date, provided that they left City employment in good
standing with satisfactory performance evaluations. In the event that such an employee is re-hired,
his/her accrued sick leave shall be credited and his/her time with the City shall be credited for
purposes of determining vacation leave or other benefits.
(d)
Employees who have been terminated from employment due to a disciplinary
firing shall not be re-hired to any position with the City.
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CODE OF ETHICS
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CODE OP ETHICS
FOR
BOUNTIFUL CITY LIGHT & POWER EMPLOYEES
1.
Demonstrate the highest standards of personal integrity,
truthfulness,honesty and fortitude in all our public activities in
order to inspire public confidence and trust in public
institutions.
Perceptions of others are critical to the reputation of an
individual or a public agency. Nothing is more important to public
administrators than the public's opinion about their honesty,
truthfulness, and personal integrity. It overshadows competence
as the premier value sought by citizens in public officials and
employees.
Any individual or collective compromise with respect to these
character traits can damage the ability of an agency to perform
its tasks or accomplish its mission. The reputation of the
administrator may be tarnished. Effectiveness may be destroyed.
A career or careers may be destroyed. The best insurance against
loss of public confidence is adherence to the highest standards of
honesty, truthfulness and fortitude.
Public administrators are obliged to develop civic virtues because
of the public responsibilities they have sought and obtained.
Respect for the truth, for fairly dealing with others, for
sensitivity to rights and responsibilities of citizens, and for the
public good must be generated, carefully nurtured and matured.
If you are responsible for the performance of others, share with
them the reasons for the importance of integrity. Hold them to
high ethical standards and teach them the moral as well as the
financial responsibility for any public funds under their care.
If you are responsible only for your own performance, do not
compromise your honesty and integrity for advancement, honors or
personal gain. Be discreet, respectful of proper authority and your
appointed or elected superiors. Be sensitive to the expectations
and the values of the public you serve.
Whether you are an official or an employee, your example will give
testimony of your regard for the rights of others.
2.
Serve in such a way that we do not realize undue personal
gain from the performance of our official duties.
The only gains you should seek from public employment are salaries,
respect and recognition for your work. No elected or appointed
public servant should borrow or accept gifts from staff or any
corporation which buys services from you, or sells to, or is
regulated by, his or her governmental agency.
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Public property, funds and power should never be directed toward
personal or political gain. Make it clear by your own actions that
you will not tolerate any use of public funds to benefit yourself,
your family or your friends.
3.
Avoid any interest or activity which is in conflict with the
conduct of our official duties.
Public employees should not under take any task which is in
conflict or could be viewed as in conflict with his or her job
responsibilities.
This general statement addresses a fundamental principle that
public employees are trustees for all the people. This means that
the people have a right to expect public employees to act as
surrogates for the entire populace with fairness toward all the
people and not a few or a limited group.
Actions or inactions which conflict with, injure or destroy this
foundation of trust between the people and their surrogates must
be avoided.
Public employees should remember that dtespite whatever preventive
steps they might take, situations which hold the possibility for
conflict of interest will always emerge.
Consequently, the
awareness of the potentiality of conflict of interest is important.
4.
Support, implement, and promote merit employment and
programs of affirmative action to assure equal employment
opportunity by our recruitment, selection and advancement of
qualified persons from all elements of society.
Oppose any discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, political affiliation, physical handicaps, age or
marital status in all aspects of personnel policy. Likewise, a
person!s lifestyle should not be the occasion for discrimination
if it bears no reasonable relation to his or her ability to perform
required tasks.
Any kind of sexual, racial or religious harassment should not be
allowed. Appropriate channels should be provided for harassed
persons to state their problems to objective officials. In the
event of a proven offense, appropriate action should be taken
immediately.
5.
Eliminate all forms of illegal discrimination, fraud and
mismanagement of public funds, amd support colleagues if they are
in difficulty because of responsible efforts to correct such
discrimination, fraud, mismanagement or abuse.
If you are a supervisor, you should not only be alert that no
illegal action issues from or is sponsored by your immediate
office. Public employees who have good reason to suspect illegal
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action in any public agency should seek assistance in how to
channel information regarding the matter to appropriate authorities.
Managers have an ethical obligation to seek adequate equipment,
software, procedures and controls to reduce the agencyfs vulnerability to misconduct.
Supervisors should inform their staff that constructive criticism
may be brought to them without reprisal, or may be carried to an
ombudsman or other designated official. As a last resort, public
employees have a right to make public their criticism, but it is
the personal and professional responsibility of the critic to
advance only well-founded criticism.
6.
Serve the public with respect, concern, courtesy and
responsiveness, recognizing that service to the public is beyond
service to oneself.
Make sure your answers to questions on public policy are complete,
understandable and true. Try to develop a goal of courteous
conduct with citizens.
Each citizen1 s questions should be answered as thoughtfully and as
fully as possible. If you do not know the answer to a question,
an effort should be made to get an answer or to help the citizen
make direct contact with the appropriate office.
Respect the right of the public (through the media) to know what
is going on in your agency even though you know queries may be
raised for partisan or other non-public purposes.
7.
Strive for personal professional excellence and encourage
the professional development of our associates and those who are
seeking to enter the field of public administration.
Staff members should be reminded of the importance of doing a good
job and their responsibility to improve the public service.
Administrators should lend their support to well-planned internship
programs.
8.
Approach organization and operational duties with a positive
attitude; constructively support open communication, creativity,
dedication and compassion.
Americans expect government to be compassionate, well-organized
and operating within the law. Public employees should understand
the purpose of their agency and the role they play in achieving
that purpose. Dedication and creativity of staff members will flow
from a sense of purpose.
Administrators should strive to create a work environment that
supports positive and constructive attitudes among workers at all

B001331

levels. This environment should permit employees to comment on work
activities without fear of reprisal.
9.
Respect and protect the privileged information to which we
have access in the course of official duties.
Much information in public offices is privileged for reasons of
national security, or because of laws or ordinances. If you talk
with colleagues about privileged matters, be sure they need the
information and you enjoin them to secrecy. If the work is
important enough to be classified, learn and follow the rules set
by the security agency.
10. Exercise whatever discretionary authority we have under law
to promote public interest.
Tell yourself and your staff quite frequently that every decision
creates a precedent, so the first decisions on a point should be
ethically sound/ this is the best protection for staff as well as
for the public.
11. Accept as a personal duty responsibility to keep-up-to-date
on emerging issues and to administer public business with
professional competence, fairness, impartiality, efficiency and
effectiveness.
All employees goals should be to keep informed about the present
and future issues and problems of their professional field and
organization in order to take advantage of opportunities and avoid
problems.
12. Respect, support, study and, when necessary, work to improve
federal and state constitutions and laws that define relationships
among public agencies, employees, clients and all citizens.
Familiarize yourself with principles of American constitutional
government. As a citizen, work for legislation that is in the
public interest.
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